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Abstract 
 
This dissertation examines how the structure of a given situation and the way in which 
decision makers mentally process information interact to determine decisions.  
Decision are affected by the surrounding ecology, information stored in memory, and 
the hypotheses chosen to access information in the surrounding ecology and memory.  
This theory draws on and extends existing cognitive simulation models to show that 
judgments, along with observed heuristics, biases and affect can be predicted 
probabilistically using models of memory processes.  A Mathematica multiple-trace 
simulation of cognitive processes of memory and hypothesis generation which learns 
and reacts to various opponents: Memory-Based Ecological Model of Relationship 
Interactions between States, version 2 (MEMORIS-2) is tested in both game-theoretic 
settings and in a simplified multi-player system of international interaction.   Results 
show that the memory-trace simulation results in equal or better outcomes in both 
static (PD) and shifting-payoff (alternating PD and Stag Hunt) game theoretic 
situations than previously-developed strategies and heuristics (e.g., Tit-For-Tat, Grim 
Trigger, etc.).  Analysis of the multi-player international interaction game shows that 
results show specific reactions to increasing threats and break into definite clusters of 
results which could be used to probabilistically predict state behavior. The simulation 
is then used to model two cases: Europe during the period 1885-1915 and the Cold 
War between 1945 and 1980, with results being compared to the historical record.  
Results show that the MEMORIS-2 simulation has the ability to probabilistically 
predict emergent properties in the international system, such as the likelihood of 
conflict, the players in that conflict, and the structure of alliances.   
  1   
Preface 
 
This paper is a step on a long professional and intellectual journey.  When I 
graduated from the Air Force Academy as a newly-minted lieutenant more than 30 
years ago, I did not think very much about the process of decision making – it was just 
something you did.  The decisions of the members of my military chain of command 
were simply givens.  My job was, at the time, to try to be the best B-52 pilot that I 
could be, and to be prepared to carry out the decisions of the “National Command 
Authority”.  In practice, I spent one week out of every three sitting with a plane loaded 
with nuclear weapons, ready to carry out the decisions of my nation.   
The long hours spent in anticipation of an order that (thankfully) never came 
gave me ample time to consider the logic of those decisions.  In particular, the 
question of just how the President could come to the time and place where he would 
actually consider unleashing the many thousands of nuclear weapons in the US 
arsenal, and what thought process would go into that decision preoccupied me.  How 
would he go about deciding an action which would likely result in unimaginable death 
and destruction, if not the very end of life on earth? 
About that time, one of my commanders told me about a program where I 
could learn to do something called “studies, analysis and gaming”.   I wasn’t too sure 
exactly what that was, but it sounded interesting.  So I called the director of the 
program and told him I was interested, and was (quite frankly) surprised to be notified 
a few weeks later that I had been admitted to the “Strategic and Tactical Sciences” 
program at the Air Force Institute of Technology, where I was to get a MS degree in 
something called “operations research”.  There, I learned for the first time the theology 
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of nuclear deterrence, learned to model the effects of nuclear weapons, and how to 
optimally assign those weapons to targets.   
Armed with this knowledge, I soon found myself immersed in the process of 
planning and developing nuclear deterrent forces, first at Strategic Air Command and 
later in the Pentagon.  I had developed the ability and computer modeling skills to 
calculate the results of nuclear warfare to three significant decimal places, and my 
skills were in great demand to support the Pentagon’s decision-making process.   
Yet there was something about the whole process that I found puzzling.  My 
superiors would often put great credence in small changes in the model results, which 
even though they could spit out numbers of arbitrary precision, were in reality 
approximations stacked upon other approximations.  At other times, results of the 
analysis process simply would be ignored.  As I returned to the Pentagon on two 
subsequent assignments, that puzzle grew:  analysis was sometimes used and 
sometimes ignored, consensus products of the staffing process were sometimes used 
and sometimes ignored, different sets of factors seemed to shape the decision each 
time – why?  This puzzle has seized me for my entire professional career.  
At the end of my military career, that puzzle still bothered me, and I decided to 
pursue my PhD in an effort to answer it.  When I started, I did not even know how to 
frame the question, nor how I might pursue even a small part of the answer.  Now, I 
can at least think of a way to frame the question and to approach a piece of the answer.   
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
Decision-making reflects who we are.  It is a human enterprise, accomplished 
by people who share all the glory and folly of humanity.  When H.G. Wells introduced 
the alien invaders in The War of the Worlds, his first sentence described them as 
“intellects vast and cool and unsympathetic” – aptly capturing their non-humanity.    
When studying the process of decision, it is important to keep in mind not only 
who we are as humans, but also who we are not.  This dissertation proceeds from that 
point of view – that the act of making a decision reflects how people actually process 
the information surrounding that decision.  Expecting decision-making to proceed 
from other modes is to force decision-makers into a semantic cage – and to be 
surprised when the occupants persist on breaking the bars.    
The Research Question 
The core research question of this dissertation is simply stated: how does the 
way our minds process data affect a decision maker’s actions?  If the interaction of the 
situation and mental processing is the key to understanding decision-making behavior, 
can that interaction be calculated and predicted probabilistically?  This leads to the 
answers to critical questions in international relations and foreign policy decision-
making theory and practice:  When do states make war and engage in conflict?  When 
do states make peace and engage in cooperation?  Despite the spilling of much ink 
over the question, the issue of state interaction and decision-making is one which 
continues to be debated in both scholarly and practitioner literature.  Clearly, the 
ability to predict, even probabilistically, the outbreak of war and the probability of 
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peace will provide an important tool for policy makers, and an important starting point 
for future research.   
Specifically, I am attempting to answer the following questions:   
 Given starting conditions, can the probability of conflict be predicted? 
 If there is conflict, who are the likely participants, and on which side? 
 What is the structure of alliances?   
 What are the probabilities for each variation of the above results?   
As I will discuss in more detail below, decisions, whether for war or peace; are 
shaped by the interaction between the decision space, the decision-makers’ situation 
recognition, and the proposed alternatives.  The intersection between these three items 
is the way in which decision-makers mentally process that information and use their 
memory to aid that process.   Thus, memory lies at the heart of decision making.  
Accordingly, I have created a simulation model which explicitly models how 
individuals process information in a given situation.   This memory-based simulation 
will be validated in game theoretic situations, in a simplified multi-player national 
security game, and then will be tested against two historical cases.  These historical 
cases will show that the process of memory can help predict the likelihood of conflict 
in a given situation, the probably states involved, and the probable structure of 
alliances.   
 
The Argument in a Nutshell 
The act of decision is shaped in two ways.  The first shaping factor is the 
surrounding ecology.  This includes the challenge at hand along with all of the known 
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and unknown factors which affect the decision.  One way to think of this is that the 
decision itself is shaped by the decision space in which the decision-maker must 
operate.   
The second way that decisions are shaped is through the way in which 
information about that decision is processed by the decision-maker.  This includes 
generating hypotheses about the situation, or situation recognition, the process of 
generating possible courses of action, or proposed alternatives, and the selection of 
the decision itself.   
This process of understanding the decision space, situation recognition, 
generating proposed alternatives, and the ultimate decision all are controlled by the 
way in which individuals mentally process information.  This requires information to 
be brought into working memory, matched up to existing semantic concepts in 
memory, and then checked against long-term memory.  This process continues until a 
satisfactory conclusion is reached, or the time for decision runs out.  The exact way in 
which this iterative process occurs within the brain is not fully understood, but it is 
well enough understood to mathematically model the general process.   
This is different than the process assumed by rational choice theory.  Of 
course, rational choice theorists readily admit this is so, but argue that it is sufficient to 
be able to assume instrumental rationality – that people act as if they were operating 
according to the tenets of rational choice.  In this setting, it is enough to understand or 
be able to infer the preference structure of the decision-maker, and to be able to fit the 
decision within a particular game.  Decision-makers may have incomplete 
information, may be affected by misperception, may be affected by biases which cause 
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them to frame or see the issue in different ways, but all of these can be dealt with 
either mathematically or by inferring that certain biases or misperceptions are 
operative based on post hoc analysis.   
The rational choice mode of analysis requires that the game being played, 
preferences, perceptions and biases be either inferred or assumed.  However, such 
inferences and assumptions can lead to misleading conclusions.  This dissertation will 
demonstrate that specific assumptions about game structure and player preferences are 
not required.  Instead of being fixed, preferences are malleable, and the way in which 
preferences shift based on the situation can be modeled and, hence, predicted.  
Intuitively, this can be seen in daily life.  There may be a general preference, along the 
lines of “do as well as I can”, but that general preference is operationalized via 
specific, situationally-based preferences.  The constantly changing situation of life 
causes people to apply these differing sets of preferences based on their recognition of 
the current situation, and even to change their preferences within a given set.  A 
person’s strong preference for maintain a desirable weight can (too easily!) be 
changed when faced with warm chocolate brownies.  The memory of the pleasure 
associated with previous brownies causes the recognition of the situation to change 
(I’ll just eat one tonight) and the preference structure accordingly shifts in favor of 
eating.      
This implies that situation and preference structure are linked, and that the 
linkage is defined by the way information is mentally processed.  Thus, given a 
situation and a good idea of how the information is processed, the operative 
preferences can be determined and probable decisions can be predicted.  In the context 
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of international relations, a leader may want to “do well”, but the way in which the 
leader goes about “doing well” changes from time to time and place to place.  At one 
point the preference may be for economic strength, at another, military strength.  In a 
dangerous situation where options are vanishing, a normally peaceful leader may well 
decide that this is Sun Tzu’s proverbial “death ground”, and that war is the only 
answer.
1
  Decision-makers face choices all the time, and sometimes choices take the 
form of choosing between desirable outcomes.  More often, a choice takes the form of 
choosing the “least bad” course of action, and as such, choice will be critically 
dependent on which set of preferences is dictated by the situation.   
The MEMORIS-2 simulation created for this dissertation shows how decision 
space, situation recognition, alternatives, and choice all are linked by the way people 
mentally process information.  Taking this knowledge, it then is possible to 
probabilistically predict outcomes given a set of situational information.   
Methodology and Procedures  
As mentioned briefly above, a three-step process is used to gain traction on this 
problem.  First, the concept of memory-based simulation will be introduced via 
analysis of simple two-sided (dyadic) interactions.  This simulation will then be used, 
following Axelrod (1984), in a tournament vs. a number of other competing strategies 
in an iterated Prisoners Dilemma (PD) game.  The tournament will then be repeated in 
a game which iterates dynamically between a PD and a Stag Hunt game.  This will 
demonstrate that the memory-based simulation is indeed a viable approach in both 
static and dynamic game theoretic situations.   
                                                 
1
 “In death ground, fight.”  The Art of War, Chapter 11: “The Nine Situations” 
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In the second step, the simulation will be expanded in two ways.  First, the 
simulation will be expanded to accommodate three players.  Next, the simulation will 
be used to model the interaction of these players in a simplified game of international 
relations.  This three-player baseline will be used to assess model behavior. 
Specifically, it will demonstrate how the simulation results vary, and how that 
variation is related to the level of the threat.  The outputs of the three-player game then 
will be analyzed using clustering techniques to show that the results fall into three 
distinct categories, which I characterize as “war”, “armed standoff”, and “peaceful 
alliance”.  Further, the distribution of these clusters changes as the general threat level 
increases, shifting from mostly peaceful alliance at low threat levels, to armed standoff 
at moderate threat levels, to war at high threat levels.  These results show that the 
memory-based simulation is a viable way to analyze the impact of varying situations 
in a small-scale setting.     
  With those results in hand, a more complex simulation will be developed and 
used to analyze two different cases, the situation in Europe which led to World War I, 
and the Cold War, which did not lead to war between the superpowers.  In each case, a 
simulation baseline will be developed to show how each case reacts to increasing 
levels of threat and to validate the cluster analysis performed previously.  Then, the 
simulations will be run using the actual historical data, which are drawn from the 
Correlates of War (COW) datasets.   
The simulation uses a simplified model of state interactions, which requires 
reducing the variables in the COW National Military Capabilities (NMC), Militarized 
Interstate Dispute (MID), Alliances, and Total Trade (TT) datasets to four dimensions: 
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combat power, economic power, war, and alliance.  Factor analysis is used to reduce 
the MID and TT data into two factors (combat and economic power), and then war 
and alliance data are recoded to fit the requirements of the simulation.   
 Using 20 years of data as initialization, the simulations will be run year by 
year to show the change in probability of war and alliance, along with the patterns of 
conflict and alliance for each year of the appropriate case.  For the World War I case, 
the simulations start every year from 1905-1913, with each simulation being 
initialized with 20 previous years of actual data.  For the Cold War, the simulations 
will run yearly from 1968-1987, with 20 years of actual data for initialization.  Thus, 
the 1968 Cold War case is initialized with data from 1948-1967 before running.  To 
capture the early years of the Cold War, an alternative initialization strategy will be 
used.  In both cases, the patterns of conflict and alliance match up well with the 
historical record.   
Results and Analysis  
Along with the data above, the simulation model will provide the following 
data for each country and each year of the simulation: 
 Whether the state is in conflict, and with which other states; 
 Whether the state is in alliance, and with which other states; and 
 Descriptive data about state characteristics and capabilities. 
When considering the expected results from the models, it is important to 
understand how validity of results will be judged.  Obviously, there is an existing 
historical record of conflict and alliance leading to WWI and during the Cold War, 
which can be compared directly to the record of conflict and alliance year by year.  
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Thus, the primary measure of merit will be outcome validity, meaning how well the 
predicted outcomes match the historical record.  Another way to consider validity is 
via process validity, which asks whether the model faithfully replicated the process of 
decision, as suggested by Taber & Timpone (1996).  As this particular simulation is 
focused on the individual level of analysis, it does not model (for example) group-
level behavior within a particular state’s decision-making process.   Modeling of these 
group-level processes will be a potential avenue for future research. 
This effort will attempt to answer the research questions by a three-step 
process: first building a simulation which is based on the way people mentally process 
information.  The second step will be testing the simulation, first in a game-theoretic 
setting and then in a simplified model of international interaction.   The final step will 
be using the simulation to examine two cases, the run-up to World War I and the Cold 
War.  The results show that the memory-based simulation accurately reflects the 
historical record, including accurate predictions of which states are most likely to 
engage in conflict, which states are most likely to ally with each other, and the 
increase or decrease in the probability of major war.   
While few would deny that decision making in real life is an imperfect exercise 
of imperfect judgment by imperfect people, rational choice remains the dominant 
paradigm for analyzing decision making.    One reason for this is the existence of 
powerful quantitative tools of analysis and modeling which can be applied within the 
rational choice paradigm.  On the other hand, tools for performing quantitative 
analysis of the cognitive process of situational recognition and the application of 
appropriate rules have been lacking.  As will be discussed below, the emergence of 
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new tools for modeling the process of situational recognition and rule choice allows 
the ability to rectify this situation.  This dissertation will use ideas from cognitive 
psychology as the micro-foundation for analysis of decision making as an alternative 
to using tools which draw their foundation from economic analysis.    Clearly, there is 
plenty of room for improvement.   
This allows for a new line of analytical approach, instead of using tools such as 
expected utility modeling based on the rational choice paradigm, it is possible to 
model situational recognition and the process of decision from the cognitive angle.  
The application of this framework returns us to the aim of this dissertation: to show 
how the relationship between the situation and how that information is processed 
affects the actual decision, and how well can modeling this interaction can 
probabilistically predict the decisions.      
Roads Not Taken 
To be sure, and as pointed out above, memory-based models are not the only 
way to model this set of interaction.  Clearly, expected utility modeling has been used 
to good effect, as has agent-based simulation (Bueno de Mesquita 2002; Cederman 
2002).  Given more time and computing power, I could explore a variety of spatial 
models, which take their cues from Downs’ (1957) insights on how politicians adjust 
their positions to appeal to voters and apply them to issues of international relations 
and security (Hug 1999; Morgan 1984, 1990 and Morrow 1985, see also Liu 2006).  I 
could also follow Richardson’s (1960) equation based approach to arms races and 
model state interactions via dynamic modeling (Li & Thompson 1978; Muncaster & 
Zinnes 1983; Zinnes & Muncaster 1984).  There also are models which attempt to 
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simulate the process of decision, such as Taber’s Poli (Policy Arguer) model (1992) 
and Guetzkow’s Inter-Nation Simulation (1962) along with its follow-ons, such as 
Hermann & Hermann (1968).  In the cognitive world, I could also explore the 
potentially promising terrain suggested by Decision Field Theory, which models shifts 
in preference structure based on how the brain processes information (Busemeyer & 
Townsend 1993; Roe, Busemeyer & Townsend 2001).  Direct comparisons between 
these approaches and memory-based models are beyond the scope of this dissertation, 
and will have to wait for follow-on efforts.   
The Cases: Europe 1880-1915 and The Cold War 
The situation in Europe between 1880 and 1915, and the Cold War provides a 
useful pair of cases to assess the memory-based simulation approach.  These cases, 
while certainly not an exhaustive set in the sense of a comparative case study, provide 
exemplars that I use to show that the simulation produces usable results.  In these 
situations, there are a relatively small set of states with a wide variety of conflict and 
alliance interactions, high levels of tension and militarized disputes, and significant 
arms races.  One led to a conflict involving most, but not all, of the participants, while 
the other did not lead to full-scale war.  While it is well beyond the scope of this 
dissertation to analyze or predict the causes of World War I and the Cold War (see, 
among many others: Farrar, 1972; Gaddis 2005; Gordon, 1974; Holsti, 1965; Hermann 
and Hermann, 1968; Kaiser, 1983; Kennedy, 1984; Levy, 1990; Maier, 1988; Holsti, 
North and Brodie, 1968; Keegan, 2000; Kissinger 1994; Massie, 1991, Trachtenberg, 
1990; Tuchman, 1962; Van Evera, 1984; Williamson, 1988), the results of the 
simulation provides validation for both the model and its underlying logic.   
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These cases are a useful test for the cognitive modeling approach, as many of 
the actions taken by actors during the run-up to the war turned on their recognition of 
the situation and the application of rules for action, such as decisions to pursue arms 
races, militarized disputes, mobilization and, either war or peace.  Further, the decision 
makers in the situation reverse their actions during key points, an eventuality which 
has tended to be problematic for rational choice approaches but can be modeled using 
this cognitive simulation approach.   
Two cases, even though they contain thousands of individual data points, are 
not of themselves decisive.  They do, however, provide the opportunity to demonstrate 
the viability of a cognitively-based modeling approach.  This would be a significant 
benefit on several levels.  First, by providing a quantitative alternative to rational 
choice modeling, it adds a significant new tool for future analysis.  Second, it would 
provide a potential foundation for analysis of political decisions that is not based on 
the economic ideas which underlie much of existing IR and decision theory.  Finally, 
it provides a potential foundation for the analysis of constructivist modes of 
interaction.   
Outline of the Dissertation 
The remainder of the dissertation will proceed as follows:  Chapter Two will 
review the relevant literature in the general areas of International Relations theory, 
foreign policy-making, and judgment and decision making.  Chapter Three will be 
devoted to developing the memory-based simulation model, and will use a building-
block approach where successive iterations of the model will add more and more 
complexity, until a memory-based, multiple-player model is ready for use.  The 
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simulation first will be validated in a game-theoretic setting, and then in a simplified 
multi-player game.  This will create the simulation and the baseline data from which 
the remainder of the dissertation will flow.    
Chapters Four and Five will be devoted to the analysis of the two cases: 
Chapter Four will cover the run-up to World War I and Chapter Five will cover the 
Cold War.  Chapter Six will provide the summary, conclusions, and directions for 
future work.  
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Chapter Two: Review of the Literature 
 
War, Peace, and Decision 
The questions of why nations choose war or peace, alliance or isolation, draw 
on distinct, although converging, streams of literature: international relations, foreign 
policy and judgment and decision-making theory.  Even though these sets of literature 
often address different questions, the focus for this effort will be the nexus of foreign-
policy decision-making in the conduct of international relations, and as such it is 
useful to situate this effort within these sets of literature.   
International Relations 
Approaches to this question can be defined on several levels.  Following 
Waltz‟ images, the question of assessment and decision can be approached on three 
levels: individual, state, and system (1959).  Others have effectively added a fourth 
level, that of interaction or relationships between various actors or between the actors 
and the system (see, Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1988, 1992; Vasquez, 1998, 
among others).  As such, in this literature, the reasons that states choose war and 
alliance can be found in either the structure of the system, the characteristics of a state, 
or the qualities of the individual.   
Systemic, Intermestic, and State-Level Models 
Realism and Its Variants 
Systemic models of international relations include realism (Carr, 1946; 
Morgenthau, 1948 [1993]), along with its various offshoots of neorealism, such as 
defensive realism (Waltz, 1979), and offensive realism (Mearsheimer, 2001).  
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Considered broadly, realism and its variants see states as unitary, rational actors within 
an anarchic environment.  In general, realist approaches see power, security and 
threats are the most important issues, and states must either engage in “self-help” or 
attempt to band with others in various “balance of power” formulations.  The key here 
is the rational (or realistic) pursuit of national interest.  The concepts of realism have 
been subsequently expanded to incorporate a wide variety of approaches, including the 
incorporation of national intentions and identity (see, among others; Walt, 1987; 
Schweller, 1994; Glaser, 1994; Oye, 1986; Ruggie, 1983; and Vasquez, 1998 for a 
summary).   
War and Alliance in Realist Theory 
In the various realist formulations, the choices for war and alliance are 
determined by the need to pursue national interests, however defined.  At least as far 
back as Thucydides, the realist view of war and alliance comes down to fear and 
power.  In the Melian Dialogue, the Athenians demand that the Melians join their 
alliance, arguing that the failure of Melos to ally with Athens would hurt the 
Athenians by making other states believe that Athens was weak.  Out of fear, the 
Athenians offered a stark choice: alliance or destruction (Thucydides, 1951).  Further, 
because realism assumes an anarchical system, then nothing can stop states from using 
force as the ultima ratio to solve their differences (Waltz 1959).   Thus, states might 
turn to force to settle disputes, out of misunderstandings of relative power, as a 
preemptive step, or due to private information leading to perceived advantage (Fearon 
1995).  Application of game theory in realist theory often leads to explain the 
interaction between nations as a form of a Prisoners Dilemma (see Chapter 3 for a 
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complete explanation) where, while it may be possible to gain by cooperation, the 
lowest risk choice can lead to conflict.   
To some theorists, the power transition is a particularly dangerous time.  At 
this point, the state with the most power is being overtaken by other states, and war 
may break out as the aspiring hegemon challenges the incumbent (Oganski, 1958; 
Modelski and Thompson, 1989).  As above, this can easily be seen in the traditional 
sense of the interplay between power and fear.    
This combination of fear and power also leads to a security dilemma.  By 
building up military force for its own security, State A also becomes more threatening 
to its neighbors, who in turn build up their forces, which then decreases the security of 
State A.  Thus, the desire to increase security can, paradoxically, lead to decreased 
security.  The opposite choice, decreasing forces, also leads to decreased security.  
How then to proceed?  One way taken by realist theorists has been to redefine the aims 
of states within the systemic landscape.  Mearsheimer‟s original concept was based on 
the idea that the pursuit of absolute power – the more the better – was the most 
important aim.  That idea has been successively refined to the idea of the pursuit of 
relative power, and particularly a balance of power by Waltz (1979), then to a balance 
of threat (Walt, 1987) and more recently, a balance of interest (Schweller, 1994).   
This leads to the other way that various shades of realist theorists believe that 
states should manage security threats – through alliances.  Alliances are (potentially) a 
way to circumvent the security dilemma.  States can engage in balancing alliances, 
where weaker states ally against the stronger, or can take a bandwagoning approach, 
where they join with the strongest state to reap some anticipated reward or to avoid the 
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prospect of being conquered themselves.  Finally, as seen in the Melian Dialogue 
above, strong states can engage in chain-ganging to harness weaker states to the cause.  
In all of these cases, alliances are necessarily shifting and temporary structures, lasting 
only as long as all the parties believe it to be in their interest.  Further, it is by no 
means certain who should align with whom.  As Snyder puts it, 
… in a multipolar system there is a general incentive to ally with some 
other state or states … that is generated by the structure of the system.  
Who aligns with whom results from a bargaining process that is 
theoretically indeterminate.  The indeterminacy is reduced, though not 
eliminated, by the prior interests, conflicts, and affinities between states 
and their internal political make-up.   (1994, 465-6, italics in original) 
The Role of Reputation 
One way that states try to resolve this indeterminacy is via reputation.  
Following Schelling, one thing that helps resolve games is the presence of a focal 
point that narrows the range of choice (1960).  In this sense, reputation can provide a 
focal point.  If a state has a reputation for backing up its threats, or for punishing those 
who cross it, then other states should make their choices accordingly.  Thus, reputation 
becomes a potential manifestation of state power.  As such, the logic goes that states 
should act to protect their reputation, even if it means short-term losses.  As Mercer 
notes, US Presidents have often invoked the specter of the impact of a lost reputation 
for resolve when taking military action (1996).   
However, Mercer takes a different view of reputation, arguing from social 
psychology that desirable behavior by members of the in-group and undesirable 
behavior by the out-group is subject to situational attribution – the friend stood firm 
and the enemy defected because they had no choice.   Opposing actions are thus 
subject to dispositional attribution – an enemy stands firm because it has resolve, or a 
  19  
friend defects due to lack of resolve.   Thus, Mercer concludes that others will judge 
reputation by our status as a member of the in- or out-group, so there is nothing to be 
gained by taking actions to protect reputation (1996).  Effectively, this is a least-regret 
type of viewpoint.  Enemies are expected to resist to the utmost and friends are 
expected to cut and run, and it is a pleasant surprise when the opposite occurs.   
Mercer focused on a single type of reputation – that of resolve.  Miller argues 
that other types of reputation, and in particular the reputation for reliability, are also 
important in alliance choices.  In this analysis, a reputation for reliability or lack 
thereof can affect the likelihood of a state being chosen for alliance, and can affect the 
structure of the agreement for alliance.  Thus, Miller‟s view offers a more nuanced 
view of reputation, which allows for both situational and gradational aspects of 
reputation (2003).   
Adding State-Level Variables: Liberalism 
One thing that the literature above shows is the increasing role in the 
characteristic of the state, whether it is interests or reputation, in the literature.  This 
leads naturally to more liberal IR concepts of the interaction between states.    
With the perceived decline of American hegemony and accompanying 
questions about the utility of power, scholars in the late 1970s began to look at state 
interaction in a different frame of reference.  If realism and its offshoots focus on why 
states often engage in violent conflict, liberalism focuses on why states cooperate.  
Rather than focusing on war and conflict, liberalism focuses on the interactive, 
interdependent, and generally peaceful nature of international relations (Keohane, 
1982, 1984; Moravcsik, 1997; Ferguson & Mansbach, 2003). 
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An important difference between liberalism and realism is that liberalism looks 
inside realism‟s “black box” decision model to find the internal processes that often 
drive a state‟s decision-making process.  Beyond power and security, the economy has 
an important role to play in liberal theories of IR.  Liberal theory adds international 
and supra-national institutions to the mix as well, trading the parsimony of realism for 
a more complete look at the interplay of various factors.  As Baldwin (1993) points 
out, the anarchical state of the world is an opportunity for cooperation as well as 
competition.  Liberalism thus leavens the essential anarchy of the world system with 
an interdependent web of formal and informal relationships, and thus, structure is an 
important consideration in liberal and neo-liberal theory (see, among others; Baldwin, 
1993; Barnett and Duvall, 2005; Barnett and Finnemore, 2004, 2005; Keohane, 1982, 
2002; Lipson, 2003; Milner, 1991; Moravcsik, 1997).   
War and Alliance in Liberal Theory 
Instead of seeking systemic reasons for conflict, Liberal IR Theory looks to the 
state.  This can be explicitly seen in Kant‟s Perpetual Peace, where the causes of war 
are laid at the feet of despotism and the hope of peace is found in republican forms of 
government.  To liberal theorists, the interdependence caused by free trade, free 
exchange of ideas, and a worldwide cosmopolitan society of free people is the way in 
which war would be eventually abolished (Kant, 2001 [1795]).    
War then, occurs for two reasons.  The first is the natural tendency of those 
states which have not developed the necessary conditions to join the worldwide 
society of republican nations.  These states will be aggressive and will cause war in 
their natural desire to increase influence and power.  This leads to the second reason 
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for war, which is the way in which ordinarily peaceful states will band together to 
repel aggression in the name of collective security.   
This results in a situation where non-democracies (or non-republics) fight each 
other, democracies fight non-democracies, but democracies do not fight each other.  
This empirical fact leads to Democratic Peace theory, as well as various formulations 
based on the interplay of domestic politics and regime types.  In these approaches, the 
dynamic of domestic politics and decision-making is the primary determinant of state 
behavior (Lipson, 2003).   
The reader will have probably noted that the above approaches are not purely 
systemic.  Instead, they cross the boundary from the systemic level to incorporate parts 
of state behavior.  This “intermestic” approach is explicitly taken in two-level game 
theory.  In this approach, a country‟s leader essentially sits down to bargain at two 
tables simultaneously.  At the international table, the interlocutors are heads of state, 
while at the domestic table the interlocutors are those important groups who have the 
ability to either ratify or veto the international agreement – or, in some cases to 
remove the executive from office entirely.  The leader is faced with the task of 
balancing those potentially competing agendas.  Arguably, this can lead to conflict by 
limiting the leader‟s freedom of action so much that an otherwise reachable agreement 
is not possible, and war ensues instead.  As Putnam puts it, this can limit the allowable 
“win space” where the parties‟ acceptable positions overlap.  At the same time (and 
familiar to those who have actually engaged in high-level negotiations), a savvy 
executive can use the threat of non-ratification as a tool to extract additional 
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concessions (Putnam, 1988).  Here, the clash of interests is not just between states, but 
also within the states themselves.   
Not surprisingly, the liberal IR explanation of alliances follows the same lines 
as that of war.   If war is a collective problem, then it needs collective action to solve 
it.  Alliances and other agreements are primarily aimed at solving collective problems, 
and as such require states to provide public goods (military force in this case) to 
protect the collective interest, as well as mechanisms to ensure there are not too many 
free-riders of defectors (Olson, 1971).   As such, reputation is also important in this 
circumstance.  That said, the earlier discussion of reputation is also applicable to the 
liberal conception of war and alliance, so I will not repeat it here.   
Marxist and Critical Theoretic Approaches 
Just as Liberalism sees the international structure being driven by the 
interaction between liberal republics and other states, Marxist theory views the 
international structure as a product of historic and material factors – and in particular 
the control of the means of economic production.  To Marx and Lenin, the current 
world system is sharply divided along economically-based class lines.  Capitalism, as 
the current dominating economic system, effectively controls the world system, and 
capitalism also carries within itself the seeds of its eventual destruction (Marx, 1859;   
Lenin, 1939). 
The failure of the “inevitable” proletarian revolution to occur has caused some 
redefinition of the original Marxist-Leninist ideas.  Immanuel Wallerstein tried to 
explain this state of affairs by redefining the world structure from a two-class division 
between the capitalists and the exploited masses to a three-layer division of core states 
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(the exploiters), peripheral states (the exploited) and a buffer of semi-peripheral states 
which both exploit and are in turn exploited.  This structure, Wallerstein argues, 
essentially allows exploitation at arm‟s length, so the contradiction between the 
exploiters and the exploited is not so sharp as to generate open conflict (1974).  This 
basic analysis has also been shared by world systems theory or dependency theory, 
which posits a situation of stratification, where states in the periphery are purposely 
kept dependent on the core.  This allows a continuation of the current world system 
(see, for example: Buzan, 1994; Frank, 1966; Galtung, 1971).   
War and Alliance in Marxist Approaches 
As the world structure for Marxists is determined by economic factors, so is 
the outbreak of war and the conclusion of alliance.  To Lenin, imperialism and 
subsequent imperialist wars of conquest was a necessary stage of capitalism, to be 
followed by an inevitable war between capitalist states once all imperialist conquests 
were completed (1939).  Wallerstein (1974) and Buzan (1994) view the domination of 
the center as nearly unshakeable, and that conflict will either be between states in the 
periphery, or more likely through war and subversion on the part of the core states to 
maintain the current world system status quo.   
Similarly, alliances lie along economic lines, and are generated by economic 
interests (Lenin 1939).  Any alliance between the core and peripheral states would 
naturally be for the purpose of maintaining the current state of affairs, and would 
naturally be broken if economic interests require it.     
The Origin of Interests: Constructivism 
It is fair to say that realism, liberalism, and Marxism tend to view the world 
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through monochromatic lenses – realism via conflict, liberalism via cooperation, and 
Marxists via economics.  However, all of these approaches view the fundamental 
interest of actors within the system as a given.  Thus, states seek power, states seek to 
solve problems, and states are products of economics, respectively.     
This fixed set of interests (however defined) generally should result in a stable 
or slowly evolving system, but changes and upheavals occur, and constructivism is an 
attempt to explain why things change and how and why state interests and the system 
structure come to exist.  Constructivism is not in itself a coherent IR theory, but it is a 
way of looking at how interests and the relations between states are formed.  In the 
constructivist idiom, meaning and structure shift constantly as states and other actors 
create an endlessly changing social reality through their actions and especially through 
their chosen means of communication (Wendt, 1992, 1999; Lebow, 2001; Onuf, 
1989).   
Put simply, the interests and identities of states are not exogenously given.  
Instead, interests and identities are constructed via social interaction.  It is much like 
two strangers meeting for the first time; they have no relationship or reality between 
them until they begin to interact.  Along with the relationship, states also build up, or 
constitute, identities as they interact.  Thus, constructivism is concerned with the 
process of forming identity, interest, and structure (Hasenclever, et al., 1997; Hopf, 
1998; Onuf, 1989; Reus-Smit, 2001; Wendt, 1992, 1999; among others).   
While there are several approaches to constructivism, they all take their cue 
from Hedley Bull‟s (1977) observation that states form a society.  Social relationships 
are built up through social interaction, and the structure of these interactions forms the 
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structure of the international system.  To constructivists, this socially-created structure 
is more important than the material aspects of the world structure in determining state 
behavior (Wendt, 1992, Reus-Smit, 2001).  Once states have socially determined their 
identities, interests, and the associated structure, they may pursue these socially-
constructed interests in much the same fashion as dictated by rational choice, except 
that the value structure is socially determined, rather than a given.   Alternatively, 
actors may play socially-determined roles within the system (Wendt, 1999; Barnett & 
Duvall, 2005; Steger, 2008).   
Since both state identities and the structure of their interaction are constantly 
evolving, the constructivist system can be thought of as the interplay between 
complex, interdependent dynamic systems.  The branch of mathematics known as 
complexity theory tells us that such a system will experience punctuated equilibria; 
that is, periods of relative stability punctuated by large shifts in alignment.  This is also 
sometimes referred to as emergent behavior (Axelrod, 1997, 4).  This is often mirrored 
by the general situation in the world system.  As Steger puts it, the world‟s “social 
space” can be constructed and reconstructed, and “such change can occur with 
lightning speed and tremendous ferocity.” (2008, 7)  However, neither complexity 
theory nor constructivism can tell us when or why a shift will occur or in what 
direction things will change.   
War and Alliance in Constructivism 
Constructivism has little to say directly about the outbreak of war.  Instead, the 
character of conflict depends on the particular set of interests and structure that has 
been developed via the interaction of the various actors.  Following the logic in the 
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previous section, if the actors develop power or security as an interest, then wars and 
alliances will occur in the same way predicted by realism, and so on (Wendt, 1992).   
Alliances and other agreements follow the same pattern, except that the 
socially-determined set of interests can create system-wide learning through such 
devices as epistemic communities, which in turn creates new norms and sets of 
interests.  These can push states toward alliances and other control regimes that would 
not be possible without this sense of collective norms (Hasenclever, et al., 2001) 
Critique of Systemic, Intermestic, and State-Level Approaches 
If asked to answer the question: “which one of the above approaches does a 
good job in predicting the possibility of war or the probability of alliance?” the answer 
would have to be, “none of the above”.  This is because, at the root, all of these 
theories are normative.  They make prescriptions for how states should act rather than 
describe how states do act.  Waltz makes this point with refreshing candor in his 
spirited defense of the viability of structural realism after the Cold War – but also 
makes it clear that states may choose to fight, or not, and may choose to balance, 
bandwagon, or not (2000).   
Similarly, Liberal theory indicates that democratic states should not fight each 
other, but may fight other states in the name of collective action.  There is currently 
strong empirical support for the democratic peace theory, but this begs the question of 
whether this relatively short-lived phenomenon is nothing more than a blip in the data.  
While democracies have not fought democracies, they have caused regime change 
(sometimes back to authoritarian governments) in other democracies, and who is to 
say that this sub rosa conflict will never break out into the open?   Further, like 
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realism, liberalism does not predict when states will fight or ally, only that states 
should or should not do so under certain circumstances.   
Along with the fundamental issues of the Marxist critique of capitalism (such 
as the Marxist view of how value is determined), which I will not expand upon, the 
main weakness of this type of theory is that the predicted conflict along class lines 
simply has not happened.  Theorists such as Wallerstein have had to result to 
Ptolemaic devices such as the invention of the “semi-periphery” in an attempt to get 
around this failure.  Even with this epicyclical addition, this set of theories basically 
predicts a status quo, which does no good when trying to understand sudden and 
emergent behaviors such as war.   
As mentioned earlier, constructivism is not a coherent theory of how states act, 
but instead focuses on how interests and structure are derived in the international 
system.  The bottom line with this set of theories is that they give prescriptions of how 
states should act, and try to explain how states determine their interest, but none of 
them predict (or to be fair, even purport to predict) when and how states will act.    
Individual-Level Models 
If state and system-level theories are not helpful, there may be more traction on 
the problem of prediction in in the individual level of analysis.  Psychological 
approaches realize that an individual decision-maker is often the critical link in 
determining what a state will or will not do.  Decisions are not simple results of some 
arbitrary black box process.  Instead, a decision results from a very human and fallible 
process.  The psychological approach assesses all the factors which bear on the 
decision-making process, including cognitive and personality issues, types of 
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information, and the historical, social and organizational context to attempt to isolate 
those factors which may or may not prove to be decisive in a particular decision (See, 
among others; Dyson and Preston, 2006; Holsti, 1965, 1972; Horowitz, McDermott 
and Stam, 2005; Jervis, 1976, et seq.; Kanwisher, 1989; Keller, 2005; Lasswell, 1930, 
1935, 1950; Vertzberger, 1986, 1990).    
States still exist and operate in an anarchic environment, and leaders still 
attempt to make “correct” decisions.  What is meant by “correct” is sometimes 
questionable, but is usually defined as being somehow “logical” and in accordance 
with “objective reality” (however defined).  This often means that authors use this 
approach to critique leaders for making decisions which are not “logical” or “correct” 
– meaning that the author thinks the question should have been decided differently (for 
example, see Vertzberger‟s (1990) critique of Israeli decision-making)  This approach 
does have the advantage of pointing out that it is often difficult for a decision-maker to 
discern what facts are actually true, meaningful and relevant, and even more difficult 
sometimes for correct data to work its way through all the various filters between the 
sender and the receiver (Vertzberger 1990, among others).   
Psychological approaches can be roughly divided into four categories, 
individual characteristics, perceptual, affective and social.  The individual 
characteristics approach is perhaps the oldest of these, going back at least as far as the 
“great man” theory of history.  Here, a decision-maker‟s performance or actions are a 
result of various characteristics, whether they be personality type or personality 
disorder (Lasswell, 1930 et seq.), decision style (Keller, 2005), cognitive complexity 
(Shapiro and Bonham, 1973; Dyson and Preston, 2006) or physical characteristics 
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such as age as a surrogate for testosterone level (Horowitz, McDermott and Stam, 
2005).   
Another group of authors also began to consider the idea that the way in which 
decision makers perceived and evaluated their environment was crucial.  Ole Holsti 
(1965, et seq.) looked at the role of stress and time pressure and their effects on 
decision making.  Robert Jervis, in his landmark study Perception and Misperception 
in International Politics, proposed that the need for cognitive consistency caused 
decision makers to either filter or misperceive contrary data (1976).  This book led to 
several similar analyses, including Yaacov Vertzberger, who posited decision makers 
as “practical-intuitive historians” who were often led astray because they became 
wedded to their intuitive ideas about a given situation, and were unable to properly 
integrate conflicting data (1985, see also Khong 1993).   Vertzberger later expanded 
this drive for cognitive consistency into a more nuanced concept of decision-making 
schema (1990).   
Perceptual approaches draw strength from an exhaustive coverage of the 
variables affecting both communication and processing of information.  We have a 
better appreciation for why decisions are sometimes wrong or confused, because we 
can see that leaders are not creatures of vast and cool intellect, serenely making 
decisions based on precise data.  Instead, leaders are immersed in an environment of 
“complex uncertainty” where they are fallible, groping, often blinded by competing 
streams of confusing data, and all too human (Verztberger, 1990).    
The social psychology literature studies the effects of social group dynamics 
on decision making.  As Tetlock (1985) argues, social factors play a pivotal role in 
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decision making, and numerous studies have tried to quantify that effect. Probably the 
most well known effort in this realm was Irving Janis‟ article and subsequent book 
“Groupthink”, where he looked at decision making in a variety of situations, most 
notably the ill-fated “Bay of Pigs” invasion.  Here, Janis showed that a variety of small 
group interactions could create an overwhelming “need for consensus” where contrary 
information and viewpoints are withheld from the process.  This type of dynamic 
creates the conditions for disastrous failure (1972).  While the idea of groupthink has 
entered the popular lexicon and has often been thrown around as a critique, efforts to 
expand the concept have met with mixed success (see, for example „t Hart et al 1997).   
Indeed, the picture of whether groups help or hurt decision-making 
effectiveness is decidedly mixed.  Plous (1993) reviews a great deal of literature on 
group decision making and finds support for both sides of the coin.  Groups can often 
outperform the average individual, but the best member of the group often 
outperforms the group.  At the same time, heuristics and biases which affect 
individuals are often mirrored in groups, and group discussion often simply reinforces 
predetermined attitudes.  Plous concludes that “collaboration is no guarantee of a 
successful outcome” (1993, 214; see also March 1994).    
Decision-Making 
This psychological literature has led us to the literature on decision-making.  
While much of the literature on rational choice decision making has been noted above, 
it is useful to consider the mechanisms of rational choice before turning to other 
decision-making approaches.   
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Rational Choice Models 
Rational choice approaches attempt to provide more rigor to the analysis of 
decisions by assuming that an individual decision-maker will be goal-oriented toward 
maximizing his or her utility function (however defined) within a given structure of 
incentives or “game”.  Everyone in the system has a distinct set of ordered preferences 
from which they work, and they analyze the situation and choose the desired 
alternative (Bueno de Mesquita 1984 et seq.; Kahler, 1998; Schelling, 1960; Snyder, 
1960).  Individuals are also aware of other individuals, and they will take their 
observed or probable actions into account using the thought processes like those 
described in game theory.  Since these processes proceed from a defined set of logical 
principles, they are amenable to computer-based modeling and analysis (Bueno de 
Mesquita 1984 et seq.; Kahler, 1998, see also Zinnes and Gillespie, 1976 for a variety 
of statistically-based approaches).   These ideas have been used to considerable effect 
by scholars such as Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, who has demonstrated significant 
predictive power using a combination of game theory and expected utility modeling.  
This approach requires the analyst to understand or make assumptions about the game 
structure, actor preferences, the salience of issues, and the amount of power that actors 
control (see, among others, Jervis, 1978; Bueno de Mesquita, 1984; 1985; 2000; 2002; 
Bueno de Mesquita, et al., 2003). 
This mathematical rigor is one of the strengths of rational choice theory, 
because it requires causal relationships and judgment mechanisms to be explicitly 
addressed.  There is also a common-sense appeal to the idea that everyone will attempt 
to choose what is best for them.  It also recognizes the key role of the individual in the 
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process.  This approach is thought to be most appropriate when the stakes are high and 
the choices are distinct, such as nuclear deterrence (Kahler, 1998; Kahn, 1960; 
Schelling, 1960; but see Snyder, 1978; Vasquez, 1998 and Ferguson & Mansbach, 
2003 for a critique).   
Critique of Individual and Rational Choice Models 
Rational choice approaches give the illusion of careful consideration of 
alternatives and the ability to take the best action.  Since rational choice theory 
requires rank ordering of alternatives, this implies that such alternatives are transitive; 
that is no matter how the ranking is created, it will be the same ranking.  Recent (and 
not so recent) work in cognitive psychology shows that preference rankings are 
intransitive – the decision changes depending on how the question is framed.  As one 
example, Tversky and Kahneman point out that preferences can show multiple 
reversals depending on the decision maker‟s understanding of the relative prospects 
for gain and loss – even when given different formulations of the same choice 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 2000b, 2000c).  It has been 
subsequently claimed that preferences are transitive within a given positive or negative 
frame (Bueno de Mesquita and McDermott, 2004).  Other research, however, has 
indicated that preference orders can indeed be intransitive based on the order of 
presentation of alternatives, particularly where there are three or more choices (Arrow, 
1951; Tversky & Kahneman, 2000c).  Indeed, as Verba (1961) points out, decision 
makers are rarely completely aware of their own value systems, to say nothing of 
neatly ordered preferences.   
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Further, decision makers are almost never able to determine a complete set of 
alternatives.  Work by Weber, et al. (1993) among others has shown that individuals 
tend to generate between 2-4 hypotheses about a given situation, even when many 
other hypotheses are possible.  One implication of this is that decision makers 
generally greatly over-estimate the probability that a given hypothesis is correct.  For 
example, say there are five possible hypotheses about a given situation, with true 
probabilities of being correct as 0.4, 0.3, 0.1, 0.1, and 0.1.  If the decision maker only 
generates two hypotheses, then any estimate made of correct probabilities (say .7/.3) 
will wildly over-estimate the probability that the leading hypothesis is correct (in this 
case, .7 vs .4) (Dougherty & Hunter, 2003) 
Additionally, decision makers will tend to generate hypotheses based on what 
are considered the most probable outcomes, rather than trying to cover the total range 
of possibilities.  This has significant implications in how decision-makers search for 
information, as this information search is guided by the hypothesis being considered.  
Rather than looking for information that is diagnostic – meaning information that will 
disprove a hypothesis, the information search tends to be confirmatory – meaning that 
the decision-maker naturally searches for information to confirm the existing “leading 
contender” (Weber, et al., 1993, Dougherty & Hunter, 2003, Gettys, et al., 1987) 
These factors (and others) when taken together show that individuals cannot be 
expected to judge or rank order preferences in the way required for rational choice 
theory.  This can be scaled from the individual to the organizational or state level.  
Even though states are not individuals, they are made up of collections of individuals, 
and the ultimate decisions are also made by individuals.  Indeed, as noted above, 
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groups can generate limitations in the ability to process information that mirror well-
known individual biases (see Allison 1971, Janis 1972, Jervis 1989, Plous 1993 and 
March 1994).  Further, the assumption that individual choice can be aggregated to 
explain societal choice is one shared by many theoretical paradigms, such as Adam 
Smith‟s “invisible hand”, public choice theory, and various flavors of liberalism.  
While it will be useful in the future to empirically test this assumption, it will be used 
for this effort.  
Finally, and often overlooked, is the fact that the specific set of incentives 
which define the “game” must be either inferred or assumed.  For example, an analyst 
may assume that the game is a “Prisoners Dilemma” rather than a “Stag Hunt”, and 
will then draw conclusions (e.g., Jervis, 1978) which can lead to policy 
recommendations based on distinctions which may or may not be operative in the 
actual policy context (e.g., “offensive” vs. “defensive” weapons).  The choice of 
which game to use is crucial, as one will get quite different results if the game is 
assumed to be a “Battle of the Sexes” vs. “Stag Hunt” vs. “Prisoners Dilemma” vs. 
“Chicken” or one of the many other games in the literature (see Hasenclever, et. al, 
1997 for some examples).   
In a way, the terminology “rational choice” is in itself a value-laden judgment 
that a person‟s maximum utility is equal to rationality which is then equal to correct 
decisions.  As Tversky and Kahneman (2000b) point out, normative and descriptive 
analysis of choice behavior are two different enterprises.     
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Heuristics and Biases 
With the original publication of Tversky and Kahneman‟s “Judgment Under 
Uncertainty” in 1974, political science scholars began to use the new ideas of 
heuristics and biases in an attempt to better understand decision making.  Despite the 
inability of the heuristics and biases paradigm to predict what decisions would be 
made, the ever-expanding menu of various heuristics and biases offered an ever-
increasing feast of explanations for why decision makers did not behave in accordance 
with the tenets of rationality.   
Voting behavior has been seen as a rich field for the application of heuristics 
and biases.  Given the limits of information and choice, the voting booth is a prototype 
arena of bounded rationality.  Gant and Davis made first use of this paradigm by 
linking party affiliation to the representativeness heuristic (1984).  This has been 
followed by numerous applications of existing heuristics and the creation of new 
voting heuristics.  This includes Mondak and McCurley‟s analysis of what the 
“coattail” heuristic, where voters were more likely to vote for congressional 
candidates that were in the same political party as the Presidential winner (1994).  
More recently, Lau and Redlawsk have proposed five “political heuristics” to explain 
voter behavior.  These included political party, ideology, endorsements, poll strength, 
and appearance (2001).  Interestingly, all of these ideas are simply repackaging 
“conventional wisdom” about why people vote for a given candidate into heuristics 
and biases terminology.  My other observation here is that the authors have been 
unable to predict which heuristic might be used – instead it takes the form of existence 
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proofs: i.e., voters choose by party, but if they don‟t do that, they choose by ideology, 
if they don‟t do that, they choose by endorsement, and so on.   
Moving to national security decision making, there is a long history of trying 
to predict individual leader behavior through the use of heuristics and biases, such as 
Nancy Kanwisher‟s explicit links between various heuristics and their associated 
biases to several current policy ideas.  For example, the “hot hand” heuristic was seen 
as the basis for the so-called “domino theory”, and that the availability heuristic was 
shown to account for judgments of a given scenario‟s viability (Kanswisher, 1989).   
 Another way of analyzing elite behavior is via “operational code” analysis.  
Nathan Leites (1951) published a seminal study for RAND which attempted to predict 
the behavior of the Soviet Politburo.  Alexander George (1969, 1979) followed up and 
systematized Leites‟ original work into a series of philosophic and instrumental 
questions, the answers to which determined the operational code of a particular leader 
or group.  At this point, it is important to note that neither Leites nor George saw this 
operational code as a direct link between beliefs and action.  Instead, existing 
operational codes serve to bound the decision space for the particular actor by 
providing general guidance on key goals or perceived relationships that affect the 
decision at hand (Walker, 1990).  This basic paradigm was expanded by Holsti (1976, 
1977) to provide a set of six master operational beliefs.  Since then, many authors have 
attempted to mine that vein for clues about leadership behavior, using more and more 
powerful software tools.   A large number of world leaders and other elite groups have 
been subject to this type of analysis, in a variety of contexts, such as Jerrold Post‟s 
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(2004) compendium of terrorist and “rogue state” leader profiles (see also Walker: 
1990 and 2000 for two useful snapshots).   
This effort to normatively critique decision making via the heuristics and 
biases paradigm continues.  As mentioned above, Vertzberger brought together an 
entire menu of psychological factors to explain why decision makers deviate from the 
rational choice norm.  The author combines a variety of factors, including heuristics 
and biases, scripts and schema, perceptual filtering, social factors, and organizational 
factors into a grand theory of decision maker behavior.  As above, the problem with 
this approach is the inability to show or predict which factors are operative, only that 
deviation can be explained by some combination of these factors (Vertzberger, 1990).   
As an aside, one of the weaknesses of Vertzberger‟s conclusions, which is 
shared by other theorists in this vein, is that the normative yardstick is unrealistic.  
Vertzberger states that decisions are correct when they are congruent with the 
objective facts of the situation (1990).  In practice, that seems to mean either a 
decision that has a good result, or the decision that the author thinks should have been 
made.  As our fragmented political system demonstrates, the norms in politics or 
political science are often quite debatable.   
Prospect Theory Approaches 
Another alternative to rational choice has been prospect theory (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979, Levy 1992 et seq).  As mentioned previously, this theory shows that 
decision-makers view the utility of gains or losses quite differently, depending on how 
the decision is framed.  This theory has been used to explore a variety of issues.  (See 
McDermott, 2004a and 2004b, for a summary).  This theory, while intellectually 
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attractive, has proved difficult to operationalize.  Further, as McDermott and others 
have pointed out, prospect theoretical analysis has often been unable to rule out 
competing explanations.  While the quest has been elusive, one effect, that of framing, 
has been shown to be fairly robust in its explanatory power.  Essentially a refinement 
of Tversky & Kahneman‟s original “anchoring and adjustment” bias, the role of 
framing in shaping subsequent work is highly significant.  (See, for example, 
Berejikian, 2002; Boettcher, 2004; Kanner, 2004; Taliaferro, 2004) 
Affective Approaches 
Lately, the analysis of political decision making has turned to the “affect” 
paradigm.  The majority of this work has been in the area of voting behavior, where 
affect and heuristics are often combined in an effort to explain voter preferences, 
although some authors have studied behavior in other areas of individual decision 
making (Bueno de Mesquita and McDermott, 2004).   
Lodge and Tabor (2000) established a three-part paradigm to explain voter 
behavior, which combined affect and heuristics.  First, the receipt of information is 
affectively charged, which triggers a number of heuristics and automatic associations 
about the information.  This “connectionist” type of analysis assumes a “semantic 
network” of connections between concepts, so the triggering of one node also triggers 
the connected nodes.  This method is often modeled using neural networks. Thus, 
there is essentially a confirmation bias about information on political candidates based 
on the affective valence of the information.  The authors followed this hypothesis up 
with a laboratory study designed to simulate the complex information environment of 
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the political campaign, reaching the conclusion that affect is both primary and 
automatic in effecting voting behavior (Lodge & Taber, 2000, 2005).   
Redlawsk (2002) expanded on this original concept by adding the online 
processing paradigm from Pennington and Hastie (1997).  Here, voters are 
hypothesized to keep a constant running assessment of information and affect about a 
given candidate and issue, and that affect changes the way in which information is 
processed.  Voters are motivated reasoners, but in the affective rather than Bayesian 
sense, therefore positively valenced information is more readily absorbed into the 
semantic network, while voters have difficulty with the opposite (Redlawsk, 2002).   
Again returning to national security issues, McDermott (2004c) applied the 
finding of Lerner, et al. (2003) to political decision making, again drawing normative 
conclusions about the efficacy of decisions taken under conditions of either anger or 
fear.  Further, the author posits, following Lerner, that specific biases can be tied to 
specific emotions.   
Critique of Heuristics, Biases, and Affect 
When reading the literature on the affect paradigm, one is struck by the 
similarity to the heuristics and biases paradigm.  They both appear to be robust effects, 
and can be readily produced in laboratory settings.  Further, it is self evident that affect 
has some impact on behavior.  However, the causal chains are often ill-defined and 
even interchangeable, which implies that even though the effect exists, the overall 
causal paradigm as currently used can be incorrect.  For example, Lerner, et al. (2004), 
posits two different causal linkages in their study of the endowment effect.  The 
authors propose an “expulsion” cause that is triggered by disgust (get rid of the item), 
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and a “change” cause that is triggered by sadness (change the situation).  However, we 
can readily make a logical case if we switch the causes: it could well be that disgust 
triggers the desire to change circumstances (in particular, avoid the disgusting 
situation) and that sadness triggers the desire to get rid of whatever is causing you to 
be sad – often experienced by country music singers and their ex-wives.   
Further, some of the effects are tautological, such as the “how do I feel?” 
affect, or the “likeability” heuristic.  If we say that we like someone because that 
person is likeable, we have not explained much.  Alice Isen likened the impact of 
affect to the framing heuristic (1993), and that may be a valid way to think about it – 
affect as just another manifestation of heuristics and biases.  These approaches explain 
real effects, but these must be seen in the context of the surrounding environment.  
This literature generally mines its ore from a single vein, that there exists some sort of 
psychosocial function, or series of functions, which mediate information processing 
and cause deviations from the rational choice ideal.  Unfortunately for the theory, each 
bias or affect seems to rely on a different psychosocial mediating function, and thus it 
is difficult to explain which affect or heuristic is responsible for a given bias, even 
post hoc.   
In a related vein, the idea of semantic networks has also been controversial in 
the literature.  Gary Marcus notes that such networks raise a number of practical 
issues.  For example, if the network would have the nodes: Brad – bought – green – 
apples, and then Brad buys green pears the following week, there is a potential issue 
with crosstalk or ambiguous meaning when comparing the first set of nodes with: Brad 
– bought – green – pears.  Further, there is the issue of multiple instances, what if Brad 
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buys fruit on multiple days?  There would need to be additional nodes for today, 
yesterday, last week, and so forth.  Finally, there is the issue of creating connections 
between previously unrelated sets of nodes.  If the owner of the grocery store where 
Brad shops runs for Mayor, then does a new set of nodes connecting Greg Grocer – 
candidate – running for – Mayor and the place where Brad shops need to be created?  
Marcus instead (simply stated) proposes the need for sets of recursive rules which 
manipulate information rather than a pre-determined semantic network (2003).   
Further, it has proven difficult to operationalize psychological approaches in 
such a way that clearly links heuristics and biases, operational codes, prospect theory, 
or affect to the actions taken or the policy selected – the actual impact of these factors 
(where they can be isolated) has tended to be quite modest.  Ferguson and Mansbach 
(2003) sum up the conventional wisdom about psychological approaches – in their 
view, psychological explanations often force us to abandon the scientific approach in 
favor of judgment and “stubbornly non-empirical” theories (135).   
Just because wisdom is conventional, however, does not mean it is correct.  At 
the aggregated, large-n level, it is entirely possible to assume that psychological 
factors can be treated as an omitted variable.  In that case psychological factors simply 
become part of the error term, and standard methodological procedures for dealing 
with the error can be applied.  If variation due to psychological factors is normally 
distributed, then that variation simply adds to the “noise”, but does not affect the 
predictions of the overall model.  If variance due to psychological factors is 
systematic, or as Ariely (2008) puts it, we are “predictably irrational”, some way to 
account for that omitted variable needs to be found.   
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Information Processing Approaches 
In another way to gain traction on the problem, recent cognitive psychology 
literature has examined the way that the human brain processes information.  This 
literature uses mathematical models of how information is stored and recalled in 
memory to show that the “biases” demonstrated in the previous literature are in fact 
caused by the way in which we process information, and particularly by how we store 
and recall information (see Hintzman, 1988; Dougherty, et al., 1999; Dougherty and 
Hunter, 2003).  The clear implication of this literature is that the process of memory 
itself creates the many observed biases, and not some hypothetical internal library of 
heuristics, or pre-determined semantic networks. 
While a significant portion of the literature on foreign policy decision making 
deals with group processes, the focus of this effort will be on the individual process of 
decision making.  As Deutch (1966) notes, the process of decision making requires the 
existence of actual decision points.  This notion has been reiterated by Bueno de 
Mesquita when he stated that “…states are only metaphorically decision-makers.  
States do not, in actuality, choose policies or have goals; leaders do.” (2002, 8) 
James March usefully divides individual decision-making approaches into two 
categories: those involving rational choice, and those involving rule following – or the 
logic of calculation vs. the logic of appropriateness.   He notes that these two 
approaches make quite different demands on the decision maker.  The rational choice 
approach requires the consideration of goals, how actions will impact the attainment of 
those goals, along with actions that will likely be taken by other actors – a demanding 
task.  The logic of appropriateness requires recognition of the situation and some 
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mechanism for selecting which rule to apply – a cognitive task that can be efficiently 
performed using simple heuristics (March 1994).   
Conceptually, it can be seen that the second approach might be more attractive.  
The rational choice requires a lot of complex calculation on the part of the decision 
maker – Clausewitz quotes Napoleon approvingly that “the decisions faced by the 
commander-in-chief resemble mathematical problems worthy of the gifts of a Newton 
or an Euler” (1989 [1874], 112 – italics in the original).  The incidence of geniuses of 
that rank among the world‟s leaders is most likely just as small as it is among the 
general population, and it appears unlikely that the average decision maker is capable 
of performing those calculations well – if he or she can perform them at all.   
Further, the rational choice paradigm draws its underlying ideas from 
economics, and thus incorporates the underlying constitutive logic of the marketplace.  
While rational choice theorists, as shown above, have argued by analogy that 
conditions faced by decision makers in the political or foreign policy realm can be 
mapped to conditions in the marketplace, such argument can be suspect.  Even Gilpin, 
in his seminal explication of the idea of political economy made the clear distinction 
between the logic of the market and the logic of the state (1987).  This distinction has 
been often raised by constructivist theorists, who draw the distinction between rational 
or utilitarian theories that draw their micro-foundations from economics and those 
theories which draw their micro-foundations from social interaction between actors 
(see Adler 2002 for a summary). 
 
 
  44  
Results: A Decidedly Mixed Bag 
As seen above, neither realist nor liberal theories predict emergent properties 
or change within the international system.  It was the failure of these theoretical 
approaches to predict or even account for the upheaval of the end of the Cold War that 
showed the value of approaches such as constructivism.  Constructivism, however, 
offers only a menu of general approaches to the idea of change, and lacks the tools to 
precisely define and test the linkages between interaction and subsequent systemic 
change.    
Aside from the above observations, the record of any theoretical paradigm or 
approach mentioned above in actually predicting the outset of war is decidedly mixed.  
Bennett and Stam recently conducted a large-n comparison of a wide variety of realist, 
liberal, state-level and rational choice formulations, and found that most approaches 
did not produce strong correlations between their theoretical predictions and the outset 
of war, and those with significant correlations “have no direct linkage to the causal 
processes generating the correlations” (2004, 207).  For example, while the “war 
equilibrium” state of Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman‟s (1992) expected utility 
measures roughly doubled the risk of the onset of war compared to the “status quo” 
equilibrium (and was thus statistically significant given the very large n of the study), 
the actual probability of the onset of war was .00006 for a “status quo” equilibrium 
and .00013 for a “war” equilibrium (Bennet & Stam 2004, 132).  This result, albeit a 
statistically significant correlation, is hardly diagnostic and certainly does not rise to 
the level of practical decision-making significance.   
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Further, war itself is an emergent event, where the existing order can be upset 
and new follow-on conditions are created.  All of the approaches mentioned above 
have difficulty with predicting the existence of emergent behavior, so say nothing of 
predicting the timing or the outcome of that emergent behavior.   
Needed: A New Approach 
All of the IR and decision-theory literature has to take into account that, for all 
the complexity of the specific situation, that in general, the actual decision is shaped 
by both the situation and the process of decision.  Further, decisions for war or for 
alliance occur rarely – and sometimes never for some states.   
With rare events, it is tempting to simply bet on the status quo.  After all, that 
is what happens most of the time.  If considering playing the lottery, a simple check of 
the odds shows that the status quo and most likely outcome is that the player will not 
win – and so the best bet is simply to keep the money and not play.  In predicting the 
choice between war and peace, simply predicting “peace” is correct over 95% of the 
time, so high accuracy solutions may not be the best.   
Instead, the challenge is far tougher, to predict when unlikely events will 
happen and which actors will be involved, without the requirement to make untenable 
assumptions about either the structure of the game or the interests of the players.      
This returns me to the main line of analytical approach, that of the interaction 
between situation and how decision-makers process information, which can be 
modeled from the cognitive angle.  The application of this framework will be shown to 
provide a way of not only understanding this interaction, but using that interaction to 
predict the actions of decision-makers, given a specific set of inputs.   
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Chapter 3:  An Indirect Approach – Memory and the Rules of 
Decision 
 
Introduction 
One of the most common descriptions of what it’s like to be a pilot says that 
flying is “hours of boredom punctuated with moments of stark terror”.  This is also 
true when considering the history of war and alliance.  Both of these are fairly rare, 
and states have existed without experiencing either.  A simple look at the Alliance or 
Militarized Interstate Dispute datasets reveals that peace and non-alliance are far more 
likely than conflict and alliance.   
 The challenges this raises for other approaches to international relations and 
decision-making in particular have been discussed in previous chapters, so I will not 
dwell on this point, other than to reiterate that understanding the relationship between 
the situation and the process of decision – how these two interact to produce a 
particular result – is critical to understanding the phenomenon of why these unlikely 
events pop up from time to time.     
In the previous chapter, I briefly looked at the idea of punctuated equilibrium.  
This refers to the property of the interaction of complex adaptive systems where long 
periods of relative calm are punctuated by periods of upheaval, to be followed by a 
new, often changed, equilibrium.  One of the properties of this type of situation is that 
a certain point exists where the system becomes unstable.  At this point, the behaviors 
that produced equilibrium suddenly start to produce disequilibrium.   
To take a simple example, consider the behavior of a car in a tight turn.  
Normally, when the turn is not tight enough, the driver can simply turn the steering 
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wheel a little bit tighter, and the car will respond.  Turn the wheel too much, and the 
car enters a skid, where turning the wheel more will simply cause the skid to get worse 
and the driver will lose control.  The driver must take corrective actions to consciously 
dampen the out-of-control situation by turning the wheel in the opposite direction.   
The point at which this occurs is sometimes referred to as the departure point, 
as the car is in departure from a controlled path.  From dynamics, the car has 
transitioned from a position of stability to a position of instability.  Of course, the 
situation in international relations is far more complex, and the process of changing 
from peace to war is not immediate.  Nevertheless, it is fairly rapid, as can be seen 
from consistent observations in the literature on crises and the outbreak of war of 
things like “events were gathering steam” and “we could feel things slipping away”.   
Similarly, the well-known simulation of rabbits and hawks exhibits the same 
characteristics.  In the simulation, rabbits eat grass, hawks eat rabbits, and both 
reproduce. Populations grow when food is plentiful and vice versa.  Normally, this 
system settles into long-term states of equilibrium, but a slight change in the food 
supply or reproductive rates will cause the system to rapidly become unstable with 
alternating population booms and busts until the system finds a new equilibrium.  Note 
that the exact same behaviors and choices (eating and reproduction) on the part of 
actors within the system lead to both stability and instability, depending on the 
situation.  This situation is equally true with more complex adaptive systems, such as 
the one used in this dissertation.   
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Figure 1:  Notional System States 
Looking at the outbreak of war as a problem of punctuated equilibrium, or of 
departure from the position of stability, I posit three basic states, as shown in Figure 1, 
above: the equilibrium zone, the instability zone, and a crossover zone, where the 
system is starting to become, but not fully yet unstable.  Once events reach that point, 
continuing actions that seem reasonable and prudent can instead lead to disaster.    
It is one thing to posit such a relationship, it is another to calculate and predict 
it.  That decisions are based on the situation is obvious – but how?  The literature 
contains all sorts of possible reasons, mostly descriptive or normative.  Some, such as 
game theory and expected utility modeling, require assumptions about the game 
structure or judgments about actor preferences, power, and salience of issues.   
Results of decisions create new reality.  This interaction is also critical to the 
path of future decisions.  To attack this problem, I have created a model of state 
interaction based on the cognitive processes by which humans remember and recall 
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information.   State decision-making is, in the end, human decision-making – someone 
has to make a decision.  Assessment and decision are both human enterprises, and 
attempts to model those enterprises should proceed from how information is actually 
processed rather than how one might normatively wish to have it processed.  To 
provide a tool to model this concept, a Memory-based Ecological Model of 
Relationship Interactions between States, version 2 (MEMORIS-2) has been 
developed by the author.
1
  The MEMORIS-2 model is an extension of memory trace 
models such as MINERVA-2, MINERVA-DM, and HyGene (Hintzman, 1988; 
Dougherty, et al., 1999; Dougherty and Hunter, 2003, Thomas, Dougherty, Springer 
and Harbison, 2008).   MEMORIS-2 is implemented using Mathematica version 7.0, 
and extends these models to work in a dynamic multiple-actor environment necessary 
to support research in state decision making in a complex interactive system.  As a 
proof of concept, a prototype MEMORIS model was used to simulate state perceptions 
in Europe between 1885 and 1915 as a brief case study to validate the basic structures 
of the model (Hanson 2006).   
The MEMORIS-2 model rests on two foundations.  First, it proceeds from 
Simon’s observation that, far from being the beneficiaries of some Laplacean 
daemon
2
, both individuals and organizations in the real world are required to make 
                                                          
1
 I must acknowledge the invaluable guidance and help of Professor Rick Thomas, who 
provided guidance on memory-based models, algorithms, and computer code, along with jump-
starting me on programming in Mathematica.   
2
 A Laplacean daemon is a mythical creature with the infinite time, resources and processing 
power needed to make a purely rational choice decision. 
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decisions in the realm of bounded rationality.  This means that neither organizations 
nor individuals have the unlimited time, processing power, or resources required to 
make purely rational calculations.  Similarly, and sometimes overlooked, the solution 
space is also bounded: only certain decisions or behaviors are feasible (Simon, 1945 
[2000], see also Verba, 1961).   
The second foundation is a broad extension of another of Simon’s ideas: 
organizations exist to process information with the aim of making a decision (1945 
[2000]).  At the same time, this process of decision is not some mechanistic or 
disembodied process.  This implies the need to understand how organizations, and by 
extension, individuals, process information.  Much of the discussion of this issue has 
been conditioned on the premises of rational choice theory, which implies an 
economic mode of decision where individuals survey the situation, rank order the 
available choices, and then choose the choice which offers the “best” utility (however 
defined).  As noted above, this approach has its limitations, not the least of which is 
that individuals cannot be expected to operate in consonance with rational choice 
theory.  It has, however, been the normative yardstick for most analysis of information 
processing and subsequent decision making.  As Jervis points out, however, an 
approach to decision-making theory should have some resemblance to how people 
actually make up their minds on serious issues and should be based not solely on 
perceptions, but on how information is actually processed (1976).   
Conceptual Basis of the Model 
Building from this foundation, the challenge is then to understand just how 
decision-makers process information within a bounded framework.  Based on the 
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cognitive psychology literature noted above, which empirically demonstrates how 
biases can be replicated using conditional memory trace models, it is unnecessary to 
posit a multitude of psychosocial mediating functions.  Instead, using this increased 
understanding of the process of memory, and thus understanding how judgment of a 
given situation can be determined by the current ecology, the sample of information 
that is stored in memory, and the cue, or hypothesis which is used to probe memory.   
Importantly, these processes can be explicitly modeled, and judgments can be 
predicted probabilistically based on human information processing mechanisms 
without recourse to either the untenable assumptions of rational choice theory, or the 
need to discern the operative heuristic or affect.   Further, the simulation is based on a 
recursive processing model of mental function rather than the connectionist models 
mentioned in the previous chapter.   
Further, this approach does not require any a priori assumptions or judgments 
about the game structure.  Instead, the actors draw conclusions about the game 
structure based on the information presented and adjust strategy accordingly.  As will 
be seen, the simulation automatically adjusts both strategy and player preferences to 
the structure of the game and to the actions of other players.   
Sampling the Environment 
Since decision makers operate in a bounded decision environment, and have 
limited ability to perceive that environment, they essentially have to work from the 
information that is available.  The availability of information is conditioned by the 
“natural” sample space of the surrounding ecology – that is, decision makers sample 
and categorize information in the environment according to fairly simple 
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classifications based on gross features, such as: friend or foe, powerful or weak, and so 
forth (see Fiedler, 2000 and Gavanski & Hui, 1992).  Since decision makers do not 
have perfect knowledge of their surrounding environment, information is generally 
tentative and is continually updated in a probabilistic fashion, as are tentative sets of 
hypotheses about the environment – the more data points which become available, the 
higher the confidence in the judgment (Gigernenzer, et al., 1991).  It should be pointed 
out that the samples can either be representative of the ecology or biased, and as such 
the sampling process can produce both adaptive and maladaptive results.   
This set of samples essentially forms a set of records, or traces, in the decision 
maker’s memory.  These traces are the record of experiences, which may or may not 
be biased or misperceived.  Part of this record is the judgments associated with that set 
of experiences.  As pointed out, these traces are imperfect, and are sometimes 
contradictory in specific detail, but they build up over time to create a general 
understanding of the environment.   
Since hypotheses are generated based on their probability, this implies that the 
set of traces in memory conditions the set of possible hypotheses.  Further, the search 
for information within the environment is conditioned by the hypothesis under 
consideration, which is determined by reference to semantic concepts.   
Development of Semantic Concepts 
This search is guided by an existing set of semantic concepts.  These semantic 
concepts are simplistic representations of the situation.  For example:  “falling behind” 
another state in a given realm, such as military power, or that the state is an “enemy” 
or an “ally”.  These semantic concepts can be combined to give nuanced judgments of 
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a given situation, such as the obvious difference between “falling behind an enemy” 
and “falling behind an ally”.   
Further, unlike traces of memory which can be repeated, semantic concepts are 
singular.  That is, there is only one exemplar concept of “falling behind”, one concept 
of “enemy” and so forth.  Thus, the judgment of whether a different semantic concept 
is active is dependent on the strength of the response from a probe of previous 
memories, but the existence of the concept does not rely on memory.  This is 
important because it allows the decision maker to be able to access semantic concepts 
for which there are no previous experiences in memory.  These concepts could be 
learned by observing other states, through history, through reasoning, or other means.  
So, even though a particular decision maker has never directly experienced “getting 
ahead”, that semantic concept is available for judgment.   Allow me to reiterate the 
point that “semantic concepts” are not the same thing as the semantic networks 
discussed in Chapter Two.   
The case of the Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD) from game theory can be a useful 
example to illustrate the idea of semantic concepts and how they can help shape 
decision making.  In this situation, two known criminals are apprehended near the 
scene of a crime.  Following convention, the first prisoner is male (Bob) and the other 
is female (Alice).  The prosecutor immediately separates the prisoners and offers each 
the following deal:  you can either remain silent (cooperate with the other prisoner) or 
implicate the other person (defect).  If both Bob and Alice cooperate with each other 
and remain silent, then they will each receive a light sentence (6 months) for loitering.  
If Bob implicates Alice while she remains silent, he will be set free and she will 
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receive a heavy sentence (10 years), and vice versa.  If both prisoners implicate each 
other, they will receive a moderate sentence (3 years).  Being set free is then the 
temptation to defect (T), the light sentence is the reward for cooperation (R), the 
moderate sentence is the penalty for mutual defection (P) and the heavy sentence is the 
sucker’s payoff (S).  As a notation convention, Bob’s moves will be put in upper case, 
while Alice’s move are in lower case, so if Bob defects and Alice cooperates, the 
move will be noted as (D, c) and so forth.  Taking as the general principle that both 
Alice and Bob prefer to spend as much time out of prison as possible, this relation can 
be written as T > R > P > S for Bob and t > r > p> s for Alice, where “>” means that 
the first result is preferred to the second.  Put into tabular form with numerical utilities 
assigned to each choice, where:  
UT = 5,   UR = 3,    UP = 1  and   US = 0   (1) 
The canonical view of the PD game is as follows: 
 
Bob
(3,3) 
(R,r)
(0,5) 
(S,t)
(5,0) 
(T,s)
(1,1) 
(P,p)
Alice
Cooperate
Cooperate Defect
Defect
 
Figure 2:  Prisoners' Dilemma Game 
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One of the points raised by this particular game formulation is that, in a 1-time 
game, both sides are better off defecting, even though that results in the next-to-last 
favorable result for both sides.  Looking at the game from Bob’s viewpoint, no matter 
what Alice does, he is better off to defect (if the play is (D, c), Bob’s payoff is 5 vs 3 if 
both sides cooperate (C, c), and if Alice defects and Bob defects (D, d), Bob’s payoff 
is 1 vs 0 if Alice defects and Bob cooperates (C, d)).  The same is true for all of 
Alice’s moves, so both sides have a dominant strategy of defection.  This situation, 
where both sides defect, and neither side has an incentive to change strategy (or to put 
it differently, each side is indifferent to the other’s strategy) is called a Nash 
equilibrium (see Myerson, 1991 [1997] for a rigorous derivation).   
The PD game also has a Pareto optimal strategy, which maximizes the total 
utility at the point where both sides cooperate.  At this point, neither side can change 
the strategy without decreasing the total utility of the game.  This (C, c) strategy is 
also a potential equilibrium strategy in repeated games, given certain conditions of 
either information, utility, time horizon, or discounting of future moves (Morrow 
1994).    (See, however, Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts and Wilson, 1982, along with 
Binmore, 1994 for a discussion of multiple equilibria in iterated PD games) 
The PD game can also be plotted in terms of its decision space, which here is 
graphically depicted as the results of various combinations of strategies.  This way, the 
possible set of payoffs given various pure and mixed strategies can be seen (Figure 3, 
below).  Thus, the set of payoffs in repeated PD games will fall within the figure 
{T,s},{R,r},{S,t},{P,p}.  Further, the set of payoffs for pure strategies will lie along 
the edges of the figure, so that if Alice always cooperates (always C), the set of 
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payoffs for both players will lie along the line {T,s},{R,r} and if Alice always defects 
(always D), the set of payoffs will lie along the line {P,p},{S,t}, and so forth.  If both 
players pursue mixed strategies, the set of payoffs lies in the interior of the figure.  In 
accordance with the so-called “Folk Theorem”, an iterated PD game will also have a 
set of cooperative equilibria that lie within the square defined by (P, p) and (R, r) 
(Binmore 1994).   
Bob
Alice
P,p
R,r
T,s
S,t
Bob
(always C)
Bob
(always D)
Alice 
(always C)
Alice 
(always D)
Mixed
Strategies
 
Figure 3:  Decision Space Representation of the PD Game 
   
With this diagram in mind, consider the case where both Bob and Alice, being 
the well-known criminals that they are, are used to being in prison from time to time, 
and each one thinks that any prison sentence of a year or less is acceptable, but a 
sentence of more than a year is not.  Since in the canonical PD formulation UR = 3 and 
UP = 1, let the utility of a 1 year sentence be: 
U1 yr = 2       (2) 
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This new utility allows the creation of 2 semantic concepts SC:  “satisfied” and 
“unsatisfied”, which are denoted by SCsa and SCun.  Given a result A: 
UA ≥ 2  SCsa   and,  UA < 2  SCun    (3) 
Adding this to the decision space diagram gives the following: 
Bob
Alice
P,p
R,r
T,s
S,t
Satisfied
Bob
Unsatisfied
Alice 
Unsatisfied    Satisfied
 
Figure 4:  Semantic Concepts Applied to PD Game 
 
Thus a result to the left of the line where Alice’s utility is 2 (prison sentence 
greater than one year) will be unsatisfactory, and likewise for Bob.  This greatly 
constrains the set of likely strategies, as both players are apt to change their course of 
action if the previous course leads them into a situation where they are unsatisfied.  In 
fact, consideration of the likely options will drive the players into the “cooperate, 
cooperate” strategy, which as discussed above, is Pareto optimal for both sides.  
Further, it will create a natural “tit for tat” result if either side defects.  If, for example, 
the sides originally choose to cooperate, and then Bob defects while Alice continues to 
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cooperate, that result will cause Alice to conclude that the situation is unsatisfactory 
(Point T,s  SCun for Alice and SCsa for Bob).  This will cause Alice to change her 
move (defect) while Bob continues to defect.  The result of (defect, defect) is P,p  
(SCun for both Alice and Bob).  This will cause both sides to change back to R,r  
(SCsa for both Alice and Bob).  See Figure 5, below.   
 
Bob
Alice
P,p
R,r
T,s
S,t
both
change
Alice 
changes
Bob
changes
neither
change
 
Figure 5:  Changes in Strategy Based on Semantic Concepts 
  
This, of course, does not rule out the development of new semantic concepts 
through experience.  This might occur in two modes.  The first is a situation where no 
existing semantic concept provides a close enough match to the given situation.  In 
that case, a decision maker may attempt to develop a new semantic concept which 
better describes this new situation, and then use this new concept to probe memory in 
an attempt to confirm this new concept.   
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For example, say that Alice knows for sure that a third person (Charlie) has 
committed an unsolved crime and has the ability to prove it.  She offers to turn state’s 
evidence against Charlie in return for her freedom no matter what Bob chooses to do.  
In this case, she now has no incentive to take any particular action because she will 
always go free.  Further, she will have no way of knowing what Bob did since her 
result is always the same (freedom).  Indifferent to the courses of action, she is just as 
likely to do one as the other.   
This puts Bob in a radically different situation – he cannot predict or infer 
Alice’s action, so it is as if he were faced with a random event rather than another 
player.  He can play either strategy, and it will have no effect on what Alice does even 
in the long run.  His previous experience tells him to play “tit for tat” in a repeated 
game when Alice defects in the expectation that the game will return to a satisfactory 
state, but playing tit for tat has no impact if Alice is simply playing randomly.  This 
may well lead Bob to add a new semantic concept: that of Random Play (SCrand) and 
to adjust his play accordingly.  Additionally, having come up with SCrand, Bob might 
also reason that a complementary semantic concept exists: that of Rational Play (SCrat) 
even if he was not experiencing that particular concept in action.   
So, if an existing set of semantic concepts, such as SCun and SCsa, does not 
closely enough describe the situation faced in a game, a new concept (SCrand) might be 
needed.  This, in turn, could lead to the development of a complementary concept 
(SCrat) purely through reasoning about the situation.   
This, naturally, begs the question of what constitutes “close enough”.  This 
would most likely depend on the situation – in some situations “close enough” could 
60 
cover a very wide stretch of ground, for example whether one is “getting ahead” or 
“falling behind” an ally is probably a moot point and has a wide margin for error.  The 
same situation for an enemy state, on the other hand, probably has a much smaller 
margin for error.  The acid test here is in the results.  Did the judgment lead to a 
successful or an unsuccessful choice of policy?  If the result is good, then future 
recollections of the event could either conclude that either the judgment was correct 
(despite doubts at the time), or that the judgment was incorrect (but it really didn’t 
matter anyway).  Either one of these cases would reinforce existing semantic concepts 
and argue against the need for developing a new semantic concept.  This, naturally, 
may well have negative long-term implications as a wide margin for error or 
suppression of doubt might lead to eventual disaster.   
Given the above discussion, it appears more likely that a policy disaster would 
lead to new semantic concepts than a simple “it doesn’t quite fit” judgment.  If the 
results of policy are bad, then future recollections could conclude that either the 
judgment was correct (but the policy was bad, or the breaks went bad) or the judgment 
was incorrect and should have been something else.  The following decision tree 
diagram shows this in a more compact fashion.   
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JudgmentPolicy Result Implication
• We missed the call
• May need a new concept
• We had bad luck
• Didn’t really matter
• May need a new concept 
(if we have time)
• Right as usual!
Good
Bad
Incorrect
Correct
Incorrect
Correct
 
Figure 6:  Does the Situation Require a New Semantic Concept? 
 
The introduction of new factors into a game will most likely require new 
semantic concepts to be developed by the players based on both their experience and 
reasoning.  To further illustrate this point, consider the situation illustrated by the 
“Stag Hunt” (SH) from game theory.  This game, which is based on a situation 
described by Rousseau, gives the two players a choice.  They can either choose to hunt 
stag, or they can hunt rabbits.  To successfully hunt stag, both players must hunt stag 
(C, c), and both will reap a high reward (R, r) for doing so.  Either player can hunt 
rabbits successfully (D, d), and will reap a small reward (P, p).  If a player hunts stag 
while the other hunts rabbits (C, d), the player attempting to hunt the stag alone will 
go home hungry while the player hunting rabbits will be successful and reap a small 
reward (S, t).  For a stag hunt, the preference order of the game is: 
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R > P >= T > S for Bob and r > p >= t > s for Alice,    (4) 
where >= means “either prefers or is indifferent to” 
Put into strategic form, one version of the game looks like this:    
 
Bob
(5,5) 
(R,r)
(0,1) 
(S,t)
(1,0) 
(T,s)
(1,1) 
(P,p)
Alice
Cooperate
Cooperate Defect
Defect
 
Figure 7:  Stag Hunt Game 
 
With this set of preferences, it can immediately be seen that there is no single 
dominant strategy, as was the situation with the PD game.  Here, if Alice chooses to 
cooperate, Bob’s best strategy is to also cooperate (C, c).  On the other hand, if Alice 
chooses to defect, Bob’s best strategy is to defect as well (D, d).  Thus, there is no 
pure Nash equilibrium strategy, although the strategy (C, c) is Pareto optimal, as is the 
same strategy in the PD game.  With this situation, for a one-time game, players 
should play a mixed strategy.  Like the PD game, (C, c) is an equilibrium point for a 
repeated game, and “always defect” is a valid strategy to minimize risk, since it keeps 
the player from getting the sucker’s payoff and going home hungry.   
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Repeated Play 
As mentioned briefly above, the “best” strategy in any game may change if the 
game is repeated.  In this case, either Alice or Bob must somehow account for the fact 
that actions in one round of play may affect decisions in subsequent rounds.  Thus, 
factors such as reputation, past actions, and the degree to which the players value (or 
discount) future payoffs may affect the strategies that players will choose to play.  As 
briefly discussed previously, the degree to which reputation affects game play is still 
controversial in the literature.  The following section will discuss the issue of how 
memories of game play are created.   
The Role of Memory 
Continuing with the discussion of multiple plays of this combined (or any 
other) game, the set of individual moves plus their result forms a series of memories, 
or traces within memory, as shown in the Venn diagram below (Figure 8).  The most 
recent trace, which is the current state of affairs, is compared against the existing set of 
semantic concepts, and the most likely concept(s) are then brought into working 
memory as active hypotheses, where they are compared to the traces in memory to 
either confirm or disconfirm the likely hypothesis.  The hypothesis with the greatest 
support within memory is then chosen as the judgment of the situation, and acted upon 
accordingly.   
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Figure 8:  Memory, Semantic Concepts, Hypotheses and Judgment  
 
Note that, as pointed out above, the set of existing semantic concepts is largely 
drawn from experience, but some may have been drawn from reasoning about the 
situation or through other means.   The hypotheses about the current event are drawn 
from the store of existing semantic concepts, and the selected judgment will either be 
drawn from the set of hypotheses immediately selected into working memory, or may 
be drawn from a new hypothesis if none of the existing set of hypotheses can be 
confirmed.    
Essentially, the representation of the situation that is written as traces into 
memory is “probed” for confirmation of the hypothesis.  Additionally, since the set of 
traces is imperfect, different hypotheses will lead to different recall of information.  
This can explain, for example, why different individuals (or groups, for that matter) 
can come up with completely different interpretations of the same set of events.  As 
Traces in Memory
Existing Semantic 
Concepts
Hypotheses in 
Working Memory
Selected 
Judgment
After Thomas, et. al., 2008 
65 
will be seen in the application of the MEMORIS-2 model, decision makers may well 
have very different interpretations of the same data, with one side of an interaction 
seeing benign intentions and the other seeing hostility.  The ecological sample and 
traces in memory can be very similar, but different probes will elicit different sets of 
results, and the follow-on search for information will be conditioned to confirm the 
initial hypothesis.   
Summary:  Information for Decision 
Decision makers thus will receive information in two modes.  The first is based 
on the events and interaction of the surrounding environment.  This mode of 
information forms the sample and the basic traces of memory.  The second mode of 
information is that of a guided search for confirmatory information, which is 
conditioned by the goal or hypothesis currently under consideration.  Given the 
limitations of individual working memory capacity, the first step of the situation 
assessment process is to determine the focus of attention.  In reality, this focus may 
often be thrust on the decision maker by conflict or crisis.  Once the decision maker’s 
attention is focused on a particular concept, the decision maker then uses existing 
views of the semantic concept under review to guide the search for information to 
confirm or disprove existing judgments of that concept.  Once these judgments are 
updated, they become part of the “memory” of the event, so the subsequent memory 
trace contains both “facts” of the given situation and “values” or judgments associated 
with that event.  These value judgments will then form the starting point for judgments 
about future events.   
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Operationalizing the Theory 
A Two-Sided Prisoners Dilemma Game 
With that groundwork in mind, I created a simulation to extend the idea of 
using semantic concepts in a two-sided game.  In keeping with a building-block 
approach, this model is used to explore a two-sided PD game, and will be extended to 
the case of an alternating PD and SH game below.  First, the simulation will simply 
add semantic concepts to the game play, and later the simulation will be extended 
using a memory-based component.   
In this case, the logic of the process for each side is essentially a mirror image 
of the other.  This time, the payoff function is that of the canonical PD game, as 
presented previously in Figure 2.  The process flow of the model is as follows: 
 
Figure 9:  Basic Game Flow 
 
First, the model is initialized by creating a set of 32 random moves.  This 
allows for several repetitions of each possible move combination of the PD game.  
Initialization
Players Assess 
the Situation
Players Decide 
on Moves
Payoff 
Assigned
Reassessment 
and New 
Moves
Game Ends
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This initialization process allows the sides to have a set of memory traces for each 
move combination, and the random walk process gives the sides a somewhat different 
starting position for each repeated set of runs.   
After the game is initialized, the players assess the situation at the start of the 
game.  For the first set of simulation runs, only two semantic concepts, those 
previously identified as SCun and SCsa, will be used.  As discussed earlier in the PD 
game description, a dividing line of 2.0 will be used, and so a payoff greater than 2.0 
will be judged as satisfactory and payoff less than 2.0 will be unsatisfactory.   
The players use a simple logic for this simulation, where if the situation is 
satisfactory (SCsa), then the players will keep the same move, but if the situation is 
otherwise (SCun), the players will reverse their move.  After the players simultaneously 
choose their moves, payoff is assigned.  Players will then repeat the process until the 
game ends at some point.  Players do not know the length of the game, so they cannot 
choose to defect at the end of the game to gain advantage.  While the number of 
simulation moves is finite, to the players it is essentially a game with an infinite 
horizon.   
As expected from the simple logic and the previous discussion about the PD 
game, this leads to a case where the players move immediately to cooperation and do 
not defect.  For 1000 trials, this leads to the following result: 
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Figure 10:  Results of the Two Sided Game with Simple Logic, No 
Random Moves 
 
Adding a random move parameter, which effectively allows players to defect 
even though they ordinarily would not, adds some dispersion to the results as 
expected, but overall the players still prefer to cooperate.  As can be seen by the right-
hand chart in Figure 11, as the percentage of random moves goes much past 25%, the 
game will essentially become a random walk between the players.   
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Figure 11:  Simple Games with Random Moves 
 
Adding uncertainty to the payoff function provides some interesting results.  
Until the level of uncertainty approaches the level at which payoffs for various moves 
begin to overlap, the payoff and play remains fairly robust.  Once it becomes possible 
for the payoff of one move to overlap another, possibly changing an “acceptable” 
result to an “unacceptable” result, then the play begins to break down and the players 
soon are moving almost randomly.  Combining payoff uncertainty with random moves 
creates much the same effect, although the combination of both factors causes the 
game to break down increasingly quickly. 
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Figure 12:  Effect of Increasingly Uncertain Payoffs 
 
Changing the L (learning) parameter also creates considerable uncertainty 
within the simulation and causes it to quickly become unstable as well.  Incorrectly 
encoding the results of moves causes the uncertainty to effectively overlap even at 
relatively high rates of correct encoding.   
 
Figure 13:  Effect of Incorrect Learning 
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With the limitations of this set of semantic concepts in mind, adding new 
characteristics to the mix might serve to further improve model performance.  To that 
end, two new semantic concepts are added, based on the absolute position, either 
positive or negative.  If the absolute position is below the expected value of the game 
times the number of moves so far, the semantic concept is negative (SCneg) and vice 
versa if the absolute position is above the expected value thus far (SCpos).    
Based on these new semantic concepts, an “optimistic” set of decision rules 
was used.  To the previous logic of keep the last move if the result is satisfactory and 
change if it was unsatisfactory, add the following: 
 
Figure 14:  Semantic Concepts, Judgment and Action 
 
As mentioned previously, the above logic adds an “optimistic” component to 
the decision process.  Previously, any satisfactory result for a single move resulted in 
the choice to keep the move unchanged, but now the move will also remain unchanged 
Concepts
SCpos + SCsat
SCpos + SCun
SCneg + SCsat
SCneg + SCun
Judgment
Going well
Still doing OK
Catching up
Falling behind
Action
Keep the same 
move
Keep the same 
move
Keep the same 
move
Change the move
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as long as the overall picture is still positive.  The result of this logic, however, is not 
to improve the chances of cooperation.  Instead, it acts to effectively blunt the ability 
of a player to punish the other player’s defection under certain initial conditions.   
Generally, the game will play out in the same fashion as in the simple logic 
above, but in cases where the random setup of the first 32 moves causes one player to 
be more than two steps into positive territory while the other is more than two steps 
into negative territory (where a step is defined by the combination of either two 
positive or two negative move results), then the situation exists where the logic will 
cause the player in negative territory to oscillate back and forth between the move 
choices while the other player continues to play the same move.  If the player in 
positive territory is playing “defect” that will cause the player in negative territory to 
continue to fall farther and farther behind.  Normally, this version of the simulation 
keeps the two players quite close in terms of their performance, with margins at the 
end of 500 moves being less than one unit, as did the previous, simpler version of the 
game.  However, under the right initial conditions, the game settles into a definite 
“win/lose” situation, which is set up as shown below.   
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Figure 15:  Results of the 4-Concept PD Simulation 
 
The impact of random moves, payoff uncertainty, and a diminished learning 
factor follow the same pattern as discussed above for the case of the simple, 2-concept 
simulation, except that they increase the probability that the game will turn into 
negative territory.   
In an effort to improve the ability of the losing player to recover, I added 
another semantic concept to cover the situation where one player was falling behind 
the other.  This is based on the relative difference between the cumulative payoffs at 
each move.  If the relative difference between the cumulative payoffs is increasing, the 
probability of the losing side acting randomly in an effort to “catch up” increases.  As 
expected, this causes the game to quickly become unstable and turn into negative 
territory as the cycle of mutual random moves increases over time, as shown in Figure 
16 below. 
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One additional factor that plays into all the simulations discussed thus far is the 
impact of the time horizon.  Even though players do not know the time horizon, the 
dynamics of the game will eventually force the game into negative territory if there is 
any uncertainty and the time horizon is long enough.  The more uncertainty, the 
shorter the time horizon before the game reaches negative territory.  Even with adding 
a fair amount of uncertainty to the mix, however, the game does tend to stay in 
positive territory over the short run (less than 200 moves), as shown in the figure 
below. 
 
Figure 16:  Impact of Trying to Catch Up 
 
Summary of PD Games with Semantic Concepts Only 
Clearly, little ground has been broken by simply adding semantic concepts to 
the mix, other than to show how a {C,c} equilibrium can be reached.  Further, these 
sets of models also show how fragile such cooperation can be – breaking down 
quickly in the face of uncertain payoffs or faulty information.  Also, it has been shown 
that the use of semantic concepts alone can lead to a semantic trap where the players 
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repeat strategies in a vain attempt to catch up.  As discussed earlier, some mechanism 
needs to be added to capture the impact of learning from the past and the ability to 
reason about the future.  That mechanism, for people, is memory.   
A Simple Memory Vector Model 
To set up a demonstration of how this works, the following procedure will be 
used.  This procedure will try to confirm the presence or absence of a given semantic 
concept.  Following the idea of Thomas, et al, (2008), I generated a set of 1000 data 
vectors of eight elements, each generated from an idealized vector corresponding to a 
given semantic concept is generated.  The vectors are generated by randomly adding 
or subtracting a small factor from each element, so the data is noisy.  As an example, 
the idealized vector corresponding to the semantic concept SCip (increasing payoff) 
would be: 
SCip = {0, .02, .04, .06, .08, .10, .12, .14}      (5) 
and an example generated vector would be: 
{-0.0196, 0.0075, 0.040, 0.080, 0.091, 0.0976, 0.125, 0.122}  
Plotting the two vectors together shows that the same general shape is retained, 
but the data is a noisy representation of the ideal vector.   
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Figure 17:  Ideal vs. Generated Vector 
 
Additionally, the vectors were encoded using an “L” or learning factor ranging 
from .1 (only 10% of vectors encoded correctly vs. 90% encoded as random noise – 
only 10% learned) to 1 (100% of vectors encoded correctly).  The probability of a 
particular hypothesis vector being encoded was varied between high base rate (7, 2, 2, 
2, 2 distribution between the particular hypothesis vector and the alternatives, ≈ 48%) 
and a low base rate (2, 7, 7, 7, 7 distribution, ≈ 8%).  This means that in the first case, 
vectors are generated at the rate of seven vectors corresponding to the target semantic 
concept, and two vectors representing each of four competing concepts.  In the low 
base rate case, the proportions are reversed.  These sets of vectors were then encoded 
as memory traces.     
Information is then gathered using various probes of the 1000 generated 
memory traces.  The probe is generated using the idealized semantic concept vector, 
and each concept vector is used in turn to probe memory.  This probe essentially 
allows the model to calculate the similarity between each probe and each trace in 
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memory based on the sum of the squared differences between each vector element.  
This similarity, Si, between Probe P and a particular (i) trace Ti is given by: 
i
N
j
ijj
i
N
TP
S
1
2
     (6) 
where Pj is the j
th
 position of Probe P, Tij is the j
th
 position of Trace Ti, and N is 
the number of vector elements in the i
th
 trace.   
A perfect match would create a similarity value of 1, while a total mismatch 
would result in a similarity value of 0.  Following earlier models such as MINERVA-
DM and HyGene, the similarity value is then cubed to create an Activation value Ai, 
which effectively decreases the weighting of low similarity values.  These activation 
values are then summed across all M traces to create an Echo Intensity, I. 
M
i
iAI
1
      (7) 
Thus, a situation where the probe matched all 1000 traces in memory would 
create an echo intensity of 1000.  After each of the hypotheses is tested against the 
traces in memory, the hypothesis with the greatest echo intensity for each trace is 
chosen as the “best” hypothesis.  With suitable tuning for the correct minimum 
activation value to judge similarity (see Thomas, et. al., 2008 for a much more detailed 
description of a complex model applied to clinical judgment), the model generates 
impressive rates of hypothesis recognition, particularly at high levels of learning, as 
shown if Figures 18 and 19, below.   
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Probability of Correct Judgment for High Base Rate Hx
(n = 1000 cases, n (match Hx) = 488)
Overall Probability of Correct Judgment
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Figure 18:  Model Performance for High Base Rate Case 
  
Probability of Correct Judgment for Low Base Rate Hx
(n = 1000 cases, n (match Hx) = 76)
Overall Probability of Correct Judgment
Correct Positives
Correct Negatives 
Correct Positives
Correct Negatives
Overall
False Positives
and
False Negatives 
False Positives
False Negatives
 
Figure 19:  Model Performance for the Low Base Rate Case 
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In both cases, there are impressive gains in correctly identifying the traces 
which represent the desired hypothesis as the percentage of correctly learned memory 
traces increases.  In the high base rate case, the overall performance of correct answers 
ranges from just over 50% in the low-learning state to near unity in the perfect 
learning state.  This matches intuition, since in the high base rate case nearly 50% of 
the traces are generated from the chosen hypothesis, so simply guessing the hypothesis 
without even looking at the data would give a 50% chance of being right.  As learning 
increases, the number of correctly-identified traces increases rapidly, although at slight 
increase in number of positive cases falsely rejected (false negatives).    
In the low base rate case, the overall rate of successful prediction remains high 
throughout.  Again, this matches intuition, since the incidence of the chosen 
hypothesis is less than 10%, so there would be a 90%+ chance of being right by 
simply rejecting the hypothesis.  As learning increases, the false positive rate greatly 
decreases, again at the cost of a slight increase in the number of false negatives.    
Adding Memory to the PD Game 
Thus far, all of the simulations have focused on the choice simply given the 
current situation without regard to the potential impacts on future moves.  For 
example, by playing PD (or other) games repeatedly, it might be more advantageous to 
consider the possible longer-term repercussions of a given move, rather than simply 
concentrating on the anticipated rewards of the next move.  Thus, considering the 
longer-term implications may have a positive effect on the overall stability of the 
game, and serve to keep the game in positive territory for both players rather than 
degenerating into mutual defection as seen above.   
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To this end, a new simulation was developed that considers the longer-term 
consequences of potential moves.  A probe of the “memory” of previous moves was 
added in an attempt to understand the longer-term consequences of a given move.  The 
basic logic flow of this memory probe is as follows:   
 
Figure 20:  Logic Flow for Probing Memory 
The mathematical mechanics for probing memory are as previously discussed.  
One of the key questions which this logic raises is: “how many moves to look 
forward?”  Intuition tells us that the more information that the process has to work 
with, the better.  However, in this case this turns out not to be so.  While developing 
this simulation, the relationship between the number of moves assessed (that is, how 
many moves down the line need to be considered when choosing the best move) and 
the accuracy of game play (was the best move chosen) was evaluated.  Interestingly, 
looking ahead more than 6-7 moves, actually decreases the performance of the 
Get current status
For each potential 
move
Look for previous 
occurrences of the 
move
Calculate average 
payoff for that move 
plus the next "n" 
moves
Pick move offering 
the best average 
payoff
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simulation.  The percentage of incorrect moves increases rapidly from near zero to 
about 30% and then levels off at around 20 moves of look-ahead.   
 
Figure 21:  Impact of Looking Ahead Too Far 
 
The reason this occurs is that the repeated PD game is not just a series of 1-
time games strung together, but is also a series of cycles between moves (Alpern, 
1993).  Since there are only 4 move combinations, even a random chance series of 
moves will return to the same starting state fairly quickly (8 moves).  With a 
purposeful combination of cooperate and defect, the cycle tends to only be 2-3 moves.  
Thus, by looking farther than 6-7 moves, the logic starts to pick up the results of more 
than one or two cycles, and the additional information gained beyond that point is 
mere repetition.  Plus, longer-term results gets combined with the results of other 
moves, so instead of adding to the set of valid information, looking too far ahead 
actually decreases the percentage of good information as it is submerged in repetitious 
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noise.  This result also has a felicitous coincidence with the long-held idea of the size 
of working memory (see Simon and Newell, 1972).    At any rate, assessing potential 
results beyond the period which we can reasonably expect to predict is probably 
counterproductive.  This point is why many computer firms have a very short planning 
horizon since, given Moore’s law, computer capacity can be assumed to increase 10x 
within 5 years, so it is foolish and limiting to look more than 3 years in the future 
(personal conversation with Nathan Myrvold, former CTO, Microsoft Corp.)     
Application: A Prisoners’ Dilemma Tournament 
Following Axelrod (1984, 1997), I set up a PD tournament to test the 
performance of the memory-based model against a variety of alternative strategies.  
The tournament was run as a round-robin competition with each strategy facing all of 
the opposing strategies in turn.  Each individual competition consisted of 1000 
simulation runs of 1000 moves each.  The value of each move combination was in 
accordance with the canonical PD game listed in Figure 2, above, with payoff values 
being mathematically transformed by simply subtracting 2 from each result.  This 
causes payoffs for mutual defection and the sucker’s payoff to have negative utility (-1 
and -2, respectively).  This also causes the division between “satisfactory” and “non-
satisfactory” semantic concepts (SCsat and SCun) to be made clear. As discussed above, 
the payoffs were made slightly “noisy” with the addition of a small (2%) random 
component, so the payoff (for example) of the strategy {D,d} would be in the range of 
.98 – 1.02.   
The following strategies were used for the tournament: 
 Memory:  A strategy using the memory-based model discussed above. 
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 Tit-For-Tat:  The winning strategy from Axelrod 1984.  This strategy 
will begin by cooperating, but will then mirror the opponent’s previous 
move. 
 Always Defect:  This strategy plays a pure defection strategy.  Defect is 
the optimal single-game strategy. 
 Always Cooperate: This strategy plays a pure cooperation strategy.   
 Tat-For-Tit:  An inverse strategy to Tit-For-Tat.  It starts out by 
defecting, and will continue to defect until the opponent defects as well, 
and then it will cooperate until the opponent cooperates, whereupon it 
will defect again. (Binmore, 1994) 
 Grim Trigger: This strategy will cooperate until the first time the 
opponent defects.  According to Morrow (1994), this strategy can be 
optimal for repeated PD games. 
 70-30:  This strategy defects 30% of the time and cooperates 70% of 
the time. 
 RLS:  This strategy attempts to predict the opponent’s next move using 
a Recursive Least Squares projection based on the previous sets of 
moves, and then takes the optimum move given that projection. 
 Average Move:  This strategy uses a heuristic based on the average 
opponent move from the previous set of moves, and selects an optimum 
move based on that heuristic. 
 Last Move: This strategy uses a heuristic where the next opponent 
move is assumed to be the same as the last move, and the selects a 
move accordingly.   
 Random: This strategy picks moves at random.   
 Each set of contests was scored using three different criteria:  
 Won/Loss:  Number of wins (better score) vs. number of losses. 
 Total Score:  Total of scores for all iterations of the contest 
 Victory Margin:  Total margin of victory (or magnitude of defeat) for 
all iterations of the contest. 
The following three tables give the results of the tournament according to each 
criterion.
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 Memory Random AlwaysD 70-30 RLS AvgPayoff LastPayoff TFT AlwaysC Tat4Tit Grim Win % Rank 
Memory  1000 529 1000 1000 1000 1000 633 1000 1000 581 87.43 1 
Random 0  0 0 530 0 492 554 1000 0 0 25.76 10 
AlwaysD 471 1000  1000 1000 1000 1000 589 1000 1000 600 86.60 2 
70-30 0 1000 0  1000 995 1000 552 1000 0 0 55.47 5 
RLS 0 470 0 0  116 505 584 745 0 234 26.54 9 
LastPayoff 0 508 0 0 495 118  552 764 0 268 27.05 8 
TFT 367 446 411 448 416 447 448  493 399 507 43.82 7 
AlwaysC 0 0 0 0 255 144 236 507  0 491 16.33 11 
Tat4Tit 0 1000 0 1000 1000 741 1000 601 1000  0 63.42 4 
Grim 419 1000 400 1000 766 858 732 493 509 1000  71.77 3 
              
Lose % 12.57 74.24 13.40 44.53 73.46 54.19 72.95 56.18 83.67 36.58 28.23   
Rank 1 10 2 5 9 6 8 7 11 4 3   
Table 1:  PD Tournament Wins vs. Losses 
Note 1: Read this chart from left to right for wins, and top to bottom for losses.  For example (reading from the left column of 
labels), Memory won vs. AlwaysD 529 times, and won against TFT 633 times.  For the losses (reading downward from the top row 
of labels), Memory lost against AlwaysD 471 times, and lost against TFT 367 times.   
Note 2: This chart based on a round-robin tournament, 1000 iterations of 1000 moves for each pair of strategies.   
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 Memory Random AlwaysD 70-30 RLS AvgPayoff LastPayoff TFT AlwaysC Tat4Tit Grim Total 
Score 
Rank 
Memory  228717 -382098 25586 229294 229355 229308 -380483 841369 838914 -380699 1479263 1 
Random -535027  -535309 -179701 -353 -249320 -1138 92 535367 -531710 -532163 -2029261 10 
AlwaysD -382470 230221  24746 229295 228974 229117 -380347 841110 838794 -380399 1479040 2 
70-30 -484029 77492 -483810  76390 87 75960 -109529 637258 -478284 -481491 -1169956 7 
RLS -535101 -227 -534994 -178334  -337793 228978 76418 538783 -534045 -150307 -1426623 9 
AvgPayoff -535240 107774 -535049 -151257 228444  228618 -5712 638955 -178524 -353440 -555432 4 
LastPayoff -535194 779 -534925 -178212 228871 -332692  71240 546065 -534096 -154774 -1422937 8 
TFT -382652 -963 -382760 -111063 75044 -6760 70194  229427 -380461 229544 -660451 5 
AlwaysC -688070 -229747 -688207 -382737 -234741 -385079 -245729 229382  -687859 229441 -3083344 11 
Tat4Tit -687362 226799 -687292 23696 229326 -8407 229389 -378273 840807  -685470 -896787 6 
Grim -382415 228444 -382649 23667 228361 227247 228232 229200 229325 837148  1466559 3 
              
Total 
Opponent  
Score 
-5147559 869289 -5147093 -1083610 1289931 -634389 1272929 -648012 5878464 -810122 -2659757   
Rank 1 8 2 4 10 7 9 6 11 5 3   
Table 2:  PD Tournament Total Points 
Note 1: Read this chart from left to right for points total for, and top to bottom for total points against.  For example (reading from 
the left column of labels), Memory scored -382,089 points vs. AlwaysD, and scored -380,483 points against TFT.  For the total 
points against (reading downward from the top row of labels), AlwaysD scored -382,470 points against Memory, and TFT scored -
382,652 against memory.   
Note 2: This chart based on a round-robin tournament, 1000 iterations of 1000 moves for each pair of strategies.   
8
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 Memory Random Always
D 
70-30 RLS AvgPayoff LastPayoff TFT AlwaysC Tat4Tit Grim Avg 
Margin 
Rank 
Memory  763.74 0.37 509.22 764.39 764.60 764.50 2.17 1528.94 1526.28 1.72 662.59 2 
Random -763.74  -765.53 -257.19 -0.13 -357.09 -1.92 1.06 765.11 -758.51 -760.61 -289.85 10 
AlwaysD -0.37 765.53  508.56 764.29 764.02 764.04 2.41 1529.32 1526.09 2.25 662.61 1 
70-30 -509.22 257.19 -508.56  254.72 151.34 254.17 1.53 1020.00 -501.98 -505.16 -8.59 6 
RLS -764.39 0.13 -764.29 -254.72  -566.24 0.11 1.37 773.52 -763.37 -378.67 -271.66 9 
AvgPayoff -764.60 357.09 -764.02 -151.34 566.24  561.31 1.05 1024.03 -170.12 -580.69 7.90 4 
LasPayoff -764.50 1.92 -764.04 -254.17 -0.11 -561.31  1.05 791.79 -763.49 -383.01 -269.59 8 
TFT -2.17 -1.06 -2.41 -1.53 -1.37 -1.05 -1.05  0.05 -2.19 0.34 -1.24 5 
AlwaysC -1528.94 -765.11 -1529.32 -1020.00 -773.52 -1024.03 -791.79 -0.05  -1528.67 0.12 -896.13 11 
Tat4Tit -1526.28 758.51 -1526.09 501.98 763.37 170.12 763.49 2.19 1528.67  -1522.62 -8.67 7 
Grim -1.72 760.61 -2.25 505.16 378.67 580.69 383.01 -0.34 -0.12 1522.62  412.63 3 
              
Avg 
Margin 
-662.59 289.85 -662.61 8.59 271.65 -7.90 269.59 1.24 896.13 8.67 -412.63   
Rank 2 10 1 6 9 4 8 5 11 7 3   
Table 3:  PD Tournament Margin of Victory 
 
Note 1: Read this chart from left to right for average margin of victory, and top to bottom for average margin of defeat.  For 
example (reading from the left column of labels), Memory had of 0.37 average margin vs. AlwaysD, and scored 2.17 average 
margin against TFT.  For the margin of defeat (reading downward from the top row of labels), AlwaysD had an average margin 
of -0.37 (negative indicates defeat) against Memory, and TFT scored -2.17 average margin against memory.   
Note 2: This chart based on a round-robin tournament, 1000 iterations of 1000 moves for each pair of strategies.   
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The following chart summarizes the ranking in the PD tournament.   
 
Figure 22:  Summary of PD Tournament Rankings 
The overall results show that the Memory-based approach had the top rank in 
both wins and overall score, and was second to the “Always Defect” strategy in 
overall margin.  That said, statistical tests show that Memory and Always Defect 
ended up in a statistical dead heat, with the difference in the means over 1000 runs 
was only 0.06, for a one-sided T-statistic of 0.31, and a p-value of 0.38.  Comparison 
to the third place finisher, “Grim Trigger” shows a definite win, with the difference in 
means over 1000 runs of 1.88, for a one-sided T-statistic of 8.7, and a significance 
<0.0001.  This shows that the memory-based model performed at least as good as, if 
not better than, the game-theoretic optimal approaches for both single-shot and 
iterated PD games.   
The relatively poor performance of Tit-for-Tat (TFT) in this tournament bears 
some discussion, as it cuts across the conventional wisdom that TFT is the best 
strategy.  Binmore (1994) points out that TFT is only a viable overall strategy as long 
0
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as there is a sufficient number of “nice” strategies in the overall mix of opponents, 
with “nice” being strategies that are generally cooperative.  In this particular 
tournament, five strategies (Memory, AlwaysD, Grim, 70-30, and Tat-for-Tit) tended 
to be “mean”, which in this context means that they tended to defect more often, the 
three heuristic strategies tended to play whatever their opponent played, and the 
random strategy was neutral, so only one “nice” strategy (Always Cooperate) was in 
the tournament.  This explains the middle-of-the-road performance of TFT.  
Additionally, Axelrod (1984) himself noted that TFT lost every single encounter, and 
that he only judged the “goodness” of the outcome by the total score. 
Alternating Games 
Having previously set up both the Stag Hunt (SH) and PD games, imagine a 
situation where, rather than playing a single game repeatedly, a game shifts back and 
forth between the two sets of payoffs.  This situation could well be more likely in real 
life than that of the single game played repeatedly.  Imagine, for example, the situation 
where the set of incentives switched back and forth between opportunities for 
cooperation and temptations for aggression, where the difference is determined 
exogenously to the players by something like advances in technology (for example, 
the introduction of things like the rifled musket, barbed wire, the machine gun, or 
nuclear weapons).  On the surface, there is quite a bit of similarity between the games 
– both have the same Pareto optimal and repeated game equilibrium of (C, c), and both 
share the same minimum risk strategy of (D, d).  However, plotting these two games 
in decision space reveals they create quite different constraints on the players.   
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Figure 23: PD and SH Games in Decision Space 
For ease of reading, the points in the decision space are denoted according to 
Bob’s payoff, so the decision space for Bob’s PD game is the figure P-T-R-S and for 
the SH game the figure is P'-T'-R'-S'.  Bob’s payoff in the PD game if he plays a pure 
“cooperate” strategy is along the line R-S and along the line R'-S' for the SH game.  
His payoff for an “always defect” strategy is along the line T-P or T'-P'.  Similarly, 
Alice’s payoffs for the two strategies are T-R or T'-R' for cooperate and S-P or S'-P' 
for defect.   
Looking at this figure, it can immediately be seen that the payoff for a given 
decision is critically dependant on which game is being played.  As the game shifts 
from PD to SH, the decision space rapidly collapses to P'-T'-R'-S', and then expands 
rapidly once the game goes back to PD.  The players will, therefore, have greatly 
different judgments on the best strategy depending on their judgment of the 
probability that one game is being played rather than another.   If the games oscillate 
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back and forth in a sinusoidal fashion, for instance, the payoff structure might look 
something like this: 
C,d
D,d
D,c
C,c
Pure
PD game
Pure
SH game
Pure
SH game
 
Figure 24:  Payoff Structure of an Alternating SH and PD Game 
This combined game can be thought of as a single 3-move game where the first 
move is the chance that the game is a SH game vs. that of a PD game (see, for another 
example, the “fashionable prisoners dilemma” in Binmore, 1994), and the payoff can 
be written in terms of the probability of an SH game.  To derive this, first look at the 
game in extensive form.   
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Figure 25:  Combined PD and SH Game in Extensive Form 
It can be seen that there is some opportunity to simplify the problem by 
engaging in some judicious pruning of the tree, since the move combination (d, D) 
gives the same payoff no matter which game is chosen.  Further, the payoff for the 
player on the wrong side of the (c, D) or (D, c) move is always zero, so the game type 
can be deleted and payoffs assessed in terms of probability p, where  
p  = ProbabilityStag Hunt                                    (8) 
Alice’s
Move
Bob’s
Move
Payoff
(A,B)
(1, 1)
((5(1-p)+p), 0)
(0, (5(1-p)+p))
((3(1-p)+5p), (3(1-p)+5p)
p=
ProbSH
 
Figure 26:  Payoffs for a Combined Game 
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Simplifying: 
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(0, 5-4p)
(3+2p, 3+2p)
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Figure 27:  Simplified Payoffs for the Combined Game 
 
Going back to Figure 26, it is intuitive that the payoff for (d, D) will always be 
preferred to the payoff for (c, D) as 1 > 0.  At some point, the preference order 
between (C, c) and (D, c) will switch.  From Figure 24, this will be at the point where 
the payoff from (C, c) and (D, c) are equal, which can be written as: 
5 – 4p = 3 + 2p   →  2 = 6p   →   p = 1/3   (9) 
Thus, based on the judgment of p, a player will play the game as:   
Stag Hunt where p > 1/3 
Prisoners Dilemma where p < 1/3 
Indifferent at p = 1/3 
This leads to the conclusion that one of the important judgments to be made in 
the combined SH-PD game is the probability judgment that the game is in fact an SH 
game.  This is in accordance to my earlier observation that the judgment of the type of 
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game is critical to the analysis.  The difference here is that the judgment is being made 
by the players within the game rather than being exogenously imposed.  This process 
of reaching a probability judgment can be made possible through the use of 4 semantic 
concepts, which are shown on the following figure: 
 
Decreasing
Payoff
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Payoff
Tipping Point
Crossover
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Figure 28:  Semantic Concepts to Describe a Combined Game 
 
For example, in a situation where both players were cooperating (c, C) and the 
payoff was decreasing, the probability that the game was in fact a Stag Hunt will also 
be decreasing, and players will tend to increase the probability of defection in hopes of 
being able to spot the inflection point and gain an advantage.  Similarly, if one player 
defects while the other cooperates (d, C) and the payoff is increasing, that shows that 
the probability of a PD situation is increasing and that of a SH is decreasing.  Once the 
crossover zone is past, the players will play the game as a PD.  Next, the point where 
the payoff for (d, C) stops increasing will indicate a tipping point where the 
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probability that the game is a PD starts to decrease and the probability of a SH starts to 
increase.   
Thus, there are 4 semantic concepts upon which to base the judgment of 
whether the game is a Stag Hunt or a Prisoners Dilemma:   
SCdp = Decreasing payoff 
SCip = Increasing Payoff  
SCxover = Crossover Zone  
SCtp = Tipping Point 
 Put into table form, this yields: 
Moves Semantic Concept Judgment Action 
(c, C) SCdp PSH is decreasing 
PPD is increasing 
Consider defecting 
(c, C) SCip PSH is increasing 
PPD is decreasing 
Continue to cooperate 
(c, C) SCxover PSH is decreasing 
PPD is increasing 
Change to defect 
(c, C) SCtp PSH is increasing 
PPD is decreasing 
Continue to cooperate 
(d, C) SCdp PSH is increasing 
PPD is decreasing 
Consider cooperating 
(d, C) SCip PSH is decreasing 
PPD is increasing 
Continue defecting 
(d, C) SCxover PSH is increasing 
PPD is decreasing 
Change to cooperate 
(d, C) SCtp PSH is increasing 
PPD is decreasing 
Continue defecting 
Table 4:  Semantic Concepts in a Combined Game 
 
Application: An Alternating Game Tournament 
Having described the environment of an alternating game situation, the 
performance of the memory-based model can be tested using the same tournament 
procedures as before.  This time, the payoff structure slowly alternates between a PD 
and SH payoff, as shown in Figure 27 above, and is slightly “noisy” (payoffs vary +/- 
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2% from the computed value), as were the payoffs in the pure PD tournament.  Again, 
the tournament was a round-robin of 1000 model runs of 1000 turns each for each of 
the 10 strategy pairs.    
In this game, the heuristic approaches (RLS, Average Payoff, and Last Payoff) 
attempt to discern which semantic concept is operative and then will move 
accordingly.  As before, the memory-based approach has no fixed strategy, and will 
adjust its strategy based on the memory traces of the opponent’s previous moves and 
the resulting anticipated payoff.   
As before, the results were recorded by win/loss, total score, and margin of 
victory.  The results are summarized in the three tables below.
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Reversal Tournament: Wins vs. Losses 
               
 Memory Random AlwaysD 70-30 RLS AvgPayoff LastPayoff TFT AlwaysC Tat4Tit Grim  Win % Rank 
Memory  1000 1000 992 1000 996 1000 626 1000 1000 1000  96.14 1 
Random 0  0 82 0 0 0 544 1000 0 0  16.26 10 
AlwaysD 0 1000  1000 0 1000 0 597 1000 1000 585  61.82 4 
70-30 8 918 0  0 0 0 553 1000 3 0  24.82 9 
RLS 0 1000 1000 1000  126 500 527 759 1000 734  66.46 3 
AvgPayoff 4 1000 0 1000 874  870 566 853 252 136  55.55 6 
LastPayoff 0 1000 1000 1000 500 130  514 746 1000 757  66.47 2 
TFT 374 456 403 447 473 434 486  514 384 517  44.88 7 
AlwaysC 0 0 0 0 241 147 254 486  0 484  16.12 11 
Tat4Tit 0 1000 0 997 0 748 0 616 1000  0  43.61 8 
Grim 0 1000 415 1000 266 864 243 483 516 1000   57.87 5 
               
Lose % 3.86 83.74 38.18 75.18 33.54 44.45 33.53 55.12 83.88 56.39 42.13    
Rank 1 10 4 9 3 6 2 7 11 8 5    
Table 5:  Reversal Tournament Wins vs. Losses 
Note 1: Read this chart from left to right for wins, and top to bottom for losses.  For example (reading from the left 
column of labels), Memory won vs. 70-30 992 times, and won against TFT 626 times.  For the losses (reading 
downward from the top row of labels), Memory lost against 70-30 8 times, and lost against TFT 374 times.   
Note 2: This chart based on a round-robin tournament, 1000 iterations of 1000 moves for each pair of strategies.   
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Reversal Tournament: Total Points Scored 
              
 Memory Random AlwaysD 70-30 RLS AvgPayoff LastPayoff TFT AlwaysC Tat4Tit Grim Total 
Score 
Rank 
Memory  259067 -174520 128376 331129 -17657 347343 -116703 571610 -80370 -172784 1075492 6 
Random 4345  -273134 -52522 162729 148702 167020 55598 385715 -270175 -268849 59430 8 
AlwaysD -420047 -171211  -294188 -49251 -146712 -50286 -540564 200372 198659 -540638 -1813867 11 
70-30 -118198 -19519 -361984  92334 99327 95285 -133066 324862 -356414 -360619 -737993 9 
RLS 124977 300332 -15916 193219  422688 571568 454978 594320 -14650 280824 2912340 2 
AvgPayoff -143505 332640 -181033 209149 545137  544730 323417 595418 -16917 -4896 2204140 4 
LastPayoff 134856 302945 -16616 196922 571267 422485  459000 592870 -15480 289673 2937920 1 
TFT -119589 54261 -542741 -134285 454135 321988 458703  571861 -540745 572038 1095627 5 
AlwaysC 155019 284285 -3302 188118 347708 281546 351662 571640  -2880 571574 2745370 3 
Tat4Tit -405679 -172549 -2965 -296954 -49171 -178048 -50504 -538045 200076  -377 -1494215 10 
Grim -420569 -171997 -542730 -295610 262441 17112 271806 571502 572021 196225  460201 7 
              
Total 
Opp Score 
-1208390 998254 -2114942 -157775 2668458 1371431 2707326 1107758 4609124 -902747 365946   
Rank 2 6 1 4 9 8 10 7 11 3 5   
Table 6:  Reversal Tournament Total Points 
Note 1: Read this chart from left to right for points total for, and top to bottom for total points against.  For example 
(reading from the left column of labels), Memory scored -174,520 points vs. AlwaysD, and scored -116,703 points against 
TFT.  For the total points against (reading downward from the top row of labels), AlwaysD scored –174,520 points against 
Memory, and TFT scored -116,703 against Memory.   
Note 2: This chart based on a round-robin tournament, 1000 iterations of 1000 moves for each pair of strategies.    
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Reversal Tournament: Margin of Victory 
              
 Memory Random AlwaysD 70-30 RLS AvgPayoff LastPayoff TFT AlwaysC Tat4Tit Grim Avg 
Margin 
Rank 
Memory  254.72 245.53 246.57 206.15 125.85 212.49 2.89 416.59 325.31 247.79 228.39 1 
Random -254.72  -101.92 -33.00 -137.60 -183.94 -135.93 1.34 101.43 -97.63 -96.85 -93.88 10 
AlwaysD -245.53 101.92  67.80 -33.33 34.32 -33.67 2.18 203.67 201.62 2.09 30.11 3 
70-30 -246.57 33.00 -67.80  -100.89 -109.82 -101.64 1.22 136.74 -59.46 -65.01 -58.02 8 
RLS -206.15 137.60 33.33 100.89  -122.45 0.30 0.84 246.61 34.52 18.38 24.39 4 
AvgPayoff -125.85 183.94 -34.32 109.82 122.45  122.25 1.43 313.87 161.13 -22.01 83.27 2 
LastPayoff -212.49 135.93 33.67 101.64 -0.30 -122.25  0.30 241.21 35.02 17.87 23.06 5 
TFT -2.89 -1.34 -2.18 -1.22 -0.84 -1.43 -0.30  0.22 -2.70 0.54 -1.21 7 
AlwaysC -416.59 -101.43 -203.67 -136.74 -246.61 -313.87 -241.21 -0.22  -202.96 -0.45 -186.38 11 
Tat4Tit -325.31 97.63 -201.62 59.46 -34.52 -161.13 -35.02 2.70 202.96  -196.60 -59.15 9 
Grim -247.79 96.85 -2.09 65.01 -18.38 22.01 -17.87 -0.54 0.45 196.60  9.43 6 
              
Avg Margin -228.39 93.88 -30.11 58.02 -24.39 -83.27 -23.06 1.21 186.38 59.15 -9.43   
Rank 1 10 3 8 4 2 5 7 11 9 6   
Table 7:  Reversal Tournament Victory Margin 
Note 1: Read this chart from left to right for average margin of victory, and top to bottom for average margin of defeat.  
For example (reading from the left column of labels), Memory had of 245.53 average margin vs. AlwaysD, and scored 
2.89 average margin against TFT.  For the margin of defeat (reading downward from the top row of labels), AlwaysD 
had an average margin of -245.53 (negative indicates defeat) against Memory, and TFT scored -2.89 average margin 
against Memory.   
Note 2: This chart based on a round-robin tournament, 1000 iterations of 1000 moves for each pair of strategies.   
 
9
8
 
99 
 
Figure 29:  Summary of Reversal Tournament 
 
The above figure shows the overall results of the Reversal Tournament.  As 
can be seen, the memory model had the top scores as far as win percentage and win 
margin, but was in the middle of the pack in the total score ranking.  Further, the 
performance of the heuristics which attempted to predict the next move by various 
heuristics was much better than in the static PD game, as would be expected.  The old 
standbys “Always Defect” and “Grim Trigger” also ranked in the top half.  This would 
be expected since strategies of defection are equilibrium strategies in both the PD and 
SH games.  The 70-30 strategy, which was crafted to take partial advantage of the 
earlier analysis that one should play the game as a PD game 2/3 of the time in an 
alternating game, did more poorly than expected.  Analysis showed that while this 
heuristic did play as expected, the difference between the 70-30 and 50-50 chances of 
Cooperate vs. Defect in the 70-30 strategy and Random strategy, respectively, was not 
enough to make more than a minor difference in the overall outcome.   
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The middling performance of the Memory model in terms of total score bears 
some more examination.  Looking at Tables 5 and 7, above, the performance of this 
model in the Won/Loss and Margin measures of merit was well superior to the other 
models.  The Memory-based model scored a convincing 96% win percentage, easily 
outscoring its nearest rival “Last Payoff”, which only had a 66% win percentage.  
Similarly, the Memory-based model also scored convincing wins across the board in 
terms of victory margin, with an average margin of over 228 points, vs. its closest 
rival “Average Payoff”, which had an average margin of about 83 points.  Further, the 
Memory-based model had positive win margins against every other strategy, and the 
best any other strategy could do was to have positive margins in 8 out of 10 contests.  
However, the Memory-based model ran in the middle of the pack in terms of overall 
score.  Analysis of the moves taken by the model revealed that the model was slower 
to react to changes in the payoff function than the heuristic models.  This caused the 
memory-based model to play more conservatively (i.e., Defect more often) than the 
heuristics, which tended to switch quickly to a “Cooperate” strategy in an effort to 
catch up to the opponent.  This often led to large score gains against similarly 
cooperative strategies, but was punished in head-to-head competition against the 
Memory-based model and by the strategies which played “Defect” most often.   
Combining the Tournament Results 
When combining the results of the two tournaments, it is clear that the 
Memory-based approach is viable across the board – both in the static PD game and in 
an alternative PD/SH environment.  Further, looking at the combined picture shows 
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that the Memory-based model dominates across all categories, as shown in the figure 
below.   
 
Figure 30:  Combined PD and Reversal Rankings 
 
As can be seen, the Memory-based approach dominates the rankings, ahead of 
both the traditional game-theoretic strategies of “Grim Trigger” and “Always Defect”, 
and ahead of all the heuristic prediction strategies.  Arguably, “Always Defect” could 
be moved up in the rankings based on which way the chart values are sorted.  The 
figure below shows the same chart, except that this time the overall performance in 
each area has been normalized (1 = best, 0 = worst), which gives a bit more of a 
nuanced view of the results. 
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Figure 31:  Normalized Combined Scores 
 
This figure shows the degree to which the Memory-based approach dominated 
the competition in both tournaments.  The results above demonstrate fairly 
convincingly that a memory-based model is a viable and effective approach to iterated 
game-theoretic situations, both for static and for dynamic games.   It is at least as 
good, if not better than the standard game theoretic or heuristic approaches, and does 
so without the necessity of making a priori judgments about the game structure.   
Application of the Model: A Three-Sided National Security Game 
Taking the memory-based approach a step farther, and in an effort to refine 
model concepts and debug any logic errors prior to continuing to analysis of the two 
test cases, a three-sided game was developed to represent the essence of national 
security choices – war or alliance, support the economy or build the military.  These 
play out in a two-level game where the choice between war and alliance is aimed 
outward at the other players in the game, while the choice between building the 
economy and building the military is primarily aimed inward, but both choices affect 
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the other level.  In an effort to keep the game focused on the “big” choices and to limit 
complexity, these simple choices are stand-ins for the wide variety of actions within a 
given rubric, so the choice for war (or conflict) covers all actions from threats, to 
moving troops to the border, to full-scale war.  Similarly, the choice for alliance 
covers the ground between diplomatic consultations, military staff talks, ententes, and 
full-scale military alliance.  The “guns vs. butter” choices on the domestic level cover 
similar ranges.  Players can only make one of the four choices, and each choice has 
different payoffs on the international and domestic level.  Players were also required 
to maintain positive scores in both military and economic realms – if either one 
dropped below zero, indicating total collapse of the economy or total destruction of 
the military, then the player was eliminated from the game and any remaining 
resources are absorbed by the “winning” player. 
There is a natural tendency to dismiss such a structure as too simplistic, as 
there are many shades of meaning within each choice.  Further, choosing only one 
action is clearly an artificiality, as states do not switch their efforts (and budgets) from 
100% focus on one action to 100% focus on another action, but instead devote 
different amounts to support each portion of their military and domestic portfolios.  
All of these statements are true, but this is an attempt to capture the essence of state 
decisions while not getting bogged down in the details.  There is always an emphasis 
on one facet of policy or another, as decision-makers’ limited attention moves from 
one crisis or the next.  Further, focusing resources on one thing means that other things 
are not done.  Money spent on the military cannot be used (directly) to build the 
economy.  Threatening another state generally means that you cannot offer alliance in 
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the same breath.  Finally, the choice to embark on a general course of action implies 
the possibility of other actions or outcomes within that space.  Moving troops to the 
border risks the outbreak of full-scale war.  A tentative offer of talks may be embraced 
by the other party and military alliance may result.  Investing in the economy and 
attendant prosperity may well create new businesses and constituencies devoted to 
continual economic expansion.   
Further, each player chooses moves in relation to the other two players, so in 
reality each player has 16 unique move combinations, which allows for considerable 
latitude.  This latitude to conduct nuanced strategy is even more pronounced in the 8-
player game discussed below.   
One distinct advantage to this approach is that it is parsimonious – it focuses 
solely on “big picture” decisions.  Further, the underlying process of situation 
recognition, hypothesis generation and decision are all the same process.  Thus this 
approach is parsimonious not only in its view of national security choices, but also in 
its view of the process underlying those choices.   
Game Move and Payoff Structure 
The game payoff structure was determined by analysis of Correlates of War 
(COW) data version 3.02 during the period 1880-1980 for major powers, specifically 
the National Military Capability (NMC) variables of military personnel, military 
budget, iron and steel production, energy production, total population and urban 
population, and the Total Trade (TTrade) dataset.  Alliance and conflict values were 
drawn from the Militarized International Disputes (version 3.02) and Alliance datasets 
(version 3.03) (Singer, 1987; Ghosen and Bennett, 2003; Small and Singer, 1969; 
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Stinnett, et al., 2002; Marshall and Jaggers, 2003).  The values for move payoffs was 
based on analysis of the change in NMC and TTrade variables, so the net growth in 
the simulation stays within the range of the growth or decline of the underlying COW 
variables.  After initial analysis of trends in the variables, including their absolute and 
relative changes in periods of both build-up and drawdown, the values were adjusted 
to create a game structure where there was no dominant game-theoretic strategy for 
either the domestic or international sides of the game, nor was there a dominant 
strategy for the combined game.    General description of the moves and payoffs is as 
follows: 
Build military:  This encompasses all actions aimed at increasing military 
capability short of threatening another state.  The payoff in military power for the 
international game is significant. Any positive economic impacts of the military build-
up are more than offset by the opportunity cost to the overall economy, so it causes the 
economy and the domestic game to suffer a loss.   
Build Economy: This choice means that the side is concentrating on building 
the non-military part of the economy, which generally creates positive gains in the 
domestic game, unless the state comes under threat.  While building the economy can 
help create latent military power, emphasis on the civilian economy will have a net 
negative effect in the international game.   
Offer alliance:  This encompasses all actions in the diplomatic realm, such as 
consultations, staff talks, commercial negotiations, ententes, and alliances.  The results 
are generally positive in both the international and domestic games, except when the 
other side rebuffs the effort through threats or ignores the effort via concentrating on 
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the economy, and in that case the impact is somewhat negative due to wasted effort 
and loss of face.  If both sides choose to offer alliance, then an alliance is concluded 
which remains in effect until one side chooses to break the alliance via threats.  Both 
sides will then receive an increase in combat power (international payoff) proportional 
to their relative strength.  
Threaten:  This includes all threatening military action, including war.  Threats 
have a generally negative effect in both the international domestic games, as combat 
power is wasted through wear and tear, and the economy is stressed by such actions.  
If both sides choose to threaten, then war breaks out, with unpredictable length and 
consequences, as shown below.   
 
Figure 32:  Cost and Duration of Wars 
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The war duration is determined by a random exponential draw, so most wars 
will be of one turn duration, but may go as high as seven turns. War results in loss of 
combat power by both sides, but the winner of the conflict may or may not receive 
domestic gain through capture of resources or territory, both costs and gains are 
determined by a random exponential distribution, as shown above.   
The summary of the game’s payoff structure is shown below.   
 
Figure 33:  Game Payoff Structure 
 
Game Logic Flow 
During the course of the game, for each turn, each player simultaneously 
chooses a course of action toward each of the other two players (total of six directed 
dyads), after which payoffs are assessed.  After a short initialization period where 
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moves are drawn randomly to provide a baseline for assessing payoffs, the sides begin 
to choose their moves based on the existing situation and the memory of previous 
moves.  First, each player assesses the recent history – what sequence of moves by 
each of the other players led to the current situation?  With that sequence in mind, the 
player then probes the existing set of semantic concepts one at a time to try to find a 
match.  Under crisis or pressure situations, the amount of time that players have to 
probe semantic memory is limited, and partial matches may be the only results.  If 
there is no complete or partial match, a new semantic concept is created to describe 
the current situation.  If there is a matching semantic concept, then the long-term store 
of memory is probed to see if this situation has occurred, and if so, to test hypotheses 
about the next likely move by the opponent, and which move will produce the best 
outcome given the situation and the opponent’s likely move.  Once the hypothesis 
about the predicted opponent move is confirmed in memory, the best possible move 
for that situation will be chosen. 
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Figure 34:  Logic Flow for the 3-player Game 
 
Initially, the order of semantic concepts is random.  Once the game begins, and 
after each move is selected, the accompanying semantic concept is moved to the top of 
the semantic concept stack, where it will then be the first concept considered the next 
move.  Thus, the decision system, particularly under crisis modes, will tend to give 
more weight to recent events rather than to events long in the past, and events which 
occur repeatedly will tend to remain near the top of the stack, which replicates the 
well-known recency and rehearsal biases in the decision-making literature (Tversky 
and Kahneman, 2001a [1974]).  One can think of the set of semantic concepts as a box 
of wrenches, and the matching of concept to situation as picking the right-sized 
wrench for the job.  After each wrench is used, it is put back into the pile of wrenches 
in the toolbox, so the same wrench is on the top when reaching for the next one.  The 
result of this is that when tasks are repeated, the most commonly used wrenches end 
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up near the top, and are thus quickly found.  In the figure below, the initial set of 
semantic concepts in the first move is checked for a match.  In this case, SC4 is the 
best match, and so that semantic concept is moved to the top of the stack for the next 
move.  The end result is that concepts which are used often are kept at or near the top 
of the stack, making subsequent searches more efficient.   
 
Figure 35:  Operation of the Semantic Concept Stack 
 
Further, and as discussed earlier in the chapter, the record of events forms 
traces in memory, which can be either correctly or incorrectly encoded, and which will 
become degraded over time (both adjustable within the model via parameters).  Thus 
more recent events will tend to carry more weight, although the entire record of events 
is available to the decision-maker.  Additionally, the model has provisions to degrade 
or even deny player knowledge of opponent strategy and payoffs, so the game can be 
played in states of either full or incomplete information, allowing the impact of 
misperception to be explicitly modeled.    This also allows situations as shown in the 
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figure below to be modeled.  In this case, the decision-maker in State A cannot 
directly perceive State B’s intentions, but may or may not have an existing judgment 
or set of semantic concepts (or inferences) about those intentions.  If so, the set of 
semantic concepts shape the way in which the State A decision-maker views the 
environment, which is formed by State B’s actions, along with the actions of all other 
actors in the system.  The decision-maker for State A then updates judgments about 
State B based on the interaction between the environment, the sample of the 
environment, and the existing set of previous judgments about State B.  The 
parameters in the model allow for exploration of the role of existing inferences or 
concepts, the accuracy with which the decision-maker samples the environment, and 
the difference between State B’s intentions (chosen strategy) and the strategy 
perceived by State A in the existing environment.   
 
Figure 36:  Factors Affecting State Judgments 
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Additional Model Features 
Further, the model also incorporates features to explicitly study the role of 
various tradeoffs.  For example, one important controversy in the IR literature is 
whether states are more concerned with absolute than relative gains.  In a relative gain 
situation, states are predicted to be more conflict-prone as they jockey for relative 
position.  In the model, the emphasis on relative or absolute gains is modeled 
probabilistically, with a random draw for each decision point to determine whether the 
model will make judgments based on relative or absolute gains.  This can also be 
thought of as modeling the difference between a decision-maker satisfying internal 
requirements (absolute gains) or maintaining position in the international arena 
(absolute gains), per Bueno de Mesquita (2002).  Initial tuning runs of the model 
reveal exactly that behavior as the emphasis is shifted from absolute to relative gains.  
Similarly, the alliance behavior can be adjusted across a range between less powerful 
states seeking alliances in an effort to balance against the more powerful state, and less 
powerful states may instead emphasize bandwagoning behavior and attempt to ally 
with the most powerful state (and vice versa for balancing).  Initial tuning runs of the 
model reveal that this feature also works as expected, so that these types of behaviors 
can also be studied in future efforts.      
Adjustments to the Model 
MEMORIS-2 uses four additional parameters during memory trace generation 
and decay: state situation uncertainty, system situation uncertainty, a learning 
parameter, and an exponential decay parameter.  The state situation uncertainty 
parameter models uncertainty in the assessment of the characteristics of a given state, 
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and the situation uncertainty parameter models uncertainty in the assessment of 
relations between two states.  Both parameters were set fairly high, at .95 and .98 
respectively, indicating a high, but not perfect accuracy in assessing the status of the 
situation.  The learning parameter models the probability that the situation will be 
correctly recognized and controls whether or not the situation is correctly encoded into 
memory.  The exponential decay parameter controlled the rate at which memory 
degrades, and this was set so that memory traces remained fairly accurate for 15-25 
years, then become increasing degraded, with memory becoming totally degraded 
after 100 years.  While all of these values are fairly reasonable, only a limited amount 
of sensitivity analysis was performed to assess the impact of changing these values, 
and the model was not “tuned” using these values in an attempt to obtain better results.  
It should be pointed out that the nature of the dataset, with most values concentrated 
near the zero end of the 0-1 scale, results in fairly sparse memory trace vectors and 
consequently fairly low data content within the traces, which should lead to the model 
being relatively insensitive to changes in the uncertainty parameter values.  As 
discussed earlier, the rate at which memory decays may well have important effects 
which will bear further investigation in the future.   
The 3-state model was tuned by adjusting the various parameters to cause the 
incidence of conflict within the model system to roughly mirror the incidence of war 
in the data.  Using EUGene 3.03, and using the population of European directed dyads 
between 1816 and 1970 (cf. Bueno de Mesquita 1992), approximately 5% of the 
directed dyad-years also had Militarized Interstate Disputes, which in this case, counts 
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each year of continuing conflict as a separate dyad-year.   Results of 1000 model runs 
after adjustments show that the incidence of conflict roughly matches the MID data.   
 
Figure 37:  3-Sided Model Probability of Conflict 
 
Results of the 3-Player Model 
With initial model tuning complete, a test series of runs was used to see if the 
model would yield recognizable patterns or groupings of results.  Since the actual 
simulations will be using Correlates of War data, which is largely year by year, each 
move in the simulation will be equal to one year of real time.  The actual cases will be 
relatively short periods of history (50 years or less), so the total model run will be 70 
years: 20 years of initialization and 50 years of actual simulation of moves.   
First Sets of Runs: Random Moves   
For these runs, the 20 years of initialization was based on randomly chosen 
moves.  All three players started with individual sets of random moves for 20 years, 
and then the simulation was allowed to run for an additional 50 years.  Each set of 
moves were divided between those which were generally hostile (1=build up military, 
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3=threaten) and those which were generally friendly (2=offer alliance, 4=build up 
economy), and the percentage of each move was varied between 90% hostile/10% 
friendly and 10% hostile/90% friendly as shown.  Each set of runs was replicated 1000 
times, for a total of 5000 simulation runs.   
 
 Build Military Offer Alliance Threaten Build Economy 
Case 1 45% 5% 45% 5% 
Case 2 35% 15% 35% 15% 
Case 3 25% 25% 25% 25% 
Case 4 15% 35% 15% 35% 
Case 5 5% 45% 5% 45% 
Table 8:  Move Distribution for Simulation 
 
After completing 5000 simulation runs, the resulting overall data was 
collected: 
 Total score (final resource + final combat power) 
 Resource score (final resource) 
 Combat score (final combat power) 
 Ally score (total alliances/turn) 
 War score (total war/turn) 
The values are summarized in the table below.  Notice that the Resource, Ally 
and War variables are all positively skewed, showing that these results tend to have 
concentrated values near the low end of the spectrum.  The Resource variable also is 
fairly “peaked”, with more values concentrated toward the middle, when compared to 
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the normal distribution, and the other variables tend to be more spread out.  This type 
of relationship will repeat itself throughout the analysis.   
Variable n Mean Std 
Dev 
Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis K-S 
Stat 
p-value 
TOTAL 5000 956.74 122.72 526.87 1283.04 -0.36 -0.47 0.05 <.01 
CP 5000 550.37 105.72 262.72 868.22 -0.06 -0.69 0.04 <.01 
RES 5000 310.23 126.26 149.64 761.38 1.34 0.50 0.22 <.01 
ALLY 5000 0.97 0.64 0.00 3.64 0.64 -0.42 0.10 <.01 
WAR 5000 0.26 0.20 0.00 1.12 0.82 0.14 0.13 <.01 
Table 9:  Summary of 3-Player Results 
 
With the first set of data in hand, the results were analyzed to see if specific 
sets or patterns developed.  If the model replicates the dynamics seen in the real world, 
the results should show specific outcomes matching (at a minimum) conflict, peace 
and some intermediate state of tension.  Similarly, the numbers of wars and alliances 
within the system should match with the general set of outcomes.   
Cluster Analysis: Determining the Appropriate Number of Clusters 
The results data was analyzed for patterns of association, or clusters, using a 
two-stage cluster analysis, as suggested by Hair (Hair, et al., 1998).  The SAS k-means 
clustering procedure (FASTCLUS) was used, as that allowed particular cases to move 
in and out of a cluster as new points are considered.  This is more robust for this type 
of data than the hierarchical clustering procedure (CLUSTER), which locks a case to a 
particular cluster.  This can often create situations where the particular clustering 
result is dependent on the order of the data, rather than the actual values of the data.  
K-means clustering is not without its potential pitfalls, as the clusters are extremely 
dependent on the number of original clusters chosen by the analyst.  To ameliorate this 
issue, the analysis was performed using a range of starting assumptions in an attempt 
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to discover the most robust approach.  Hierarchical clustering was used to determine 
the number of clusters, followed by k-means clustering to perform the actual 
clustering.  After the data was entered into SAS, the data was normalized using the 
SAS STANDARD procedure and then a hierarchical cluster procedure was performed 
using the CLUSTER procedure.  Results of the cluster analysis are shown in the table 
below.   
 The Cluster Procedure 
 Ward's Minimum Variance Cluster Analysis 
 Eigenvalues of the Covariance Matrix 
 Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
1 2.9922 0.6905 0.3740 0.3740 
2 2.3017 0.9804 0.2877 0.6617 
3 1.3213 0.6028 0.1652 0.8269 
4 0.7185 0.4430 0.0898 0.9167 
5 0.2755 0.0636 0.0344 0.9512 
6 0.2119 0.0557 0.0265 0.9777 
7 0.1562 0.1336 0.0195 0.9972 
8 0.0226  0.0028 1.0000 
Table 10:  Hierarchical Cluster Analysis 
 
 
Figure 38:  Hierarchical Cluster Analysis 
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There are no hard and fast rules for choosing the correct number of clusters, 
but the normal rules of thumb are based on the eigenvalues, the eigenvalue plot, and 
the cumulative proportion plot, and then analyst judgment of the actual clusters.  
Based on the results above, I expected that the final result would be either three or four 
clusters.  Following Hair’s procedure, I then produced a dendogram, or tree plot of the 
cluster values.  This shows in a different format how the clusters tend to break apart, 
and can give additional guidance on the best number of clusters.   
 
Figure 39:  Dendogram of Clusters 
  
The dendogram shows the same basic situation as the eigenvalues.  The height 
of each “limb” of the tree is the amount of pseudo-R2 or variance that each cluster 
provides.  Once the heights of the limbs get short, that means that the additional 
clusters are not providing much additional explanation of the variance in the data.   
The division into two clusters accounts for about 27% of the variance, and the 
Cut line for 3 clusters 
Cut line for 4 clusters 
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subsequent division into three clusters adds another 18% of variance.  When the center 
cluster divides into two additional clusters, that division picks up about 8% of 
variance.  The “cuts” in the tree are at the point where additional clusters give 10% 
and 5% of additional variance – which can easily be seen as the points of diminishing 
returns.  These two cuts also show that the number of clusters should be either three or 
four.   
The final criterion is analyst judgment – how well do the clusters actually work 
in describing the data.  For that, I turn to an additional clustering algorithm, k-means 
clustering.  This is a very quick way to generate clusters, but its reliability is critically 
dependent on picking the proper number of clusters.  This is why the two-stage 
procedure was used – the hierarchical stage generates the proper number of clusters, 
and then the k-means stage creates the actual clusters for analysis.   
Analysis with Three Clusters 
To test the three cluster solution, I used the SAS k-means clustering procedure 
(FASTCLUS), specifying the entire set of variables as data and three clusters.  As 
shown in the figure below, the procedure produced three distinct clusters which I 
characterize as follows: 
 Conflict (1749 cases): High levels of conflict, low levels of alliance and 
resource, mean levels of combat power.   
 Standoff (2182 cases): Low levels of conflict, mean levels of alliance, 
low levels of resources, and high levels of combat power. 
 Alliance (1069 cases):  Low levels of conflict, high levels of alliances, 
high levels of resources, and low levels of combat power.   
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Figure 40:  Normalized Means for 3 Clusters (n=5000) 
 
This breakout of clusters appears to have considerable face validity.  In both 
the “Conflict” and “Standoff” cases, the emphasis is on developing combat power 
rather than resources.  In the “Conflict” cluster, players spend a lot of effort 
developing combat power, and then that power is used up during conflict, so the 
resultant combat power state tends to stay low.  In both the “Standoff” and “Alliance” 
cases, the number of alliances is at the mean value or much higher, which means that 
there is a fairly active and long-lasting alliance structure in both cases, where in the 
“Conflict” case, alliances are rarely made and quickly broken.   
The three clusters also break out nicely from a statistical viewpoint.  An 
Euclidean measure of distance between clusters,  Mahalanobis distance (D2), was used 
with an F-test to determine whether the clusters are actually statistically different.  As 
can be seen in the table below, the difference in each of the variables is highly 
significant across clusters (p<.0001), and the Scheffé test shows that the inter-cluster 
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variation is also highly significant (p<.0001) for all cluster combinations (1-2, 1-3 and 
2-3).   
 n CP Res Ally War Scheffé 
Conflict 1749 -0.08 -0.57 -0.86 1.01 <.0001 
Standoff 2182 0.46 -0.39 0.02 -0.49 <.0001 
Alliance 1069 -0.80 1.76 1.30 -0.64 <.0001 
R2  0.65 0.84 0.59 0.55  
F-test  4700 12761 3654 3096  
Significance  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  
Table 11:  3-Player Cluster Statistics 
 
Analysis of Four Clusters 
The three cluster results appear solid and provide good explanatory power, but 
given the results from the hierarchical cluster analysis, four clusters may also be a 
contender.  Recall from the dendogram in Figure 38 that the fourth cluster is a 
subdivision of the central cluster, so I expected that the four cluster case would keep 
the “Conflict” and “Alliance” clusters and then subdivide the central “Standoff” 
cluster.   
As before, I used the SAS k-means algorithm, and the results are as follows: 
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Figure 41:  Means for 4 Clusters (n=5000) 
 
The four clusters shown are described below:  
 Conflict (1491 cases): High levels of conflict, low levels of alliance and 
resource, low levels of combat power.   
 Uneasy Standoff (928 cases): Mean level of conflict, low levels of 
alliance and resource, and high levels of combat power.   
 Standoff (1605 cases): Low levels of conflict, mean levels of alliance, 
low levels of resources, and high levels of combat power. 
 Alliance (976 cases):  Low levels of conflict, high levels of alliances, 
high levels of resources, and low levels of combat power.   
Comparing these results to the 3-cluster analysis in Figure 39 shows that, as 
expected, the central “Standoff” cluster generally divided into two subdivisions, 
largely based on the level of conflict.  Notice also that the overall level of combat 
power has increased slightly in the two central clusters, and decreased in the 
“Conflict” cluster, which shows that about 300 cases with moderate levels of conflict 
(and consequently lower levels of combat power)  that would have originally been in 
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the “Conflict” cluster have now shifted to the two “Standoff” clusters.  As expected, 
the “Alliance” cluster was virtually unchanged, with a difference of less than 100 
clusters.   
These clusters are fairly descriptive, although the two central clusters share 
virtually the same levels of combat power, and the “Standoff” and “Alliance” clusters 
share the same levels of conflict, which diminishes their descriptive power in terms of 
distinguishing between outcomes.  Looking at the statistical results in the table below, 
each cluster does show highly significant differences in each of the variables 
(p<.0001), and the additional cluster does increase R
2 
values by a small amount (1-
3%), which is probably simply due to the extra variable in the mix.  However, the 
Scheffé test shows that the clusters themselves are not necessarily distinct, with the 
overlapping values discussed above making the inter-cluster distances become non-
significant between clusters 2 and 3 (Uneasy Standoff – Standoff), and 3 and 4 
(Standoff-Alliance).    
 
 n CP Res Ally War Scheffé 
Conflict 1491 -0.49 -0.58 -0.85 1.14 <.0001 
Uneasy Standoff 928 0.77 -0.49 -0.20 -0.13 (2-3) 
Standoff 1605 0.76 -0.32 0.09 -0.61 (2-3),(3-4) 
Alliance 976 -1.23 1.88 1.33 -0.61 (4-3) 
R2  0.66 0.87 0.56 0.58  
F-test  3292 10776 2255 2347  
Significance  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  
Table 12:  Statistical Results for 4 Clusters 
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Conclusion of Cluster Analysis 
Based on the above results, the case for three clusters looks to be solid, and the 
remainder of the analysis will proceed with three clusters as the best combination of 
descriptive power and statistical significance.  As stated above, if the simulation is 
working as expected, it should show a changing distribution of results in accordance 
with the changes in inputs.  Recall that the distribution of threat vs. peaceful moves 
was changed from 90%/10% in the first set of runs through 10%/90% in the final set.  
Based on that, results should show a change in the distribution of cluster results, with 
more threatening environments eliciting more conflict, and less threatening 
environments resulting in less conflict.  The actual results are as shown: 
 
Figure 42:  Cluster Distribution vs. Threat (n=5000) 
 
 90% 
threat 
70% 
threat 
50% 
threat 
30% 
threat 
10% 
threat 
Total Test Value Signif. 
Conflict 906 585 206 51 1 1749 chi-sq 6549 <.0001 
Standoff 94 415 793 862 18 2182 contingency coeff 0.7531  
Alliance 0 0 1 87 981 1069 Cramer's v 0.8093  
Table 13:  Statistical Results of Clusters vs. Threat 
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The above results clearly show that the simulation behaves as expected, and 
that the results are highly statistically significant.  With high or even moderate levels 
of threat, the cluster results are entirely divided between the Conflict and Standoff 
clusters, indicating patterns of high armaments, high conflict, or both.  However, once 
the conflict level decreases to lower levels, there is a rapid shift in the distribution to 
an almost entirely peaceful situation at very low levels of conflict.   
These initial results, while by no means definitive, are certainly suggestive that 
the three-sided model is replicating some of the dynamics predicted in the IR literature 
and demonstrated in the COW data, particularly in the areas of conflict and alliance 
behavior.  Further, the model creates clusters of results which have face validity, and 
react to changes in the general threat level as expected.  With these initial results in 
hand, it is time to turn to expanding the three-sided game into a large enough game to 
model the chosen test cases.   
Developing the multi-state simulation model:  MEMORIS-2 
The MEMORIS-2 model is a straight-forward extrapolation of the three-sided 
game discussed above, with the exceptions of increased number of players (8), 
rescaling the payoff structure, and the requirement of a mechanism to initialize the 
simulation using real-world data instead of through random moves.    
It was necessary to rescale the payoff structure to allow for the increased 
number of players.  If the payoff values had remained constant, than the five 
additional move choices would have (potentially) increased the possible total payoff 
by a factor of 2.5, which would have created unrealistic growth rates.  The overall 
126 
payoff structure was simply arithmetically rescaled to keep the maximum possible 
growth or decline rates to +/- 10%.   
The increase in number of players is a (relatively) simple programming task, 
requiring only that the Mathematica simulation logic be expanded to allow for more 
players, and increasing the size of the several arrays and data structures within the 
program code.   
Data for Initialization 
Initialization of the model through existing COW data is somewhat more 
complex.  For each iteration (one year of time), the model will need to input the 
dyadic data vectors for all states in the system.  These vectors are then converted to 
sets of features, with values transformed from COW data for the given year and 
rescaled to match the model’s payoff structure. 
These sets of features form an extended trace vector, composed of (0,1) values.  
This trace vector represents the episodic memory of a state’s interaction with another 
state for that year.  This trace is then read into memory, where is becomes part of the 
state’s total experience with all other states in the system.  As stated earlier, the trace 
can also be encoded incorrectly into memory, which would model the action of either 
misperception or deception within the system.  Once the trace is stored in memory, 
traces from previous years are degraded using an exponential decay function to 
simulate gradual degradation of information over time.   
The above process is relatively simple, and can be automated.  The more 
difficult aspect is to attribute player strategies to match up with the changes in scores 
over time.  Of course, if MID or alliance data shows that conflict or alliance was 
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initiated in a given year, then the choice is simple, but otherwise the choice of imputed 
strategy is subjective.  The historical record helps with breaking ties, but as with all 
coding endeavors, the exact coding decision is necessarily tentative and subject to 
revision.    
Once the coding of the initialization data is complete, that data is read into the 
MEMORIS-2 memory, and the simulation begins from that point.  Each player will go 
through the identical process of situation recognition, comparison to semantic 
concepts, hypothesis generation and testing, and selection of chosen strategies, as in 
the previously-discussed three-player model.  Once this inference engine completes its 
operation, MEMORIS-2 then records key variables, completes any required updates of 
existing memory traces, and then steps to the next year.  As before, a Monte Carlo 
process will be used to determine the outcome of probabilistic events such as war, and 
to determine whether the player is seeking relative vs. absolute gains, and whether the 
player is engaging in balancing or bandwagoning alliance behavior.   
Having laid the groundwork and successfully developed the model, I now turn 
to analysis of the two test cases.   
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Chapter 4:  Europe 1885-1914:  The Great War That Was 
 
Introduction 
As stated in Chapter One, the study of decision offers two competing lines of 
analytical approach, one of rational choice which can be modeled via the tools of 
expected utility, and one of situational recognition and use of rules which can be 
modeled from the cognitive angle.  This returns us to how the interaction between the 
situation and the way in which decision-makers process information affects 
subsequent actions.  The situation in Europe between 1885 and 1914 provides an 
opportunity to explore this question.  In this situation, there are a relatively small set of 
states with a wide variety of conflict and alliance interactions, leading up to a conflict 
involving most, but not all, of the participants.   
The Situation 
World War I was a tragedy of enormous proportions.  Despite the optimism of 
the end of the 19
th
 century (c.f., Angell, 1910), the world soon found itself embroiled 
in a conflict that was beyond the imagination of any decision-maker, military or 
civilian.  Such was the calamity that the outbreak of World War I is one of the most 
analyzed periods in history.  The number of causes proposed for the outbreak of war is 
as diverse as the authors writing about the subject.  These causes include: the actions 
of Germany, the existence of Germany itself, interlocking alliance structures, secret 
alliances, offense-defense imbalances, the cult of the offensive, mobilization races, 
crisis instability, military plans, misperception, the situation in the Balkans, the naval 
armaments race, militarism, greed, and the structure of European power.  While it is 
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well beyond the scope of this effort to analyze or predict the causes of World War I 
(see, among many others: Farrar, 1972; Holsti, 1965; Hermann and Hermann, 1968; 
Holsti, North and Brodie, 1968; Keegan, 2000; Massie, 1991, Tuchman, 1962, Joll & 
Martell 2007, Strachan, 2004), I will not add a new cause to that already long list, 
other than to show probabilistically how the combination of the external situation and 
the processing of that information created a greatly increased probability of major 
systemic war in Europe between 1885 and 1914.  I will also show that, even though 
the incentives for a given action remained constant throughout the period, that the 
pattern and pace of events created a situation where hostile actions were more 
attractive than peaceful actions.   
Data for the Simulation 
The MEMORIS-2 model is able to readily handle eight state players at a time.  
In theory, the model itself is not arbitrarily limited to a certain number of players.  
Each increase in the number of players, however, causes an exponential increase in 
run-times, roughly doubling for every three extra players.   With eight players, a 
normal set of 1000 simulation runs takes roughly eighteen hours on a quad-core 
desktop computer which I hand-built specifically for running Mathematica.   
The eight states chosen were: The United Kingdom, France, Germany, Austria-
Hungary, Italy, Russia, Turkey, and Serbia.  While this certainly leaves out some 
potentially key players, such as Romania, Greece, and Belgium, the major decision-
makers for the critical events leading to the war are all present.  Further, the model 
shows roughly the same dynamic in the three-player game in Chapter Three as it does 
in the eight-player European scenario, so it is unlikely that the inclusion of other states 
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would significantly change the results.  Further optimization of the model, faster 
computers, and of course, more time will allow for expanded analysis, but that is 
another project.   
As stated in the previous chapter, this set of simulation runs is drawn from the 
existing Correlates of War datasets.  Specifically, data is drawn from the National 
Military Capabilities, Militarized Interstate Disputes, Formal Alliances, and Total 
Trade datasets (Singer, 1987; Ghosen and Bennett, 2003; Small and Singer, 1969; 
Stinnett, et al., 2002; Marshall and Jaggers, 2003).  The specific variables drawn from 
each dataset are summarized in the Table below: 
Dataset Version Variable(s) 
National Military 
Capabilities 
3.02 
Total population (tpop), military 
personnel (milper), military 
expenditures (milex), iron and steel 
production(irst), energy production 
(energy), urban population (upop) 
Militarized Interstate 
Disputes Dyadic Data 
3.02 HostLevA, HostLevB 
Formal Alliances 3.03 SSType 
Total Trade 3.0 ttrade 
Table 14:  Data variables and sources 
 
It should be noted that the variables above are not normally distributed.  
Continuous variables form either unimodal or bimodal distributions with most values 
clustered to one end or the other of the value range.  The data from the Militarized 
Interstate Disputes and Alliance databases are discrete on a 0-4 or 0-5 scale, again 
with most values clustered at the low end of the scale.   
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Factor Analysis of NMC Data 
As seen in the previous chapter, the existing MEMORIS-2 model uses four 
variables, Resource, Combat Power, Alliance and War for its calculations.  This 
required a conversion from the above data into a form which was readily usable by the 
simulation model.  My intuition was that the NMC data along with Total Trade 
measures two basic factors, military strength and economic strength.  This led to an 
initial try at grouping the variables as follows:   
Economic strength (Resource) = f(energy, upop, ttrade)   (10) 
Military strength (Combat Power) =s f(milper, milex, irst, tpop)   (11) 
To test this intuition, I conducted a factor analysis on a subset of the COW data 
using SAS FACTOR procedure.  I used an original exploratory set of five factors, 
which resulted in the following eigenvalue matrix and factor patterns for the principal 
components.   
 Eigenvalues of the Correlation Matrix: Total = 7   
 Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
1 4.559 2.651 0.651 0.651 
2 1.909 1.556 0.273 0.924 
3 0.353 0.260 0.050 0.975 
4 0.093 0.039 0.013 0.988 
5 0.054 0.036 0.008 0.996 
6 0.018 0.004 0.003 0.998 
7 0.014 --- 0.002 1.000 
Table 15:  Factor Analysis Eigenvalues 
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 Factor Pattern 
 Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 Factor5 
MILPER 0.5209 0.8330 -0.0274 0.1671 0.0465 
MILEX 0.8193 0.3442 -0.4502 -0.0284 -0.0687 
ENERGY 0.9118 -0.3938 0.0293 -0.0375 -0.0432 
IRST 0.8921 -0.3403 0.2202 0.1674 -0.0986 
UPOP 0.9776 -0.1066 0.0496 -0.1460 -0.0122 
TPOP 0.4284 0.8382 0.3120 -0.1167 -0.0050 
TTRADE 0.9223 -0.3340 -0.0240 0.0149 0.1881 
Table 16:  Initial Factor Pattern 
 
               Variance Explained by Each Factor 
 
Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 Factor5 
4.5595 1.9087 0.3531 0.0933 0.0540 
     
Table 17:  Variance Explained by Factors 
 
The above factor results show that the vast majority of the variance in the data 
(92.4%) is explained by the first two factors (Table 15, right column).  Additionally, 
the factor pattern, which shows the amount of variance in each variable explained by 
the corresponding factor, shows that each variable has over 50% variation explained 
by the first two factors, and then only weakly for the last three (Table 16).  This shows 
that the initial impression of two distinct factors looks pretty good.   
The cluster analysis was re-run with just two factors, giving the following 
results: 
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              Factor Pattern 
 Factor1 Factor2 
MILPER 0.52087 0.8330 
MILEX 0.81934 0.34418 
ENERGY 0.91178 -0.39384 
IRST 0.89208 -0.3403 
UPOP 0.97755 -0.1066 
TPOP 0.42838 0.83819 
TTRADE 0.92228 -0.33402 
Table 18:  Factor Pattern with Two Factors 
              
 
   
MILPER MILEX ENERGY IRST UPOP TPOP TTRADE 
0.9652 0.7898 0.9864 0.9116 0.9670 0.8861 0.9622 
Table 19:  Variance Explained by Factors 
 
The above results confirm that two factors explain the vast majority of the total 
variance, and that for individual variables, the two factors explain about 80% or better 
of the variance in each individual variable.  However, from the factor pattern, the 
factor loadings do not follow the initial intuition.  This is not unusual for principal 
components factor analysis, as it tries to account for as much variance with the first 
factor as possible, so all of the variables except tpop load at 50% or higher on this first 
factor.  The general solution at this point is to use Varimax factor rotation, which 
orthogonally rotates the factors to produce a situation where each factor will have 
either high or low correlation with each variable.  Thus, Varimax rotation tries to 
divide the variables between the factors rather than loading the maximum variance on 
the first factor, as seen earlier in the principal components analysis. With this in mind, 
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Varimax factor rotation was used to produce the final factor set, with the results as 
follows: 
           Rotated Factor Pattern 
 Factor1 Factor2 
MILPER 0.1083 0.9765 
MILEX 0.5891 0.6654 
ENERGY 0.9924 0.0404 
IRST 0.9514 0.0801 
UPOP 0.9271 0.3277 
TPOP 0.0227 0.9410 
TTRADE 0.9759 0.0988 
Table 20:  Rotated Factor Pattern for NMC Data 
 
   
MILPER MILEX ENERGY IRST UPOP TPOP TTRADE 
0.9652 0.7898 0.9864 0.9116 0.9670 0.8861 0.9622 
Table 21:  Variance Explained by Rotated Factors 
 
As expected, the rotated factor pattern breaks fairly cleanly into two pieces, 
with milper and tpop in the second factor (combat power) and irst, energy, upop and 
ttrade into the first factor (resources).  Note that the milex variable shows at higher 
than .5 in both factors (Table 20), but more strongly in the second factor, which 
follows the intuition that milex should also be in the combat power factor.   
Resources = f(irst, energy, upop, ttrade)    (12) 
Combat Power = f(milex, milper, tpop)    (13) 
This is slightly different than the original intuition, which originally had iron 
and steel production in the combat power column, but clearly such industry is also a 
big part of the overall economic strength of a state.  The showing of military 
expenditures in both factors is also worthy of note, but I can certainly make a logical 
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case that while military expenditure is primarily related to combat power, such 
expenditures are often used to buy military hardware, which clearly has an impact on 
the overall economy.  This case is, of course, made quite often by any Congressman 
who has a defense contractor in his or her district!   
Conversion of Variables 
With this analysis in hand, converting the COW NMC and Trade data to 
MEMORIS-2 input data was fairly straightforward.  Since the variables had several 
orders of magnitude differences in scale, all variables were rescaled to a 0-1 scoring 
range based on the total range of each variable for the period 1885-1905.  The 
individual scores were added together (irst, energy, upop and ttrade for resources and 
milper, milex and tpop for combat power) and each result multiplied by 500 as a 
scaling factor.  Based on the 1885-1905 data, this left Serbia with a zero score for both 
factors.  Since going below zero causes a state to be eliminated, 25 points were added 
to all results to keep everyone in the black.  This gave the following initial set of 
scores for 1885 (see Table).  Scores were calculated for each year 1885-1914.   
 UK FR GMY AUH ITA SER RUS TUR 
Resource 1089 382 467 154 258 25 210 40 
Cmbt Pwr 674 424 482 265 282 25 646 254 
Table 22:  Initial Values for WWI Case 
The second part of the conversion process was attributing MEMORIS-2 moves 
to the actual data.  Recall from the previous chapter that each player only has four 
move choices: 
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 Move 1: build-up military 
 Move 2: offer alliance (results in formal alliance if both sides choose 
this move) 
 Move 3: threaten (results in war if both sides choose this move) 
 Move 4: build economy 
The process of move attribution required a combination of the resource, 
combat power, MID, and alliance data.  The overall process was relatively 
straightforward. 
 
Figure 43:  Alliance and War Coding 
 
The data was then formatted to create a status vector for each dyadic 
combination of states for each year, for a total of over 1,500 directed dyadic pairs of 
input data spanning 30 years of time.  This vector will consist of the moves for each 
state in the dyadic pair, followed by resource change, combat power change, 
1
•If no MID or Alliance that year:
•Compare resource growth with combat power growth
•Choose move=1 if combat power growth larger, move=4 otherwise
2
•If MID exists:
•If HIGHACT = 5 (war), then both players move=3
•Otherwise, initiating party move=3, other side move=1
3
•If Alliance exists:
•If Alliance level=1 (Formal alliance), both player move=2 for 1st year
•If Alliance level=2 or 3 (entente or non-agression pact), initiating 
player move=2, other side move=4 or 1, depending on situation
•Subsequent alliance years, refer to step 1
 137   
cumulative resources and cumulative combat power for each side, memory-degraded 
versions of the previous four factors, a 5-digit binary coding variable, flags for 
alliances, war, and the year.  Move data, coding variables and status flags are all 
binary (0,1) data.  For example, a status vector would look like:  
[200,300,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,3,-2, .5,.9,1080,670,236,260 ,…  0,0,1890] 
 where the first element is the country code for the first country in the pair (in this case 
the UK), the second element is the country code for the other country in the pair 
(Austria-Hungary), player one’s move (1,0,0,0 = move 1), player two’s move, etc., 
finishing with alliance=0 (no alliance), war=0 (no war) and the year.  This data was 
then read into a single combined file, and was then used to initialize the simulation.   
Drawing from the above data, each year is composed of 56 directed dyad 
interactions, so each state’s interaction with every other state in the system requires a 
separate calculation and choice.    For the first 20 years of the simulation, each state’s 
move choice and result is based on the actual Correlates of War data for that period of 
time.  This allows the historical record to be essentially “read” into the memory of the 
simulation.  Once the 20-year initialization is complete, then the model begins to 
calculate move choices based on each state’s judgment of the given situation, the 
assessment of the likely moves of the other party, and the anticipated results.  As 
described in the previous chapter, each state’s strategy toward every other state is 
independent, so a state could threaten one state, offer alliance to another, build up 
forces against a third, and so forth.  States do have knowledge of existing wars and 
alliances, and that knowledge is part of the decision process.        
  
 138   
Creating the simulation baseline 
Prior to starting the analysis with actual historical data, I accomplished several 
sets of baseline runs get a feel for how the simulation reacted to various move 
combinations.  The initial baseline runs all started with the initial 1885 values shown 
above, and the first 20 moves were generated randomly from that starting point.  After 
this initialization, the simulation was allowed to calculate its own moves for an 
additional 50 moves, making the total length of the simulation 70 moves, or 70 years 
of time.  This was accomplished 1000 times for each set of runs.   
The random generation of the 20-move initialization was varied according to 
the procedure used in the 3-player game in the previous chapter.  Moves were divided 
between those which were generally hostile (1=build up military, 3=threaten) and 
those which were generally friendly (2=offer alliance, 4=build up economy), and the 
percentage of each move was varied between 90% hostile/10% friendly and 10% 
hostile/90% friendly as shown. 
 Build Military Offer Alliance Threaten Build Economy 
Case 1 45% 5% 45% 5% 
Case 2 35% 15% 35% 15% 
Case 3 25% 25% 25% 25% 
Case 4 15% 35% 15% 35% 
Case 5 5% 45% 5% 45% 
Table 23:  Distribution of Initial Moves 
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Results of the Simulation Baseline 
After completing 1000 simulation runs for each case, the resulting overall data 
were collected: 
 Total score (final resource + final combat power) 
 Resource score (final resource) 
 Combat score (final combat power) 
 Ally score (total alliances/turn) 
 War score (total war/turn) 
A summary of the statistical properties of the main results is below.  As can be 
seen from the table, the output variables are all roughly normally distributed, 
positively skewed, and show varying degrees of negative kurtosis.  Thus, each output 
variable is distributed somewhat “flatter” than the normal distribution, and the means 
are skewed by clusters of observations at the low end of the range.    
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis K-S 
Stat 
p-value 
TOTAL 5000 4339.92 3179.33 574.38 17493.05 0.68 -0.56 0.17 <.01 
CP 5000 522.94 243.54 78.87 1371.45 0.87 -0.05 0.12 <.01 
RES 5000 1786.06 1542.27 25.07 6309.90 0.43 -1.04 0.19 <.01 
ALLY 5000 11.43 7.54 0.72 30.40 0.13 -1.36 0.17 <.01 
WAR 5000 2.08 1.97 0.00 9.08 0.72 -0.84 0.21 <.01 
Table 24:  Statistical Properties of Results (WWI Baseline) 
         
Cluster Analysis of the Results 
These results were then analyzed for distinct clusters, following the basic 
procedure outlined in the previous chapter.   The data were all normalized, and then 
analyzed both hierarchically and using k-means cluster techniques (SAS procedures 
CLUSTER and FASTCLUS).  As seen in the 3-player case, the results broke into 
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either three or four distinct clusters.  Again, the difference between three and four 
clusters is that the “middle” cluster essentially broke into two separate sub-clusters, 
which did not offer any new interpretive value.  The two sub-clusters were essentially 
variations of the same trend, so three clusters are used in the remainder of the analysis 
for the sake of simplicity.   
Again, the three clusters show virtually the same dynamic that was shown in 
the previous chapter.  One cluster showed a high level of war, along with high combat 
power, and low resource and alliance levels, indicating high and continuous conflict, 
which I characterize as a “Conflict” cluster.  The second cluster showed lower levels 
of war and combat power, with moderate numbers of alliances and high resources, 
which I characterize as a “Standoff” cluster.  The final cluster shows low levels of war 
and combat power, but very high resource and alliance levels, which I characterize as 
a “Peaceful Alliance” cluster.  A summary of the results is shown below. 
 
Figure 44:  WW1 Base Cluster Values 
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 CP Res Ally War Scheffé 
Conflict 0.50 -1.01 -1.11 1.27 <.0001 
Standoff -0.40 0.69 -0.10 -0.32 <.0001 
Alliance -0.79 1.00 0.91 -0.78 <.0001 
R-squared 0.47 0.80 0.75 0.81  
F-test 3274 10255 7641 10580  
Significance <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  
 Table 25:  WW1 Base Cluster Statistics 
 
As can be seen, the above table, the clusters are quite distinct, both at the 
variable level and at the between-clusters level, as shown by the highly significant F 
and Scheffé tests.  With this division into clusters, I can now show how the 
distribution of results changes as the general level of threat increases.   
 
Figure 45: Cluster Values vs. Increasing Threat (WW1 case) 
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mean for each set of threat-level runs.  Note that the means show a nearly-perfect 
inversion as the threat level changes from low to high.  The only exception is for the 
Combat Power variable, which drops between the 90% and 70% threat cases, then 
falling as the threat level decreases.  The reason for this result is that when players in 
the model engage in high levels of conflict, it tends to offset the normal buildup in 
combat power.  This is because, as in real life, using your military tends to chew it up.  
More moderate threat levels (such as the 70% case) cause buildups, but not as much 
actual conflict.   
With the significant change in the mean values shown above, it is not 
surprising to find a significant change in the number of cases in each cluster as the 
threat changes.  Following the shift in the distribution of threat from Table 25 above 
gave the following distribution of cases by cluster. 
 
Figure 46:  Cluster Distribution vs. Threat (WW1 Base Case) 
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 90% 
threat 
70% 
threat 
50% 
threat 
30% 
threat 
10% 
threat 
n Test Value Signif 
Conflict 974 650 3 1 0 1628 Chi-sq 6287 <.0001 
Standoff 26 350 745 124 2 1247 Cont. coeff. 0.7463  
Alliance 0 0 252 875 998 2125 Cramer's v 0.7929  
      5000    
Table 26:  Cluster Distribution (WW1 Base Case) 
 
As was the case in Chapter Three, there is also a strong and statistically 
significant relationship between the amount of threat and the distribution of cluster 
results.  Note that as the threat level drops below 50%, the number of cases with high 
conflict drops to near zero, while the number of cases with a more peaceful “alliance” 
pattern increases.  In the middle area, the “standoff” pattern dominates.  These results 
give an expected baseline which will now be used to assess the runs which used the 
actual historical data.   
Cluster Example Cases 
To give an example of each type of cluster, I have plotted the overall scores 
(Resources + Combat Power) along with the incidence of conflict (shown as vertical 
bars).  Since these cluster examples are based on random initialization, there is no 
attempt to tie these particular results with any historical events.   
The “Alliance Cluster” is characterized by a high degree of growth and very 
low conflict (in this case, only two episodes of war).  States essentially shift to a 
maximum peacetime economic growth (about 10% per year). 
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Figure 47:  WW1 Alliance Example 
The “Standoff” cluster is characterized by low economic growth along with 
intermittent conflict.  Note that the height of the conflict bars indicates the number of 
states in conflict (2, 4, etc.) and the wider conflict bars indicate multi-year conflicts.  
States are required to balance their economic and military needs, and therefore the 
overall growth is much less than in the Alliance case. 
 
Figure 48:  WW1 Standoff Example 
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The “Conflict” case is marked by high intensity conflict generally involving 
four or more states, and these conflicts are more likely to be multi-year. As might be 
expected, this occurs along with generally low growth.  Here, most of the effort is put 
toward military power, and that power ends up being chewed up in constant, large-
scale conflict.   
 
Figure 49:  WW1 Conflict Example 
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will be seen, these sets of results are still highly significant, so the 5-fold decrease in 
run times is a more than acceptable tradeoff.   
The first set of simulation runs starts with 1885 and uses actual data from 
1885-1904 to initialize the simulation.  Subsequently, each set of runs moved one year 
into the future, with the next set of runs using the 1886-1905 data for initialization, 
and so forth to the final set of runs using 1893-1912 to initialize.  As previously, data 
was collected year by year for each set of simulation runs.    The following table 
summarizes the statistical properties of the runs.   
 
Variable 
N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis 
K-S 
Stat p-value 
TOTAL 
1800 7476.11 7970.25 1039.11 10270.76 1.44 1.14 0.261 <.01 
CP 
1800 1104.38 509.70 169.70 2668.31 0.55 -0.46 0.079 <.01 
RES 
1800 1623.97 1756.17 125.80 9876.40 1.54 1.86 0.253 <.01 
ALLY 
1800 7.07 1.06 2.76 10.26 0.08 0.28 0.103 <.01 
WAR 
1800 0.83 0.98 0.00 6.08 1.29 1.83 0.255 <.01 
Table 27:  World War I Result Statistics 
 
Cluster Results: World War I Historical Data 
The cluster analysis of the nine historical data runs was performed in the same 
manner as previously discussed.  The results are shown in the figure and table below.  
As expected, the clusters followed the same basic pattern as was seen in both the 
WW1 baseline case and in the 3-player baseline.  Three clusters were found during the 
analysis, which corresponded fairly well to the three clusters in the baseline of 
Conflict, Uneasy Standoff, and Peaceful Alliance.  The middle “Standoff” cluster is 
slightly different than the baseline case (Figure 44), but very close to the same values 
as seen in the 3-player game (ref Figure 40, Chapter 3).   
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Figure 50 : Cluster Results, WW1 Yearly Analysis 
 
 
 
 
Table 28: Cluster Statistics, WW1 Yearly Analysis 
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variable.  However, from Table 27, recall that the distribution for the Resource 
variable had high kurtosis, so the distribution of results was much more tightly 
clustered for this variable than we saw for the Ally variable, which explains why one 
value is significant and the other is not.  Further, this also shows why the Resource 
variable mean for the “Standoff” cluster was different in this case than in the baseline 
case.  In the baseline case, the Resource variable distribution had negative kurtosis, 
meaning that the distribution was more spread out than in the yearly case.  This is, 
naturally, due to the fact that these simulation runs were initialized using a single set 
of historical data, which caused all result variables to be more tightly clustered 
together.   
Nevertheless, the results do follow the initial baseline results quite closely, and 
the plot of the clusters by year shows the same type of relationship seen in the baseline 
case, as shown below.   
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Figure 51:  WW1 Clusters by Year 
  
 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 Total   
Conflict 43 8 6 12 32 96 150 42 59 448 chi-sq 1932 
Standoff 157 1 0 8 160 104 50 158 141 779 cont coeff 0.7195 
Peace 0 191 194 180 8 0 0 0 0 573 Cramer's v 0.7327 
          1800   
Table 29:  WW1 Cluster Statistics by Year 
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this time, the threat of major conflict remains elevated – and when the threat of major 
war is significantly high year after year, it only takes one more spark to ignite the 
tinder, as happened in the summer of 1914.   
 
Figure 52:  WW1 Variable Means by Year 
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actually started in 1914, the simulation results indicate that it could have just as easily 
started in 1912 or 1913.   
The same picture is also shown when looking at the percentage of simulation 
years where there is actual war.  This is calculated by dividing the number of 
simulation dyad-years where war occurred into the total number of dyad years in all of 
the simulation runs.  Each simulation run is 50 years, times 200 simulation runs, times 
8 dyads, for a total of 80,000 possible dyad-years.  So a probability of .3 means that 
24,000 dyad-years out of 80,000 resulted in war – a very high incidence of possible 
conflict, particularly when repeated over several years.   
  
Figure 53:  Percentage of Conflict-Years (WW1 Case) 
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Figure 54:  Total Conflict Probability by Country (WW1 Case) 
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Figure 55:  State-State Probability of Conflict (WW1 Case) 
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The state-by-state results show that, according to the simulation, the locus of 
conflict is clearly in Southeastern Europe, with the vast majority of the conflict 
coming between Italy, Serbia, Turkey and Austria-Hungary.  This begs the question of 
why war between Germany and France or the UK rarely happened in the simulation.  
One of the factors that causes the simulation to drive towards conflict is existing 
conflict.  In the historical data, there is little direct conflict between these states, other 
than military plans and posturing.  Years in which states only engaged in military 
planning activity were coded as peaceful, while only active threats in the MID data 
were coded as threats in the model.  Thus, the model does not pick up on these latent 
conflicts, even when conflicts start with states which are allied.  Here, as often occurs 
in real life, the state will not choose war simply because an allied state goes to war.  
Instead, states make their own judgments about the efficacy of war.   
Like the previous conflict charts, the following alliance charts show the 
percentage of dyad-years where formal military alliance was predicted by the 
simulation.  Even though, as stated in Chapter 3, the offer of alliance might 
incorporate the possibility of actions such as military staff talks or even an entente, the 
data in the following figure shows only the probability of formal military alliance. 
The patterns of alliance in the simulation are very similar to those found in the 
historical record.  The state-by-state alliance results clearly show the same types of 
dynamics that occurred in the actual case.  For example, the UK largely stays clear of 
alliance until 1912.  Italy backs out of the Triple Alliance and throws in with France.  
Germany and Austria-Hungary remain staunch allies, and Russia and France increase 
their probability of alliance throughout.   
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Figure 56:  Probabilities of Alliance (WW1 Case) 
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Conclusions and Observations: World War 1 Case 
The MEMORIS-2 simulation performed quite well in predicting the general 
tenor of the situation along with the patterns of conflict and alliance at the outbreak of 
World War I.  The ebb and flow of tension, levels of armaments, and threat of war 
generally matches up with the historical record.   
Additionally, comparing the yearly-results to the baseline level of threat shows 
a sudden and dramatic shift in the threat level around 1910.  The baseline threat vs. 
clusters figure below has been annotated with the corresponding cluster results for the 
years prior to and after 1910.  This shows that the corresponding perceived level of 
threat within the system underwent a dramatic shift around that time, with no “middle 
ground” between the perceptions of low levels of threat and high levels of threat.   
 
Figure 57:  Dramatic Shift in pre-WW1 Threat Level 
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While the simulation generally did well, the patterns of conflict did not quite 
match the historical experience.  The model accurately picked the players for the 
outbreak of the war, but did not capture the spread of war from Eastern to Western 
Europe.   This occurred for two reasons.  The first was discussed above, that the 
alliance structure in the model was not as tightly coupled as was the historical case.  
The UK, France, and Germany, in particular, could choose to “opt out” of the conflict 
in Eastern Europe, and mostly took that option rather than opting for war.  The second 
reason has to do with the coarseness of the alliance and conflict data.  The simulation 
data takes an all-or-nothing approach.  While wars can have differing costs and 
uncertain length, a state is either at war or not.  There is no middle ground of imminent 
threat between peace and war in the way in which the data were coded.  The alliance 
data shares the same limitation of being all or nothing.   
This model, naturally, shares the characteristics of all models: it is a greatly 
simplified version of reality, and as such any exact prediction is generally exactly 
wrong.  Further, this brief example can in no way be considered a definitive look at 
WWI – if for no other reason that I made no attempt to perform sensitivity analysis on 
the results.  The model does show fairly convincingly the general outlines of the 
situation, along with the probabilities of war and formal alliance among the players in 
the simulation.  That said, I think that it is fair to say that the model works as expected 
in the case of World War I.  With that result, I now turn to the Cold War Case.       
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Chapter Five: The Great War that Wasn’t:  The Cold War 
 
Introduction 
The period of the Cold War was remarkable for what did not happen.  Despite 
sharing many of the facets of the previous case, including great power rivalry, arms 
races, militarized disputes in far-flung corners of the world, and a lengthy period of 
armed standoff, the Cold War never did break into the apocalyptic conflict that so 
many feared.  Even though the sides came terrifyingly close to war on several 
occasions, the match was never lit.   
One of the most commonly-cited reasons for the failure to come to blows was 
the presence of nuclear weapons.  When I was at US Strategic Command, the standard 
briefing given to visitors included a slide showing war deaths as a percentage of 
population dropping significantly since the end of World War II.  To make sure the 
visitors got the point, the decrease was labeled “Impact of Nuclear Deterrence”.  I 
used that slide quite a number of times in my own briefings to various audiences 
around the country.   
Of course, no one knows for sure whether or not that contention is true.  
Nuclear war did not occur, but why?  Waiting for the proverbial “black swan” to 
appear probably is not a good answer in this particular case.  The following analysis 
will help gain some insight into the probability of war during the Cold War, and this 
will give some further data points to use to answer the question.   
The remainder of this chapter will follow the general procedure outlined in 
Chapter Four. 
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Data for the Simulation 
Yearly data was drawn from the Correlates of War databases for the period 
1947-1967, and was processed into MEMORIS-2 input format following the 
procedure for the World War I data.  The eight states were chosen based on their place 
in the National Military Capability rankings for that period.  The eight states were: 
US, Soviet Union, China, UK, France, West Germany, Japan, and India.  As in the 
World War I case, this leaves out some important players, but it does capture the 
major independent players in the Cold War alliance system, and those players have 
significant interactions with the other players.  For example, the next state on the list 
would have been Brazil, which really didn’t have much of a direct role in the Cold 
War at all.   
Creating the Simulation Baseline 
As in the previous two chapters, a simulation baseline was created to generate 
initial clusters of data and to validate that the baseline data matched expectations.   
The baseline runs started in 1947, with initial data for each state player as determined 
above.  Again, the simulation was initialized using 20 years of random data, which 
varied in level of threat according to the table below.   
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 Build Military Offer Alliance Threaten Build Economy 
Case 1 45% 5% 45% 5% 
Case 2 35% 15% 35% 15% 
Case 3 25% 25% 25% 25% 
Case 4 15% 35% 15% 35% 
Case 5 5% 45% 5% 45% 
Table 30:  Distribution of Initial Moves 
 
After the 20 years of initialization, the simulation was allowed to run for 50 years.  
Each set of simulation runs was replicated 1000 times.   
Once the simulation results were completed, data was collected as described in 
the previous two chapters.  The statistical summary of the data is shown in the table 
below.   
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis K-S 
Stat 
p-value 
TOTAL 5000 1432.71 286.57 547.70 2444.22 -0.169 -0.137 0.036 <.01 
CP 5000 972.07 178.79 322.61 1485.29 -0.302 -0.126 0.031 <.01 
RES 5000 87.99 79.39 14.25 464.15 1.446 1.041 0.207 <.01 
ALLY 5000 9.58 6.80 1.16 26.52 0.847 -0.632 0.158 <.01 
WAR 5000 2.55 1.63 0.08 7.20 0.642 -0.790 0.124 <.01 
Table 31:  Cold War Baseline Statistics 
As seen in previous results, the distributions for Resources, Ally and War are 
all positively skewed, which shows there are a number of values clustered at the low 
end of the range.  Additionally, the Resource value has high kurtosis, so that values of 
this variable are more concentrated toward the mean compared to the remaining 
variables, which are somewhat more spread out than the normal distribution.   
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Cluster Analysis of the Cold War Baseline 
The results of the simulation runs were normalized and then analyzed for 
clusters using the procedure in the previous chapter.  The data broke into distinct 
clusters as seen in the previous chapters.  As before, the clusters show similar 
dynamics to those already seen in this dissertation.  One cluster (Conflict) shows high 
levels of conflict, along with low levels of alliance, resources and combat power.  
Another cluster (Peaceful Alliance) shows low levels of war, high levels of alliance 
and resources, and mean levels of combat power.  The third cluster (Standoff) takes 
the middle ground.  Note that the levels of combat power for the War cluster are quite 
low, which again shows the impact of high levels of war on combat power.   
 
Figure 58:  Cold War Baseline Clusters 
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   CP Res Ally War Scheffé 
Conflict -1.08 -0.67 -0.85 1.23 <.0001 
Standoff 0.69 -0.33 -0.18 -0.37 <.0001 
Alliance 0.01 1.81 1.73 -0.99 <.0001 
R2 0.5939 0.8597 0.8472 0.7364 
 
F-test 3654 1513 13855 6981 
 
Significance <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
 
Figure 59:  Cold War Baseline Cluster Statistics 
As before, the distribution of clusters is quite distinct, with all variable 
differences highly significant across clusters, and the Scheffé test shows that the 
differences between clusters are also highly significant.  As in the World War I case, 
the distribution of clusters also changes as expected with increasing levels of threat, as 
shown in the figure and table below. 
 
Figure 60:  Cluster Distribution vs. Threat (CW Base Case) 
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 90% 
threat 
70% 
threat 
50% 
threat 
30% 
threat 
10% 
threat 
Total Test Value Signif. 
Conflict 956 521 68 3 0 1548 chi-sq 8013 <.0001 
Standoff 44 479 932 983 0 2438 contingency 
coeff 
0.7847  
Alliance 0 0 0 14 1000 1014 Cramer's v 0.8952  
      5000    
Table 32:  Cluster Distribution Statistics 
The distribution of clusters definitely shows the same general trend as in the 
previous chapters, with a strongly significant shift from War to Standoff to Peaceful 
Alliance as the threat level decreases.  Similarly, looking at the figure below shows 
how the mean simulation results change with the threat.  As seen in previous chapters, 
there is a near-perfect inversion of the values as the threat level changes from low to 
high.   
 
Figure 61:  Mean Values vs. Threat (Cold War Base Case) 
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just 1-2 conflicts.  Even though conflict is very scattered, it is enough to keep the 
players from shifting entirely to peacetime rates of growth, as shown below. 
 
Figure 62:  Cold War Alliance Example 
The “Standoff” example is virtually the same as seen in the World War I case: 
intermittent but generally low-level conflict, along with a shift away from economic 
growth to a balance between combat and economic power.  Note that this particular 
case includes one major conflict, with five players involved.   
 
Figure 63:  Cold War Standoff Example 
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The final example case shows the impact of constant conflict with an almost 
total shift of emphasis toward combat power.  The growth of the main players in the 
conflict is virtually flat, and this gives states who stay out of the conflict (such as India 
in this example) to surpass the other states.   
 
Figure 64:  Cold War "Conflict" Example 
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Similarly, the Cold War runs had to be between the end of World War II and the end 
of the Cold War.  Since 20 years of data were used for each simulation run, that also 
bounded the possible set of data for the runs, and thus the Cold War simulation runs 
begin in 1968 (1947 plus 20 years initialization).  After the discussion of the initial set 
of Cold War runs, an alternative method of initialization will be used to capture the 
initial part of the Cold War, but since the procedure is different, it will be discussed 
separately.   
Statistics for the resulting data are in the table below.  The combat power (CP) 
and Ally variables have negative kurtosis, meaning they are more spread out than the 
normal distribution, which will affect the performance of the clusters.  Note also the 
high positive skew and kurtosis for the War variable, which indicates that most values 
are concentrated at the low end of the range (few wars).   
Variable N Mean Std 
Dev 
Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis K-S 
Stat 
p-value 
TOTAL 4000 9088.26 6061.22 1256.03 67843.90 1.375 2.013 0.107 <.01 
CP 4000 869.40 393.82 137.92 2064.96 0.105 -0.824 0.059 <.01 
RES 4000 1904.84 1322.87 89.11 7186.19 0.783 0.074 0.089 <.01 
ALLY 4000 11.64 2.24 6.28 16.42 -0.504 -1.117 0.204 <.01 
WAR 4000 0.88 0.83 0.08 4.98 1.616 2.399 0.231 <.01 
Table 33:  Statistics for Yearly Runs (Cold War Case) 
 
 Cluster results: Cold War Historical Data 
Cluster analysis of the output data was performed using the same procedures in 
previous chapters.  As before, the data broke into three distinct clusters, generally 
corresponding to the previously described “Conflict”, “Standoff” and “Alliance” 
clusters.  The major difference is that the Alliance cluster has higher normalized levels 
of conflict than seen previously.  As pointed out above, the level of conflict was 
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tightly clustered at the low end of the spectrum, so even though it was higher than the 
Standoff cluster, the Alliance cluster still has a very low level of conflict.   
 
Figure 65:  Yearly Clusters (Cold War Case) 
 
 
 CP Res Ally War Scheffé 
Conflict 0.17 -0.83 -1.35 1.75 <.0001* 
Standoff 0.57 -0.45 0.03 -0.45 <.0001 
Alliance -0.99 1.12 0.6 -0.11 <.0001** 
R
2
 
0.4923 0.6242 0.3965 0.5839 
*n.s. for 
CP 
F-test 
1938 3320 1313 2805 
**n.s. for 
Ally 
Significance <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
 
Table 34:  Cluster Statistics (Cold War Years Case) 
 
As expected from the statistical values, even though the results for each 
variable are highly significant across the clusters, the Scheffé test shows that the 
difference between the central “Standoff” cluster was not significant in terms of the 
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between the “Standoff” and “Alliance” clusters was not significant on the Ally 
variable.  All other variable differences were significant at the .0001 level between 
clusters, so while not perfect, these clusters are sufficiently well-defined and distinct 
for analysis.   
 
Figure 66:  Cold War Clusters by Year 
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 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 Total 
Conflict 65 193 53 75 78 22 13 11 10 1 4 15 17 0 10 9 11 9 10 6 612 
Standoff 135 7 147 125 122 178 182 177 165 0 1 83 34 5 0 5 4 51 5 21 1447 
Alliance 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 12 25 199 195 102 149 195 190 186 185 140 185 173 1941 
                     4000 
Test Value Signif. 
chi-sq 4337 <.0001 
contingency 
coeff 
0.7212  
Cramer's v 0.7363  
Table 35:  Cluster Distribution by Year (Cold War Case) 
 
 
             Figure 67:  Variable Means by Year (Cold War) 
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The distribution of clusters in the Cold War case is virtually reversed from that 
of the World War I case.  Here, the first years of the simulation start out with a high 
degree of threat in the late 60s, but switches to a medium threat level during the 70s, 
then drops to a low threat level during the 80s.  The small peaks in conflict during late 
70s and 1986-1987 correspond to Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and subsequent 
Chinese abrogation of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Peace and Friendship and China-India 
border conflicts.   
The same general lessening of tension can be seen when looking at the 
variables themselves in Figure 67 above.  By the early 1970s, the general level of 
conflict is well below the mean, with only intermittent peaks above the mean, but still 
well below the situation prior to World War I.  Further, the alliance structure remains 
remarkably constant once it is formed.  This shows the overall stability of the Cold 
War alliance system among the major players.  Notice that the overall level of 
resources and combat power also changes at significant historical points, 
corresponding to the Reagan-era buildup and the subsequent “Peace Dividend”.   
These same trends are also reflected in the percentages of years of conflict.  As 
in the previous chapter, this was calculated by dividing the number of dyad-years with 
conflict into the number of total dyad-years.  The early part of the chart shows a 
relatively high (20%) percentage of conflict and then drops to a very low level, with 
the notable exceptions discussed previously.   
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Figure 68:  Percentages of Conflict (Cold War) 
 
This is a striking result, which gives the counter-intuitive impression (at least 
from the American point of view) that while the world tended to focus strictly on the 
superpower standoff, the real threat of war may well have come under the American 
radar.   
This might also be evidence of the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons.  Recall 
that the model payoff structure did not change between this case and the World War I 
case, so there is no special way in which nuclear weapons affects the calculations for 
or against a particular action in the simulation.  Thus, the conflict results could be 
taken as what would have been more likely to happen in the absence of nuclear 
weapons.   
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
Simulation Start Year
Predicted Percentage of Conflict-Years
US-Soviet
USSR-China
China-India
172  
The conflict picture by country also shows a somewhat different picture than 
expected.  Here, China and USSR have the highest overall probabilities of war, 
followed by the India and the US.  This reflects the proximity of China to two constant 
foes in border skirmishes: the USSR and India.   
 
Figure 69:  Conflict Percentage by Country 
    
The state-by-state conflict analysis shows essentially the same dynamics as 
discussed above, but gives more detail on which states were predicted to be at war at a 
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Figure 70:  State-by-State Probability of Conflict (Cold War) 
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Figure 71:  State-by-State Probability of Alliance (Cold War) 
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As seen in the figure above, the patterns of alliance remain quite constant 
throughout the simulation period.  The anomalous results of decreased probability of 
western alliance before 1972 are due to a coding issue which caused the historical data 
not to reflect the already existing alliance data.  Notice, however that the simulation 
effectively regenerated the alliance between NATO partners after just a few years.  
Also, note that the projected results show France’s occasional attempts at dalliance 
with the Soviet Union, along with India’s attempt at rapprochement with the Soviet 
Union in the 1970s.   
Capturing the First Years of the Cold War: Short-Initialization Runs 
While the simulation results capture the latter part of the Cold War very well, 
they do not capture the early part due to the need to initialize the model with 20 years 
of data.  One way out of this would be to just start the initialization in 1927 rather than 
1947, but the world situation changed so radically during that time that the 
initialization data would be fairly meaningless.   
Instead, I attempted a series of simulation runs with only five years of 
initialization data.  This allows the model to assess the period from the early 1950s on.  
One problem with this approach is that it produces results which change significantly 
from year to year.  This is because the short initialization period never allows the 
model to get any long-term data on the behavior of other actors in the system, and so 
the conditions at the end year of the initialization play an outsize role in where the 
simulation goes from there.  Because of this, the data is presented using 3-year moving 
averages to smooth out the response and allow for easier interpretation of the results.  
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Additionally, since this data is not of the same quality as previously discussed, I will 
only present a few key results instead of the entire set of data given above.   
The short-initialization runs created the same basic groups of clusters as seen 
before:  Conflict, Standoff, and Alliance.  As before, these clusters were distinct and 
highly significant across all variables using the F-test (p<.0001 for all variables).  
Also, as seen previously, the Scheffé test revealed that the clusters were generally 
distinct from each other, although the center cluster was not distinct from the other 
two clusters in one of the four variables.  Again, since the majority of the variables 
were statistically significant between clusters (p<.0001), the clusters are judged to be 
valid for the purposes of the analysis.   
The cluster distribution by year was strongly significant (Chi-Sq = 1214, 
p<.0001) and is shown in the figure below.   
 
Figure 72:  Early Cold War Cluster Distribution 
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As can be seen, the situation in the early 1950s was very threatening, but the 
threat levels drops significantly by the late 1950s, only to spike upward with the U2, 
Berlin Wall, and Cuban Missile Crisis in the early 60s.  Plotting the moving average of 
the mean values for each variable of this time period shows the same basic results.   
 
Figure 73:  Early Cold War Variable Means by Year 
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US military buildup during the Vietnam War, with a significant ramp-up in both US 
and Soviet military power, and to the strain that the conflict put on American allies.   
Similarly, the plot of the probability of conflict shows the pattern of ebb and 
flow in the level of the general threat.   
 
Figure 74:  Cold War Probability of Conflict 
 
The above chart combines the probability of conflict for both the main analysis 
and the short-initialization analysis runs.  The double line indicates the break between 
the two sets of runs.  Even though the early part of the chart is more “noisy”, key 
spikes in the probability of war can be seen after the general decrease in tension after 
the end of the Korean War.  The early 1960s saw a significant probability of war, 
between the U2 crisis, the Berlin Wall, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the formal entry 
of the US into the Vietnam War in 1964.   
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Conclusion and Observations: The Cold War Case 
As seen in the previous chapter, the MEMORIS-2 simulation captures the ebb 
and flow of conflict and alliance throughout the Cold War period fairly accurately.  
The increases and decreases in the probability of war match up well to the historical 
record.   Events such as the U2 shoot down, the Berlin Wall crisis, the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, Vietnam, the Sino-Soviet border wars, and the Sino-Indian wars are all 
reflected in the simulation predictions.   
One thing that is clear is that the dynamics were definitely different between 
World War I and the Cold War.  In the World War I analysis, there was a sudden and 
definite shift from a state of peace to a high probability of war.  During the Cold War, 
the general trend is a gradually decreasing probability of war, punctuated by 
intermittent crises.  As shown in the figure below, by looking at the distribution of the 
cluster predictions, it can be seen that the Cold War had three distinct periods.  The 
period of the early Cold War was marked by high-to-moderate, but gradually 
decreasing threat levels.  The period of the 1970s was one of moderate threat, and the 
latter years of the Cold War were generally low threat, with the exception of the Sino-
Soviet and Sino-Indian clashes.   
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Figure 75:  Decreasing Cold War Threat Levels 
 
The simulation did well in pointing out periods of conflict, but as mentioned 
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war at that time, but the vast majority of conflict during this period was limited to 
China and India.  This is an area that will bear more investigation in future analyses.   
As seen in the previous chapter, the simulation did very well in predicting the 
enduring patterns of alliance throughout the Cold War, along with the strains on US 
alliances during the Vietnam War.   While these results are very encouraging, this set 
of simulation runs really only included NATO and the US-Japanese alliances as long-
term fixtures.  The depth and longevity of these alliances is possibly unmatched in 
history, so future efforts comparing the performance of other alliances, such as the 
Warsaw Pact and other regionally-based alliances would be potentially quite useful.   
The role of nuclear weapons is another area for further study.  I speculated 
earlier that the fact that, in reality the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Indian wars did not spiral 
into general conflict might well have been due to the deterrent power of nuclear 
weapons.  In the first case, both sides were nuclear weapons states, and in the second, 
the Chinese did have nuclear weapons, and the Indian government was certainly 
capable of producing them ever since their so-called “Peaceful Nuclear Explosion” in 
1974.  This is also an area for further study, and I will have more to say about this 
during the concluding chapter of the dissertation.   
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Chapter Six: Observations and Conclusions 
 
Revisiting the Research Question 
I started this dissertation in an effort to better understand the process of 
decision-making, and specifically, to understand how the way our minds process data 
affects a decision maker’s actions.  I began the analysis with the intuition that there 
was an interaction between the decision space and the way in which information was 
processed by the decision-maker, and further, that this interaction could be simulated.  
Most important, that once the process could be simulated, the outcome could be 
probabilistically predicted.     
Specifically, once the simulation was built, I wanted to get the answers to the 
following questions:   
 Given starting conditions, can the probability of conflict be predicted? 
 If there is conflict, who are the likely participants, and on which side? 
 What is the structure of alliances?   
 What are the probabilities for each variation of the above results?   
The process of building and testing the MEMORIS-2 simulation shows that the 
way in which people mentally process information is important, if not critical, in 
determining the resulting decision.  This conclusion was validated during the two 
game theory tournaments in Chapter Three, along with the example cases of World 
War I and the Cold War in Chapters Four and Five.   
Performance of the Simulation 
When building models, it is important to remember that they are not reality.  
Models provide an explicit way to explore key variables and their relationships within 
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a given situation.  The MEMORIS-2 simulation is no different.  It takes a very limited 
set of input data and then simulates the interaction of states within that context.  The 
simulation does not provide an “answer” or point prediction of reality.  Instead, 
MEMORIS-2 shows how emergent behavior – which in this case is represented by 
choices for war or alliance, can emerge from the interaction between available 
information and the way that information is processed.  The tool of simulation allows 
these interactions to be repeated many times, and thus we can gain insight into both 
likely results and counterfactuals – particularly by seeing that the same situation can 
lead to multiple results.  Some of these results are more likely than others, and this can 
lead to better understanding of the relative risks inherent in a given situation or choice 
of actions.  Further, simulation allows the impact of specific factors to be explicitly 
tested rather than simply assumed.       
Nevertheless, any model must have some grounding in reality, and should be 
able to readily demonstrate some face validity otherwise it will not be accepted.  This 
was accomplished in several ways.  In the game theory setting, the memory-based 
simulation was at least equal to, if not superior to other strategies and heuristics.  This, 
I believe, is reflective of the ability of the human brain to recognize patterns and adapt 
to new situations.  This ability, which was embedded in the simulation, allowed the 
memory-based model to outperform other models, particularly when the situation was 
dynamic.   
Further, the memory-based simulation approach did not require me to make 
any particular assumptions about either the game structure or player preferences in 
order to determine player strategies.  The simulation was able to determine the game 
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structure from within, and to adjust play to gain the best results.  Preference structure 
within the game changed as the situation changed, so although there was a general 
preference to “do well”, the manifestations of that general preference changed based 
on the specific situation.   
Additionally, because the action of the memory trace model replicates the 
heuristics and biases in the decision-making literature, the simulation does not require 
any assumptions about the presence or absence of such heuristics and biases.  In 
effect, the MEMORIS-2 simulation probabilistically incorporates heuristics and 
biases.  To take a commonplace example, a casino does not need to know which 
strategy or “system” that a player is using to make bets – all the owners need to know 
is that, in the aggregate, the house will win a certain, calculable percentage of the 
money wagered.  Similarly, MEMORIS-2 predicts, in the aggregate, the probability of 
war vs. peace, alliance vs. non-alliance, and who will be involved in either conflict or 
alliance.   
In the two cases, the MEMORIS-2 simulation identified when conflict was 
likely, identified the initial players in the conflict, and identified the formal alliance 
structures.  As pointed out in Chapters Four, the simulation did not always identify the 
secondary players in the conflict, so even though the original flash point of the war 
was correctly identified as Eastern Europe, the other major powers usually sat out the 
conflict.   
Further, the simulation was unequivocal in differentiating between peace and 
war.  The end of the World War I simulation predicted conflict or the continuation of 
armed standoff with near certainty, while the end of the Cold War simulation 
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predicted a 90% chance of peace (and would have been higher absent the Sino-Indian 
wars).  This compares quite favorably to other results predicted in the literature.  For 
example, as previously noted in Chapter Two, expected utility modeling predicted a 
doubling in likelihood ratio for states liable to go to war, although the actual 
percentage was well less than 1%.  In contrast, the MEMORIS-2 prediction for war 
after 1910 is 30% per year, which translates into a six-fold increase in likelihood ratio 
compared to the pre-1910 state.  Similarly, the predicted probability of a peaceful end 
to the Cold War showed a likelihood ratio of 5 to 1.   
Implications for IR Theory 
The success of the MEMORIS-2 simulation has several implications for IR 
theory.  As mentioned in Chapter 2, both Realist and Liberal IR theory have well-
known problems in accounting for major systemic changes, particularly since both 
assume that states operate from a set of exogenously-given interests within a defined 
international system.   The results of this dissertation directly challenge these 
underlying assumptions, and instead demonstrate that conflict and cooperation, along 
with change and continuity, can result from the same cognitive processes and the same 
given situation.   
Further, the underlying logic of MEMORIS-2 does not require normative 
assumptions or beliefs about how states should act, as is the case with both Realism 
and Liberalism.  Instead, it shows in a replicable way how states probably will act in a 
given situation.  The analysis shows that both structure and interest are malleable, 
even within the context of a game where payoffs for given actions are constant.    
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Even staying within the realist or liberal paradigm, the MEMORIS-2 
simulation offers the opportunity to explicitly test the operation of several mechanisms 
that have been contested within those paradigms.  For example, the question of what 
causes states to ally with each other can be explored via sensitivity analysis of the 
various parameters in the model, such as pursuit of relative vs. absolute gains, and the 
tendency to bandwagon or balance.  By varying these factors, the probability that 
states will or will not ally with others in various situations can be calculated, and this 
may help clarify the debate on alliance formation within the realist community.  
Similarly, sensitivity analysis on these factors could provide increased clarity in other 
contested areas of both realist and liberal theory.   
This simulation approach could also be used to explore the working of 
reputation.  In the MEMORIS-2 simulation, reputation is not a separate variable, but 
the action of reputation is an emergent property which is developed through 
interaction.  Further, the working of reputation appears to be non-monolithic – state 
reputation in the combat power part of the simulation is different than that in the 
resource part of the simulation.  While the two examples used in this dissertation were 
not explored in enough depth to make any specific judgments, further analysis could 
gain traction on whether states with given reputations are more effective than states 
with opposite reputations.   
I think that the main impact of this work will be in the area of Constructivism.  
One of the main critiques that constructivists have leveled at other theories is that they 
assume that rational choice, which is based on economic modes of analysis, is the way 
that best describes how states should act.   As has been pointed out above, the 
187    
assumptions underlying the belief that humans act as homo economicus are highly 
suspect, and even instrumental rationality cannot salvage them.   
The issue for Constructivism is that it has previously lacked tools to formally 
and explicitly explore how the interaction between actors shapes actor identities, 
interests, and the overall structure.  By showing how this interaction occurs 
cognitively, the MEMORIS-2 simulation is a starting point for further development of 
tools that are not based in untenable assumptions of rational-economic analysis, but 
instead are based on cognitive processes which are shared by all humans.   
Further, this tool can be used to explore the previously undiscovered terrain of 
how structure and interest are determined, and what set of interests and structure is 
likely to emerge from a given situation.             
Implications for Policy Makers 
The most important application of the MEMORIS-2 simulation is that it 
answers an important question for policy makers.  When a situation occurs, there are 
plenty of voices within the policy process who are more than willing to tell the 
decision maker what action should be taken.  While a decision maker may chafe at the 
unwanted advice, with the (partially warranted) view that it is one thing to propose 
action and another to bear the consequences of ordering that action, the multitude of 
viewpoints can serve a positive end by adding to the possibility that important factors 
will not end up being overlooked.   
Nevertheless, the weakness of policy advice based on what should be done is 
that the assessment of what will result is inextricably intertwined with the judgment of 
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what should be done.  Causes and effects are linked, and so a policy prescription based 
on a given analysis will undoubtedly predict an outcome based on that same analysis.   
What this mode of predicting results misses is that each action and interaction 
creates a new reality, and the resulting situation may turn on a different axis of policy.  
If this is not true, then why is the “law of unintended consequences” the only practical 
maxim that everyone believes in?     
The need for decision makers is clear – a way to help them understand the 
question that no one can answer conclusively: what will happen if I choose this action?  
This requires the ability to assess how the situation will develop dynamically, and to 
predict how the given set of actions will change the picture for other players in the 
system.  MEMORIS-2 will allow such a decision aid to be developed.  By its ability to 
repeatedly simulate the complex interaction between the situation, information, and 
how that information is processed, MEMORIS-2 demonstrates that the ability to 
probabilistically predict the likely outcomes of a given set of actions is within reach.   
This is not only useful as a set of probable outcomes, but also will help quantify the 
relative risk of a proposed action.    
Beyond the potential to create a decision aid for policy makers, I want to return 
to the first figure of the dissertation, which is reproduced below.  Initially, I posited a 
dynamic model of emergent behavior for entry into war, as shown in the figure below. 
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Figure 76:  Notional Systems States 
 
My intuition was that as a state or states approaches conflict or other 
instability, the system enters a “crossover zone” when actions which formerly may 
have been stabilizing now become destabilizing, and the situation can escalate with 
little or no warning.  Here, actions which one side views to be prudent instead are 
viewed by the other side as threatening.  This insight is not new, but the fact that the 
MEMORIS-2 simulation can show when a group of states enters that zone is new.   
Further, the insight that players can shift preference structures based on the situation is 
also new. 
This situation can be seen with reference to the World War I example.  In the 
pre-1910 state, the simulation showed that the European system was in a general 
peaceful state, perhaps tense but with low threat.  Within a very short time, the threat 
escalated to very high levels, and conflict appeared nearly certain – the only question 
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was what would set it off.  This sudden shift in the level of threat is shown in the 
figure below from Chapter Four.   
 
Figure 77:  WW1 Sudden Shift in Threat Level 
 
This state of affairs is due to the way in which information is processed.  
Without re-plowing the ground on the discussion in Chapter Three, the impact of the 
process of information search and retrieval is generally confirmatory, which pushes 
the system toward incrementalism and maintaining the status quo as the normal 
pattern, as judgments will tend to shift incrementally.  While moving incrementally, 
this confirmatory information search also implies a positive feedback loop, causing 
judgments to diverge from reality as conflicting information is initially overlooked.  
This positive feedback can occur unchecked for some time.  This dynamic can, as seen 
in the World War I case, create the situation where states end up going to war, not 
because the decision makers want to, but because they see no other alternative.   
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This is also in reflected in the shifts in player preferences as the crossover zone 
is reached.  Before the crossover zone is reached, player preference is usually toward 
non-threatening behavior.  When the crossover zone is reached, the perception of a 
new situation also causes a shift in preferences to more “defensive” actions, such as 
military buildups and pre-emptive threats.   
Change in the system occurs once the set of contradictory information becomes 
too large, or once the set of confirmatory information is effectively forgotten.  Either 
of these will cause the hypothesis used to probe memory to change. The judgment 
about a given situation will then rapidly shift as the “crossover zone” is reached and 
the decision maker sees previous information in a new light.  This rapid shift in 
judgment will likely be accompanied by a rapid shift in policy, which will cascade 
through the system until a new equilibrium is reached, leading to another period of 
relative stability.   
Similarly, the situation on the back half of the instability curve (Figure 76) 
shows a move from relative instability and high levels of threat to lower levels of 
threat as the system reaches a new equilibrium.  This is arguably what happens in the 
Cold War, as predicted by the simulation.  This can be seen in the figure below, from 
Chapter Five. 
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Figure 78:  Cold War Threat Distribution 
 
The above figure shows the pre-1970 state of high threat, gradually 
transitioning through the moderate threats of the 1970s, and then to a relatively stable 
situation after that.   
There are two lessons which can be potentially drawn from this.  The first is 
that actions taken within the crossover zone are very likely to be misunderstood.  The 
MEMORIS-2 simulation has the ability to predict when the system is entering such a 
zone, and so could be used as a policy-support tool to show when the situation is in 
danger of getting out of hand.  As shown in World War I, actions that seemed prudent 
to one side were deemed as immediate threats to the other.  While this dynamic has 
been predicted in earlier work on the security dilemma, the difference here is that such 
a dilemma can emerge spontaneously based on the shifting perception of the situation, 
rather than from any overt material factors.  Again, this occurs because the interaction 
of the players causes a shift in the structure of interest and therefore a change in the 
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structure of the system.  This change only occurs when the perception of the decision 
space and the menu of possible choices begin to feed back on each other – once this 
occurs the decision space shrinks as choices are seen in a different light, which further 
shrinks the perceived decision space, and so on.  As seen, this can happen with 
bewildering rapidity, and once the crossover zone is reached, the decision-makers find 
themselves girding for war not because they want to, but because they see no other 
choice.   
The decision-maker, then, needs to be very careful when approaching the 
crossover zone – and further, needs to take actions to actively dampen the crisis rather 
than “just in case” preparations that may only serve to push the situation over the 
edge.  Mistakes then can happen very quickly, and there may be no pulling back once 
that happens.   
The second lesson is to avoid repeatedly “pushing the envelope”.  There is a 
tendency here to think that, now that the crossover zone can be predicted, that an 
aggressive decision-maker would try to push the situation right up to the edge of the 
zone in the hope of making the other party blink.  In flying, the winner of the fight is 
often the one who can fly the airplane right to the proverbial “edge of the envelope”, 
where the rumble of buffet in the stick lets you know that you are getting maximum 
performance out of the airplane, but any further back pressure will put you out of 
control.  The danger here is that you can lose the fight by simply being too aggressive.  
The danger is even higher in the decision-making arena, particularly when it comes to 
war.  The MEMORIS-2 simulation models cognitive processes, not aerodynamics, so 
despite the fact that the predictions turn out to be well-behaved numerically, the 
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margin of error is still significant, and so it is better to err on the side of caution than 
to push the envelope. This runs contrary to the idea of “brinkmanship” from 
deterrence theory.  Instead of showing resolve, the repeated practice of brinkmanship 
can lead to disaster – the point of no return is probably closer than we know.  That 
said, the use of MEMORIS-2 or a follow-on simulation can help show when that 
crossover zone is being approached, or even if it has already been entered without 
knowing it.   
Implications for Nuclear Deterrence 
One of the most important, if not the most important unanswered questions of 
the Cold War is that of the efficacy of nuclear deterrence.  As stated previously, many 
scholars and policy makers, myself included, have asserted that nuclear weapons kept 
the peace.  I would not have spent the years I did on nuclear alert, ready to deliver 
those weapons, if I had not believed it to be true.  There are, thankfully, no data points 
to the contrary.   
The comparison of the World War I and Cold War results does, however, show 
some tantalizing evidence to the contrary, as seen in the figure below.   
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Figure 79:  Combined Probability of Conflict 
  
Here, I have overlaid the probability of conflict chart for the Cold War case 
with the probability of conflict during 1911-1914.  As can be seen, the Cold War 
probability of conflict only reaches that point during the Korean War, but does come 
within 5% during the early 1960s.  This could be interpreted as showing that the 
probability of war was consistently below, and usually well below the pre-WW1 level 
for the entire period of the Cold War.  Thus, the probability of conflict, although 
terrifying in spots, never reached the point at which war would have become virtually 
certain as it did prior to WW1.  Taking this reasoning to its conclusion would indicate 
that since the probability of war was lower, then the role of nuclear weapons in 
keeping the peace may well have been overstated.   
Further, the predicted probability of conflict between the US and USSR was 
quite low – less than 5% for most of the Cold War period (Figure 70, Chapter 5).  This 
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that time, which would also provide ammunition to discount the deterrent value of 
nuclear weapons.   
There is one potential problem with this line of reasoning, and that is that 
nuclear weapons did exist, and the current simulation does not allow me to unpack 
their potential role in limiting the extent and violence of the actual crises in the 
historical record.   For example, absent US nuclear weapons, the Soviets may well 
have decided to simply take Berlin in a coup de main rather than settling for blockade 
in 1948.  Whether this would have triggered general war absent nuclear weapons in 
another issue, as neither side may have had the stomach for large-scale war so soon 
after the devastation of WWII.   
This argument can be stood on its head though.  Absent the nuclear standoff, 
would some of the major crises of the Cold War even have been crises?  It is hard to 
imagine that shooting down a reconnaissance plane would be grounds for all-out war.  
Nor is it easy to imagine how Khrushchev would have been able to covertly deploy 
significant combat power to Cuba in 1962 absent nuclear weapons.   
Nevertheless, the MEMORIS-2 simulation does not capture the existential 
threat posed by nuclear weapons, and so the tantalizing possibility that nuclear 
deterrence was not needed to keep the sides from all-out war is just that.   
Avenues for Future Research 
Although this dissertation answers an important question and advances the 
understanding of decision-making behavior, it also raises several other questions and 
avenues for further study.   
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First, there is the issue of nuclear deterrence.  It would be fairly straightforward 
to try to gauge the impact of nuclear weapons by changing the game payoff structure 
for nuclear-armed states, and then comparing the results of that simulation with the 
current Cold War results.  If the revised simulation showed lower levels of conflict 
along with decreased conflict between nuclear-armed powers, it would indicate that 
the existential threat of nuclear weapons did have a damping effect on the escalation 
of conflict.   Contrariwise, it is entirely possible that higher levels of conflict may 
result, and that would indicate that, rather than be a stabilizing factor, nuclear weapons 
may be destabilizing.    
 Another avenue for research is in the area of alliances.  While the 
MEMORIS-2 simulation was remarkably accurate in predicting enduring patterns of 
alliance, it did not entirely capture the effect of alliances on bringing other states into 
World War I.  This could mean several things.  One is that the entry, in particular, of 
Germany into the war was not a foregone conclusion.  That seems unlikely, given the 
historical record, but bears further analysis.  Another is that the alliance ties between 
states are not properly implemented, and the simulation logic needs further adjusting 
to account for such situations.  A third and more interesting idea is that there is a 
difference in capability or focus between states.  This would mean, for example, that 
states may be more or less likely to be concerned with relative gains, and that would in 
turn impact their propensity for conflict.  In another example, states may also have 
greater or lesser capability to properly assess the situation.  Both of these cases are 
controlled by parameters within the situation.  During the dissertation runs, these 
parameters were kept constant after their initial tuning, but future efforts to perform 
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sensitivity analysis using these parameters would yield more insight into their role in 
alliance behavior.   
As mentioned previously, the simulation could also be used to compare various 
regionally-based alliances to see if the patterns shown in the two dissertation cases 
hold for other alliances.  It is more likely that other alliances would have differing 
results, and thus the simulation could perform some interesting comparative analysis.   
Similarly, the performance of the MEMORIS-2 simulation could be validated 
against other regions of interest.  There are many historical and possibly future 
regional wars that could be studied.  Also, the model could be scaled up to take on 
more players, which only takes either faster hardware or more efficient code to make 
possible.  In this vein, the model could also be scaled down to sub-state levels to look 
at the interaction of actors in revolutionary or ethnic conflicts.   
Finally, one of the issues in International Relations theory is the lack of tools 
such as game-theoretic or expected utility that can operate within the context of 
Constructivism.  Here, the MEMORIS-2 simulation, when extended, offers the 
opportunity to create a quantitative modeling foundation to explicitly simulate the 
relationship between social discourse and structure.  This could give an avenue to 
answer the nagging questions of how certain value structures become dominant within 
the international system. 
Final Remarks 
There are several important differences between the basis of the MEMORIS-2 
simulation and other approaches.  The first is that the same process (probes of 
memory) and the same data (traces in memory and semantic concepts) is used 
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throughout.  There is, therefore, no need to determine which bias or heuristic is 
operational, or to determine the decision-maker’s affective state.  The judgment about 
the situation at hand is effectively framed by the probes of memory.  Further, there is 
no need to make a priori judgments about the game or player utility functions, as both 
likelihood and utility judgments are calculated based on existing traces in memory and 
the way in which those traces are probed.  Instead of a rational choice or expected 
value simulation, it is a way to simulate complex social judgment and interaction.     
Further, this type of simulation offers the ability to aid policy makers by 
allowing probabilistic judgments of what will happen if a given policy choice is taken.  
Such judgments will not suffer the weakness of judgments which are based on a given 
policy prescription and thus assume that the set of factors which operated before the 
action will operate equally after the action.  An assessment of what will occur, even a 
probabilistic one, along with the relative risk of things going wrong, will be an 
invaluable tool to policy makers.   
As such, MEMORIS-2 and the follow-ons outlined above offers a solid 
platform and departure point for future efforts.  This dissertation has shown that the 
tool works in a variety of settings.  One tool is certainly not enough – otherwise our 
tool boxes would be much smaller – but this appears to be a very flexible and 
extensible tool that can serve a variety of purposes. I look forward to extending that 
tool in the near future.   
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